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FOG
No king, no law; no peace and no war
Defines the essence and existence
This dim sparkling of the land
Which is Portugal saddening
The glow without light and without burning,
As what the corpse will-o’-the-wisp holds.
No one knows what they want.
No one knows the soul they carry,
Nor what is evil nor what is good.
(What distant anxiety nearby weeps?)
All is uncertain and ultimate
All is sparse, nothing is whole.
Oh, Portugal, today you are fog…
It is Time!
Fernando Pessoa
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Figure 1: Romains de la décadence (Thomas Couture 1847)
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Abstract
The thesis starts with a historical analysis of the development of depression as a concept. 
Through this inquiry, the controversies behind the apparent consensus about depression’s 
etiology and treatment are illuminated, suggesting that the understanding of the climbing 
rates of depression in contemporary Western civilization is still up for grabs. That’s what 
the thesis sets out to investigate. In order to accomplish this aim, the study builds upon 
the classical accounts of Georg Simmel,  Émile Durkheim and the more contemporary 
ideas  of  Dany-Robert  Dufour,  in dialogue with an array of  supplementary theoretical 
sources.  Navigating  through  this  ‘sea’ of  extraordinary  and different  theories,  a  new 
avenue of reflections arises,  contributing for the sophistication of the questions  made 
about the phenomenon of depression’s rates. The fundamental argument emerging from 
this theoretical undertaking is that ‘crises of meaninglessness’ that pervade the collective 
body of Western contemporary societies have, as one of its consequences, the expansion 
of  depression  rates.  Meaninglessness  in  contemporary times  is  the  primary object  of 
investigation of the thesis. The concept, in the context of this study, is not understood as 
merely an effect  of  the historical  decline of shared social  norms due to  processes of 
individualization.  Rather,  it  is  claimed,  it  originates  from  and  is  reinforced  by  the 
‘political-economic theology of neo-liberalism’ which becomes virtually generalized in 
the West, erecting money as a God. The study concludes that by undermining culturally 
established values, ideals, institutions and principles that may block the dissemination of 
commodities  this  new transcendence has  been challenging the task of  signifying life, 
potentializing – among other subjective difficulties – the diffusion of depression.
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Introduction
The  concern  with  the  theme  of  the  increasing  prevalence  of  depression  in 
contemporary societies is closely related to my professional background.
I  have  an  undergraduate  Degree  in  Psychology  and  my  career  path  as  a 
psychologist has been marked by an interest in the clinical and the sociological fields.
These two domains are, of course, deeply connected. The clinical psychologist 
deals with a ‘being-in-the-world’, a socially constituted individual. In my experience as a 
psychotherapist,  it  has  always  been  clear  that  clinical  understanding  could  only  get 
perspective through sociological knowledge.
This perception led me to do the Masters in Psychosociology on the subject of 
jealousy in contemporary love relationships. Having at that time established a practice 
with  people  experiencing  compulsive  forms  of  jealousy,  I  realized  that  a  deeper 
understanding  of  their  discourse  would  be  greatly  potentialized  through  sociological 
sensitivity  to  the  cultural  environment  within  which  their  relationships  were  being 
constituted.
The research led to the conclusion, to state it briefly, that contemporary  jealousy 
configures itself as a feeling and an attitude that seems to reveal and, somehow, to cope 
with the multiple, flexible and plural state of love relationships in conditions of social 
deregulation.  Further,  the  study  suggested  that  contemporary  pathological  forms  of 
jealousy can  be understood within societies  which,  in  the  West,  become increasingly 
organized around consumerism and linked superficiality fueled by media discourses of 
ego-glorification and by a culture based on disposability of objects, experiences and, also, 
of people.
The move to depression as a topic of interest  was, again, an effect of clinical 
concern with a problem surfacing with growing frequency in psychological practice and 
debate.  In addition to this,  the increased number of reports  on the media (newspaper 
news,  magazines,  television  programs,  documentaries  and  so  on)  disseminating  a 
reductionist  biomedical  view  about  depression  –  largely  assimilated  by  lay  people  - 
started to capture my sociological imagination.
Regarding academic  studies  on depression in  the  psychiatric  domain,  I  would 
soon  find  out,  even  though  different  and  sometimes  concurring  theories  were  being 
advanced, the biomedical perspective has also been the dominating paradigm. That is, 
despite  ‘scientific controversies’ on the physiological etiology of depression,  both the 
media and the academy are disseminating the purportedly consensual idea that this is a 
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biological condition - more specifically,  a chemical dysfunction of the brain - which, 
nowadays, can and should be treated through medication.
As  we are  going to  analyze  in  the  first  chapters  of  the  thesis,  this  is  a  false 
consensus. In reality, the whole discursive field wherein the phenomenon of depression is 
located is fragmented, composed by disputing perspectives and numerous inconclusive 
hypotheses.
The  definitive  understanding  of  depression  -  and  its  climbing  rates  in  the 
contemporary epoch – is therefore, despite the apparent consensus, still up for grabs.
My purpose in resuming the debate is not, however, to overcome contradictions 
and reach any kind of definitive answer. I am not pursuing ultimate and generalizable 
responses. Rather, I believe (and expect) that this study may contribute to sophisticate the 
questions made, and enrich the explanations given thus far about the phenomenon of the 
rampant rates of depression in contemporary Western societies.
Indeed, I think that anyone searching for explanations should take the complexity 
of the depressive suffering with serious consideration.
Talking about his experience, Andrew Solomon touchingly expresses the hurting 
intensity of depressive pain:
In the  tightest  corner  of  my bed,  split  and racked by this  thing  no one else 
seemed to be able to see, I prayed to a God I had never entirely believed in, and 
I asked for deliverance. I would have been happy to die the most painful death, 
though I was too dumbly lethargic even to conceptualize suicide. Every second 
of being alive hurt me. Because this thing had drained all fluid from me, I could 
not even cry. My mouth was parched as well. I had thought that when you feel 
your worst your tears flood, but the very worst pain is the arid pain of total 
violation that comes after the tears are all used up, the pain that stops up every 
space through which you once metered the world, or the world, you. This is the 
presence of major depression (2001, p. 19).
Such a life-destroying agony should  impose,  I  think,  intellectual  humility and 
watchfulness as to avoid forcing the reality of the illness – always subjective, certainly 
variable  and  pluri-determined  –  to  fit  into  the  moulds  of  a  reductionist  theoretical 
approach.
Nevertheless,  new avenues  of  reflection  should  and need to  be  opened.  First, 
because the above mentioned lack of sociological sensitivity that marks the dominating 
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views  about  depression  rates  has  been  muting  a  range  of  socially  and  politically 
meaningful  questions.  Second, the spreading ‘silence’ about  the social  and existential 
levels of depression is very much in line with and telling of the pathogenic aspects of the 
contemporary social order which, we claim, underlie depression’s expansion in Western 
civilization.
It is also important to remark that the thesis does not intend to understand the 
phenomenon of depression in all its aspects. Rather, the ensuing reflections are specific to 
the sociological profile of depression´s elevated rates, analyzing its significance within 
the collective state of affairs of Western contemporary societies.
Although the research privileges  the sociological  strand of  concerns,  we are not 
arguing that depression is, merely, a social effect. Rather, it would be better conceived as 
a phenomenon which is expressive of each individual as a whole. Within this always 
unique whole, the sociological aspect – acknowledging the fact that individuals are not 
only influenced but constituted within society – is one element interplaying with others in 
hardly separable interconnections.
Still, within this sociological level of analysis, I should remark that even though the 
thesis  focuses  on  ‘crises  of  meaninglessness  in  contemporary Western  societies’,  the 
existence of disparate phenomena varying either cross-culturally within the West, or in 
different strata of a single society, is recognized.
The phenomenon of depression is not envisaged in this study as a self-contained 
and strictly defined experience that remains invariable independently of either individuals 
who suffer from them, or the plurality of cultural programs that change in resonance to 
time and space.
This means to conceive of depression as a particular experience for each unique 
individual who is experiencing it within each unique cultural context. Nevertheless, these 
experiences often preserve some commonality which constitute the ‘family resemblances’ 
that they share with one another.
Our aim is to investigate these “familiar resemblances” (Wittgenstein 2001) of 
‘different depressions’, under sociological lens.
Another aspect to be considered is the thesis’ stance on the concept of depression 
per se. More specifically, the thesis’ viewpoint on the distinction between, on the one 
side, non-pathological kinds of depressive states – sometimes referred as ‘intense sadness 
/ anguish’ and ‘alienation’ - and on the other, depression as a pathological disturbance.
This is a pressing issue for studies on depression. For any academic incursion on 
the  theme  is  expected  to  answer  questions  such  as:  “what  exactly  does  the  term 
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‘depression’ stand for in this study?”; “is it referring to depression as a mood disorder in 
the  manners  defined  by  The Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders 
(DSM)?”;  “if  not,  how are the boundaries between pathological  and non-pathological 
depressive experiences defined?”
In order to determine the thesis’ response to these questions, I need to introduce, 
here, a few observations that will be further developed in chapter 2.
First, I believe that the boundaries between a disordered (pathological) and a non-
disordered (non-pathological) depressive state is an important step towards addressing 
fundamental medical and social issues. For instance, as Wakefield (1992) notes, such a 
boundary  helps  to  establish  the  responsibilities  of  mental  health  professionals 
discriminating them from those specific to domains outside the medical field. Thus, the 
definition of what is pathological is fundamental in order to avoid – or at least to resist 
against  -  the  socially  troublesome  and  economically  onerous  medicalization  of  non-
pathological mental states.
There  is  a  second,  more  controversial  issue  on  the  demarcation  between 
‘pathological’ and ‘normal’ depressive  experiences.  An influential  perspective  on  this 
regard is represented by Allan V. Horwitz and Jerome C. Wakefield. The authors defend 
the  view  that  pathological  depression  is  a  result  of  a  malfunctioning  psychological 
mechanism  as  designed  by  nature,  acknowledging,  however,  that  what  is  deemed  a 
disorder  varies  in  each  cultural  setting  in  accordance  with  specific  societal  values 
(Horwitz & Wakefield 2007). In contrast, when depressive symptoms emerge in response 
to social factors, not being associated to a natural malfunctioning, they argue, what is at 
stake is a non-pathological depressive state. The argument is more sophisticated than this, 
and we will have the opportunity to elaborate on it later.
Important  here  is  to  say that  the  thesis  adopts  a  sociological  perspective  that 
cancels the dichotomy between individual and society. From such a point of view, all 
individual  experiences  occur  in  a  constitutive  collective  background.  Hence,  either 
intense sadness, other different forms of non-pathological anguish, alienation etc., or a 
more  rigid-type  of  pathological  depression  are  equally  constituted  within  a  social 
scenario that not only influences but constitutes these experiences.
In  sum,  even  though  we  concede  that  the  conceptual  discrimination  between 
pathological and non-pathological forms of depression has clinical and social value, the 
social  factors  we  will  analyze  here  underlie  both  types.  The  following  sociological 
analysis  applies,  thereby,  for  either  pathological  or  non-pathological  depressive 
experiences.
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Having clarified such peripheral aspects, I can now turn to issues lying at the core 
of this study.
The initial questions capturing my sociological imagination would sound like this: 
If there is a ‘social voice’ to be restituted to the growing number of diagnosed depression 
in our time, which voice is this? What is this phenomenon saying (both as an experience 
that  is  becoming  increasingly  common  and  as  a  concept  prevalently  defined  as  a 
biological condition)?
At the back of my mind, a more specific question was: If compulsive jealousy - as 
my previous investigation suggested - should be sociologically understood as a kind of 
adaptive response to  conditions  of  plurality and openness,  how should  depression  be 
perceived in such a context? In other words, if a person dominated by intense jealousy is 
actively  and  compulsively  attempting  to  fill  her  relationship  with  control  and 
predictability, what are the increasing rates of depressive suffering ‘telling’ us? What are 
depressed people attempting to say – although silently and (apparently) in a passive way - 
about our life in common through their barely speakable pain that often makes action 
seem impossible?
A  cluster  of  insightful  theoretical  accounts  from  both  classical  and  more 
contemporary scholars were the fundamental tools that, carefully handled, helped me to 
open the way through the ‘silence’.
Notably, the classical accounts of Georg Simmel, Émile Durkheim and the more 
contemporary ideas of Dany-Robert Dufour were continuous ‘theoretical pointers’ along 
this  path,  in  dialogue  with  many  other  secondary  but  equally  important  theoretical 
sources. These sources ranged from the domain of social theory (authors such as Alain 
Ehrenberg,  Richard  Sennett,  Christopher  Lash,  Philip  Rieff,  Charles  Taylor,  Nikolas 
Rose, Hartmut Rosa and others) to the domain of philosophy and literature (Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Walter Benjamin, Georg Lukács, Fyodor Dostoyevsky), the anthropological 
and historical domains (Mary Douglas and Mircea Eliade).
To navigate into this ‘sea’ of extraordinary, but sometimes contradictory (or even 
concurring) ideas was in no way an easy task, demanding necessary discriminations and 
the continuous need to determine, check and sometime rectify my own point of view after 
new  discoveries.  But  it  was  certainly  a  pleasing  and  enriching  theoretical  journey. 
Progressively, the construction of a new avenue of reflections was taking shape.
The central theme that emerged from this inquiry in search for the sociological 
profile of depression in contemporary Western civilizations was the issue of meaning.
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Meaninglessness – although not being explicitly referred in the  The Diagnostic  
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM V)1 – returns over and over in the 
discourse of people experiencing depression. As one finds in Elizabeth Wurtzel’s memoir:
That's the thing I want to make clear about depression: It's got nothing at all 
to do with life. In the course of life, there is sadness and pain and sorrow, all  
of  which,  in  their  right  time  and  season,  are  normal  --  unpleasant,  but 
normal.  Depression  is  an  altogether  different  zone  because  it  involves  a 
complete  absence:  absence  of  affect,  absence  of  feeling,  absence  of 
response, absence of interest.  The pain you feel in the course of a major 
clinical depression is an attempt on nature's part (nature, after all, abhors a 
vacuum) to fill up the empty space. But for all intents and purposes, the 
deeply depressed are just the walking, waking dead (1997, p. 19).
Or again, with Andrew Solomon:
In depression, the meaninglessness of every enterprise and every emotion, 
the meaninglessness of life itself, becomes self-evident. The only feeling 
left in this loveless state is insignificance (2001, p. 15).
The  thesis  is  thus  a  sociological  theoretical  effort  towards  understanding  the 
growing emergence of life-destroying feelings of meaninglessness throughout society - 
manifested,  among  other  pathological  forms,  and  perhaps  most  explicitly,  in  the 
burgeoning rates of depression.
The basic idea underlying such an inquiry is  that when  some people,  at  some 
point of their  lives,  feel  engulfed by sentiments of life´s insignificance that underlies 
depressive pain, both subjective and collective elements are in question.
For  issues  of  significance  and meaning –  as  we will  see in  greater  length  in 
chapter 4 – involve not only personal choices and private perspectives (as the current 
dominating discourse about values articulates). Rather, they are rooted within the socially 
constituted narratives in which individuals find the answers for the questions of meaning 
and reasons for action.
1 In the Manual, the issue is implicit in what is described as an essential feature of Major 
Depressive Episode: “Loss of interest or pleasure is nearly always present, at least to 
some  degree.  Individuals  may  report  feeling  less  interested  in  hobbies,  "not  caring 
anymore,"  or  not feeling any enjoyment  in  activities that  were previously considered 
pleasurable” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
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The  thesis  will  thus  theoretically  elaborate  a  sociological  understanding  of 
contemporary  civilizations  that  aims  to  analyze  why  ‘crises  of  meaninglessness’  - 
sometimes  leading  to  depression  -  have  been  emerging  in  increasing  frequency  in 
Western  contemporary  civilizations.  In  other  words,  the  thesis  aim  is,  primarily,  to 
analyse the conditions underpinning the alleged ‘crises of meaninglessness’ that pervades 
the  contemporary  Western  civilization.  Secondarily,  it  intends  to  examine  weather 
depression figures, in such a context, as one of the typical subjective ‘responses’.
From the outset, it is necessary to remark that these reflections don’t subscribe to 
a  view  of  the  contemporary  epoch  as  a  time  when  historical  processes  altered  the 
structures of Western societies to a point wherein any dominant pattern of culture is able 
to impose itself and thus, a time when the minimum basis for meaning is lacking.
Drawing on Simmel’s sensibility for the molecular processes of life, and avoiding 
the temptations of ordered but over-simplified views, the thesis acknowledges that if self-
centeredness,  egoism,  competitiveness,  consumerism,  limitlessness  and  forms  of 
symbolic impoverishment due to the blurring of ideals and values can be recognized as 
part of the contemporary experience, this is not the whole picture. Rather, the dedication 
to collective concerns, feelings of commonness and other socially binding motors such as 
‘giving’ and ‘gratitude’ – the latter being used here in Simmel’s sense of the “… moral 
memory of humanity” (Simmel 1950, p. 388) – still provide some stability to the fluid  
world of contemporary social relations.
Further, as chapter 7 brings to discussion, the thesis concedes the moral potential 
of individualism. However, the fact that contemporary agents live in a cultural habitat 
wherein they are expected (at least in principle) to be authentic, flexible and autonomous 
(Ehrenberg 2010b; Honneth 2004; Petersen 2011; Sennett 1978) should not be too hastily 
understood  as  an  unproblematic  move  from  discipline  to  freedom  and  absolute 
contingency. 
Conversely, behind ‘liberation’, a new scheme of control and social domination - 
one of a very different type, based more on seduction than on suppression - and a new set 
of norms (or ‘dogmas’) arises.
After the waning of the transcendent authority of the divine as the fundamental 
source of pre-modern meaning and the subsequent exhaustion of the so-called ‘modern 
dream of progress’, the vacuum of transcendental answers for the problem of meaning 
has  been  filled  by a  “political-economic-theology”  (Keohane & Kuhling  2014).  This 
move means, in a very specific sense, that pre-modern religious transcendence is back 
with us, wearing new secular masks.
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 This ‘theological return’ was anticipated by Georg Simmel’s classical accounts 
on money as “the modern God” (Simmel 2005) and, more recently, radicalized in what 
has been analyzed by Dany-Robert-Dufour (2009) as the “divine market”. The so-called 
‘religion’ has its sacred commandments and, historically, it had its “evangelists”- figures 
such as Smith, Becker,  Friedman, and others - who in one way or another raised the 
banner  of  individual  freedom  as  the  sacrosanct  rule,  glorified  Money  as  the  new 
omnipotent God and the market as its inviolable temple.
In the new spreading religion of the money-God, if the ‘rationality of money’ and 
the ideal of a (purportedly) free, sovereign individual are sacralized, all values and ideals 
which do not survive by virtue of this rationality – and sometimes threaten to clash with it 
- are profaned.
This  is,  by  way  of  introduction,  the  analytical  framework  within  which  the 
research problem emerges.
Research question
How ‘crises of meaninglessness’ pervading the contemporary Western civilization should 
be analysed in its conditions and underpinnings? And as a correlate of this primary and 
general question: How the rising prevalence of depression in the contemporary West can 
be understood as one of the consequences of such crises?
The structure of the thesis
In order to address the research problem, the thesis is organized in 9 chapters and 
a conclusion.
The study starts, in chapter 1, with the delineation of depression as a concept, 
analyzing the controversies behind the apparent consensus about depression’s etiology. 
The chapter  progresses  to  a  brief  genealogy of  the  concept  of  depression  within  the 
psychiatric  field,  analyzing  the  historical  paths  through  which  the  understanding  of 
depression was fundamentally transformed.
In chapter 2, the main explanatory accounts for the expansion of depression rates 
in  contemporary  times  are  presented  and  analyzed.  Closing  the  chapter,  the  thesis’ 
perspective on the subject is established.
Chapter 3 deals with some fundamental analytical issues underpinning the task of 
understanding and explaining depression in ‘western contemporary civilization’. Towards 
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this objective, the chapter starts by outlining the general lines of the debate about whether 
the present era should be seen as a completely distinct epoch from modernity or as an 
intensification / radicalization of modern patterns, spelling out the thesis’ specific stand 
on the issue. Next, we analyze the crises and controversies in epistemology reflected in 
the philosophical debates surrounding the question of ‘postmodernism’ in its interplays 
with resurgent positivism, empiricism and reductive biologism in the ‘age of the brain’. 
In the context of these debates, the epistemological perspective adopted in the thesis is 
outlined.
Chapter 4 is central for the subsequent developments of the thesis’ argument. The 
chapter  devises  a  sociological  understanding  of  notions  such  as  ‘meaning’, 
‘meaningfulness’ and ‘meaninglessness’, elaborating upon the foundational accounts on 
the subject by Simmel, Durkheim and, secondarily but also importantly, Benjamin.
In chapter 5, the historical understanding of the shifts in the collective order of 
meaning from Greek times to Modernity is pursued. Within this broader analysis, the 
chapter  deals with the shifting representations of melancholy in its  relations with the 
order  of  meaning  culturally  dominant  in  each  period.  This  latter  step  will  help  to 
substantiate  the  subsequent  discussion  on how current  views about  depression  reveal 
recent vicissitudes of the contemporary order of meaning.
Chapter 6 focuses on the fissures suffered by the modern order of meaning in the 
heart of the eighteenth century Enlightenment and further, in Romanticism. Following 
this, some representative modern intellectual formulations and reactions to the problem of 
meaning in the modern epoch are analyzed, as philosophically elaborated in the works of 
Fyodor  Dostoyevsky,  Friedrich Nietzsche  and  György Lukács  in  dialogue  with  the 
classical sociological accounts of Émile Durkheim and Georg Simmel.
Chapter 7 deals with the transformations affecting the collective order of meaning 
in  contemporary  times.  Elaborating  on  the  anthropological  idea  of  the  ‘sacred’ as  a 
foundation of meaningfulness – by building upon the ideas of Douglas and Eliade – the 
chapter analyzes the ways by which ‘sacredness’ (and thus, meaning) become challenged 
in contemporary times. Still, it argues against totalizing perspectives on meaninglessness 
which promote an understanding of the contemporary epoch as a time when meaning 
becomes  radically  fragmented,  leading  to  inherently  limitless  and  meaningless  lives. 
These discussions set out the basis for the thesis’ particular understanding on the notion 
of ‘contemporary meaninglessness’.
Chapter 8 develops the idea that spreading ‘crises of meaninglessness’ emerge 
under the effects of the political-economic theology of neo-liberalism, whereby the ideal 
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of  a  self-referential  individuality  and the  pragmatic  principles  inherent  to  the  money 
rationality acquire Supreme worth. Meaninglessness is thus generated and fueled in a 
context wherein ‘sacred limits’ - under the guise of cultural forms and social ideals - and 
the intrinsic worth of various phenomena are either converted into cash value or actively 
rejected as ‘heresies’ against the new religion of the money-God.
Chapter  9  elaborates  on  the  idea  of  depression  as  a  social  pathology  of 
meaninglessness  in  the  contemporary  culture  of  the  money-God.  The  chapter  is 
composed of two fundamental sections. In the first section, building upon the ideas of 
Julia  Kristeva,  we  start  by  depicting  the  depressive  experience  as  a  crisis  of 
symbolization fostered by the faith of the money-God.  The next step is to analyze the 
relationship between this ‘new faith’ and the ‘contemporary experience of time’ in its 
consequences  for  meaninglessness  and depression.  Following this,  the  second section 
analyzes the mainstream biomedical mode of thinking about depression as a phenomenon 
that simultaneously reveals and reinforces broader crises of meaninglessness.
The conclusion is structured in four parts. First, it ties together the main analytical 
findings  of  the  thesis.  Second,  some  of  the  ways  by  which  the  experience  of 
meaningfulness can incarnate in the contemporary epoch are explored through a brief 
analysis of Andrew Solomon’s biographical trajectory - especially in the last stages of his 
experience with depression and after his recovery. Third, the limitations of the study are 
identified, pointing towards some worthwhile aspects of the project to be investigated in 
the  future.  The  section  ends  with  some  considerations  on  the  thesis’ contributions, 
analyzing, in a succinct manner, how they contradict or amplify existing theories on the 
theme.
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Chapter 1: A Brief Genealogy of Depression
1.1 - What is depression? Controversies behind the consensus
The  increase  in  the  rates  of  depression  is,  today,  a  fact  pictured  by  several 
statistical  and epidemiological  studies2.  Nevertheless,  psychiatry is  still  struggling for 
answers able to understand the complexities of the illness, with its controversies around 
definition,  etiology and treatment.  Thus far,  all  simplistic  answers  have proved to be 
insufficient.
Paradoxically, depression begins to become coherent and consensual in the social 
imaginary, being conceived as a problem related mostly to the state of our brains. As has 
been analyzed by several scholars (Currie 2005; Gardner 2003; Healy 2004b; Pignarre 
2001) the dissemination  of  this  conception  echoes  the  dominant  paradigm within  the 
medical  field,  the  effects  of  education  campaigns  among  doctors  or  even  direct-to-
consumer marketing which, reinforced by media discourses, articulate a discursive reality 
of depression, associating it with chemical functioning, genetics and drugs.
However,  notwithstanding the significant advances in brain science of the last 
decades, the controversies involving the causes of depression are far from being solved. 
Rather,  the  physical  etiology  of  depression  remains  unknown.  The  physiological  or 
genetically-based explanation sometimes associated with the functionality of serotonin or 
norepinephrine  neurotransmission  remains  grounded  in  assumptions  and  vague 
indicatives.  As admitted by several scholars of the field (Gilbert  1992; Hansen 2005; 
Healy 2004b; Horwitz & Wakefield 2007; Radden 2003), the link between depression 
and  the  lowering  of  neurotransmitter  levels,  as  well  as  its  genetic  determination  - 
although broadly accepted by the public and noticed by consumer literature3 and by the 
media  as  scientific  facts  -  are  in  reality controversial  hypotheses.  No abnormality of 
serotonin or other substance in depression has ever been demonstrated (Healy 2004b; 
Pignarre 2001). Concerning genetics, Gardner (2003), in reporting Papolos and Papolos 
1997 study, notes that even though it is usually admitted that genetic research has yielded 
some indications that the potential to develop depression is passed through genes, there is 
no proof of genetic determinism.
2 As it has been widely disseminated by several studies, magazines and newspapers, the 
World Health Organization estimates that, until 2020, depression will become the second 
main cause of morbidity in the industrialized world after cardiovascular diseases. More 
detailed statistic data will be provided later in this chapter.
3 This is a term used by Paula Gardner (2003) to refer to prominent depression manuals 
addressed to the general public.
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David  Healy,  an  Irish  psychopharmacologist,  a  practicing  psychiatrist  and 
historian of psychiatry, understands that the propagation of the hypothesis of ‘depression 
as  chemical  imbalance’  as  a  fact  is  the  result  of  a  very  successful  marketing  of 
antidepressants.  Although  abnormality  of  serotonin  in  depression  has  never  been 
demonstrated, the fact that the marketing of antidepressants has emphasized that they 
increase  the  neurotransmitter’s  levels  feeds  the  idea  of  depression  as  a  lowering  of 
serotonin in the brain (Healy 2004b).
So, insofar as fluoxetine, which inhibits the reuptake of serotonin, also appears to 
alleviate depression (whether minor or major), some authors reason (Kramer 1993; Rego 
2005) that serotonin reuptake causes depression. Obviously enough, however, the fact 
that a drug affects the amount of serotonin available leading to mental relief does not 
entail that the distress was being caused by a deficiency in serotonin, nor even that its  
cause is somehow associated to a malfunction of the brain (Radden 2003). Since there is 
no sufficient evidence to justify that serotonin deficiency causes depression, this kind of 
reasoning constitutes what Hansen terms “the post-hoc fallacy” (2005, p. 132). Radden 
concurs, noting that the fallacy of this reasoning is made clear when we think that it 
equals saying that because drinking alcohol eases stress after a ‘difficult day’, alcohol 
deficiency is the underlying cause of stress (Radden 2003, p. 45).
Media  discourses  have  a  significant  part  in  the  propagation  of  theses  myths, 
tending  to  reify  dominant  research  paradigms,  while  ignoring  the  controversies  and 
contradictory studies that pervades the field. For instance, the controversy triggered by 
facts  such  as  the  existence  of  other  new  antidepressants  which  successfully  treated 
depression without significantly inhibiting either serotonin or norepinephrine. Even more 
impacting are the reports about the newer tricyclic antidepressant Tianeptine that does the 
exact  opposite of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) drugs, enhancing rather 
than preventing  serotonin reuptake,  but  is  still  effective.  The media  don’t  give much 
attention to these reports (Gardner 2003, p. 113).
Behind  the  myths,  what  justify  the  chemical  treatment  of  depression  are  not 
physiological alterations upon which the medication will operate and restore, but simply 
its prospective effects.
The ‘chemical-imbalance myth’ has, admittedly,  its functions. In respect to the 
practical advantages of the biological view of depression, Horwitz and Wakefield note 
that the afflicted individuals themselves often feel that by recognizing their illness as a 
medical entity,  they get medical help more easily.  Psychologically,  they add, defining 
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oneself  as  a  victim of  an actual  illness  provides  a  more acceptable account  of  one’s 
problems (Horwitz & Wakefield 2007, p. 216).
Thus, despite controversies, the mythology of ‘biological depression’ perpetuates, 
blurring the fact that the understanding of depression is still up for grabs.
1.2  –  The  conceptualization  of  depression  in  the  psychiatric  field:  historical 
developments
The history of a disorder we know today as depression begins in the modern era, 
concomitantly with the wane of the notion of melancholia in psychiatric circles and the 
linked yearning for making psychiatry scientific.
Alain Ehrenberg, in his influential book  The Weariness of the Self: Diagnosing  
the History of Depression in the Contemporary Age (2010b) points out that towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, the reference to melancholia within psychiatric treatises 
starts to lose importance.
The German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin had an important role in this historical 
change. In his Manual of Psychiatry, published in 1899, Kraepelin included the concept 
of  manic-depressive  psychosis,  in  which  melancholia  is  embedded.  From  there, 
melancholia  as a  morbid,  discrete  entity is  removed from the psychiatric  nosography 
(Vertzman 1995).
Emil  Kraepelin,  considered  by some  as  the  founder  of  the  modern  scientific 
psychiatry,  as  well  as  of  psychopharmacology  and  psychiatric  genetics,  was 
contemporaneous of scholars such as Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud. Throughout his 
career,  Kraepelin  attempted  to  classify,  categorize  and  describe  psychiatric  disorders, 
anticipating the current dominant models for identification of mental disorders. Yet, by 
the time he developed his work, it seemed clear to him that the brain was the seat of  
emotions, thought and behaviour. This perspective helped to bring mental disturbances 
firmly in the hands of medicine (Gilbert 1992) which would, later, profoundly affect the 
views on depression.
A second historical force in the promotion of psychiatry as an integral part of 
medicine and of scientific modernity affecting views on depression is signaled by Alain 
Ehrenberg (2010b). According to him, between the world wars, psychiatrists observed 
that electroshock therapy had had some success treating melancholia, which meant that 
for  the  first  time,  somatic  and psychic  aspects  of  mental  illness  became intertwined. 
However, Ehrenberg stresses that whereas electroshock showed that biological treatments 
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work, they had not brought any definitive answer for the causes of melancholy.  This 
would thus set an issue with which psychiatry has been constantly struggling with: “…we 
heal better and better, perhaps, but we cannot agree either about what we are healing or 
about the effectiveness of the treatment” (Ehrenberg 2010b, p. 68).
After  the  impulse  granted  by  electroshocks  treatments,  the  launching  of 
Meprobamate under the brand name Milltown in 1955 was a watershed in psychiatry’s 
development as a scientific area: it produced relaxation without unduly sedating (Healy 
2004b). The antidepressant story takes a further important step in 1957 with the discovery 
of imipramine and the monoamine oxidase inhibitor (MAOI) Iproniazid. However, in the 
beginning of antidepressants history, the pharmaceutical companies involved had little 
interest in an antidepressant and did nothing to promote either of these drugs. Besides, 
very few clinicians in office practice at the time seemed to encounter depression (Healy 
2004b, p. 7).
In the 1950s decade, psychiatry already had a diagnostic manual, the first version 
of the DSM (The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders), produced long 
ago in 1918. This manual was marked by influences brought about by psychoanalysis and 
the  social  communitarian  psychiatry.  Under  the  important  influence  of  Adolf  Meyer 
(1866-1950), there was a predominance of psychodynamic categories and an emphasis on 
the opposition between neurosis  and psychosis.  Opposing fundamental  aspects  of the 
perspective proposed by Kraepelin, Meyer’s diagnostic rationality was based on types of 
reactions to difficult life problems. For the general psychiatric thinking of those days, 
influenced by Meyer, the patient would be better understood if his life situation were 
taken into consideration (Dunker & Neto 2011; Horwitz 2002).
The DSM-I, and also the DSM-II, published in 1952, weren’t based on elaborated 
classification schemes. In the first two manuals, symptoms, in themselves, didn’t reveal 
disease entities but disguised underlying conflicts that could not be expressed directly. 
However,  disclosing  the  nascent  yearning  for  the  scientific  understanding  of  mental 
disorders, the manual’s second version already demonstrated a greater affinity with the 
biological perspective (Dunker & Neto 2011).
In this context, bit by bit medications were gaining social respectability within 
psychiatry.  However,  in  the  end  of  the  1960’s  decade,  several  controversies  still 
dominated the field: antidepressants were still seen as mere tools for the treatment, not 
addressing the central concern of psychiatrists at the time: causes (Ehrenberg 2010b).
 Generally  speaking,  the  psychiatric  mindset  of  the  later  1960s  pictured 
depression as an entity divided in different classifications, which varied as functions of its 
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etiology. The endogenous depression lacked any psychological causes, being therefore an 
exclusively  biological  entity.  Exogenous  depression,  in  turn,  was  subdivided  in  two: 
exogenous depression (unleashed by a recent external event) and neurotic / psychogenic 
depression  (associated  with  unconscious  conflicts).  Furthermore,  depression  was 
understood as a syndrome, that is,  a cluster of symptoms that would appear either in 
neurotic or psychotic structures (Gilbert 1992).
In  the  late  1960s,  however,  new  tensions  emerged  which  would  profoundly 
transform these conceptions, leading to the definitive establishment of psychiatry as an 
integral part of medicine.
Part of these tensions stemmed from the critiques raised by the ‘antipsychiatry 
movement’,  questioning  the  legitimacy  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  and  treatments  and 
associating psychiatry with the authoritarian extension of the state (Healy 2004b; Mayes 
& Horwitz 2005).
Further,  psychiatrists  needed  to  demonstrate  that  their  practice  produced 
fundamentally different and superior results to those of psychologists and social workers 
in order to attain privileged coverage by health insurance companies (Hale 1995, cited in 
Mayes & Horwitz 2005, p. 257).
Finally, some currents within the research-oriented psychiatrists insisted that the 
discipline needed to invest on diagnostic reliability through a more objective demarcation 
of the different mental disorders.  This should be met  by a new approach to research 
wherein attention would turn from etiology to the symptoms that compose each disorder 
and the optimal treatment to alleviate them. Therefore, where specific etiologies could 
not be empirically ascertained, they should not be attributed to any cause at all (Mayes & 
Horwitz 2005, p. 256).
The confluence of these pressures led to the publication in 1980 of the DSM-III, 
generally  considered  a  watershed  in  the  psychiatric  profession.  A  new  form  of 
standardization of psychiatric diagnosis was introduced and, following that, a wholly new 
understanding of  mental  illnesses,  in  general,  and of  depression,  in  particular,  would 
emerge.
 Through the abdication of the search for underlying causes, the manual evoked a 
new  method  of  psychiatric  nosology:  descriptivism,  in  which  a  neutral  depiction  of 
mental disturbances is  sought without recourse to any specific theoretical framework. 
According  to  the  basic  tenets  of  the  so  influential  ‘descriptive  psychiatry’ –  which 
became  dominant  after  the  twentieth  century,  characterizing  either  the  DSM  or  the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) - mental disorders are to be classified and 
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apprehended through observable  symptoms.  In  the  new dominant  approach,  concerns 
with psychopathology give place to concerns with supposedly neutral descriptions and 
quantitative apprehensions of symptoms.
According to Radden (2003), this does not mean that the descriptivist nosology 
denies the existence of causes, but simply that causes are no longer part of the reference 
to conceptualize mental disorders. Given that etiology of most mental disorders is still 
unknown, the reasoning underlying the DSM-III  (and also its successors, the DSM-IV 
and the DSM-V) is  that  whether  or not  we know what  causes  depression (and other 
mental  disorders),  a  descriptive  classification  can  be  a  useful  tool  for  the  attempt  to 
alleviate suffering brought about them (Hansen 2003). The DSM is intended thus, to be a 
reliable classificatory system that allows the superation of confusions in the scope of 
terminology, having any pretension to constitute itself as a psychopathology that looks 
into the psychic reality of the disturbances, its conditions and causes.
Nevertheless,  whilst  avoiding  etiology-based  classifications,  the  manual 
subscribes to a neo-Kraepelinian assumption that the core symptoms of mental disorders 
stemmed from some form of malfunctioning of the brain (Mayes & Horwitz 2005). Thus, 
behind the a-theoretical character of the manual, its classificatory system corresponds to 
the gradual ascension of biological psychiatry as a dominant strand in psychiatry.
Another novelty introduced by the DSM-III was the significant amplification of 
classifiable  mental  disturbances.  Several  new disorders  were  included in  the  manual, 
while the concept of neurosis, considered a vague and unscientific notion by many, was 
relegated to a very secondary place. Later, in the DSM-IV, it was going to be eliminated 
altogether (Healy 2004b). The contextual influences and social variants, in turn, which 
were  formerly  at  the  very  core  of  the  etiological  understanding  of  the  pathologies, 
became subsumed within the term “specific cultural syndromes” (Dunker & Neto 2011, 
p. 616, my transl.).
In  respect  to  depression,  the  most  visible  consequence of  the  new psychiatric 
nosography was the removing of depressive syndromes from the categories of neurosis 
and psychosis. Further, as of the DSM-III, it  was established that inasmuch as it was 
seemingly impossible to arrive at etiological conclusions in order to define the concepts 
of endogenous, exogenous and neurotic depression, these categories should be replaced 
by  the  notion  of  ‘major  depression’,  belonging  to  the  cluster  of  mood  disorders 
(Ehrenberg 2010b).
The  fourth  edition  of  the  manual,  published  by  The  American  Psychiatric 
Association (APA) in the 1990s decade (considered the “brain decade” by the WHO) is 
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said to have reaffirmed and solidified the transformation of psychiatry and mental health 
that the DSM-III began in 1980 (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005).  The manual was designed, 
yet, to correspond with the codes used in the International Statistical Classification of  
Diseases and Related Health Problems,  10th Revision (ICD-10) by the World Health 
Organization (WHO).
The same is true for the most recent edition of the manual: the DSM-V, launched 
in 2013. However, whilst the basic nosological paradigm underlying the two previous 
manuals is maintained, the DSM-V inaugurates specific shifts in relation to diagnostic 
categories.
Regarding depression,  Horwitz (2010) depicts some changes that reinforce the 
already existing tendency of  the two previous manuals  to pathologize non-disordered 
depressive states. For instance, the removal of the ‘bereavement exclusion' criterion from 
the diagnostic of a major depressive episode is, he claims, a problematic change. In basic 
terms, it entails that a person who meets the criteria for major depressive disorder will no 
longer be denied this diagnosis because she has recently lost a loved one. In light of this, 
Horwitz  notes  that  since  many  people  grieving  a  significant  loss  will  exhibit  the 
symptoms enlisted in the manual’s diagnostic criteria for depression for two weeks (in 
addition to the fact that virtually everybody will be bereaved at some point in life), the 
change could pathologize large numbers of people4.  
Other  nosological  shifts  are  found  in  the  manual,  as  the  inclusion  of  new 
depressive disorders, such as disruptive mood dysregulation disorder and premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder.  Aside from that,  little has changed in the 5th edition of the DSM 
regarding the core symptoms (and its established duration) applied to the diagnostic of 
major depressive episode.
The DSM-V defines ‘major depressive episodes’ that make up a ‘major depressive 
disorder’ as a condition marked by depressed mood or loss of interest and pleasure for 
nearly  all  activities,  changes  in  appetite  or  weight,  sleep  and  psychomotor  activity, 
decreased energy, tiredness, reduced feelings of worthlessness, guilt, exaggerated sense 
of responsibility for events outside the person’s control, difficulty thinking, concentrating 
or taking decisions, memory difficulties, recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation, 
plans  or  suicide  attempts.  Major  Depressive  Episodes  also  meet  clinically significant 
4 At the time when Horwitz wrote this essay,  the DSM-V has not yet been launched,  
which means that he was commenting on proposed (but not yet confirmed) alterations. 
The  publication  of  DSM-V  revealed  that  the  ‘bereavement  exclusion’ criterion  was 
removed indeed from the diagnostic criteria for major depression. It’s worth noticing that 
this criterion was replaced, in the new manual, by guidelines aiming to help the clinician 
to discriminate grief from major depression (even if the latter is a function of the grieving 
process).
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impairment  in  social,  occupational,  or  other  important  areas  of  functioning,  being 
diagnosed in  the presence of  these  symptoms (persisting  for  most  of  the  day,  nearly 
everyday) in a minimum of two consecutive weeks (American Psychiatric Association 
2013).
1.2.1 - Brave new brains
“And the poor ‘so-and-so’ who  feels a mix of  
sadness,  melancholy,  dismay,  apathy,  lack  of  
cheerfulness, of appetite of sexual desire, really  
thinks  he  is  going  mad.  He  has  no  idea  –  
information  –  that  he  can  have  a  hormonal  
imbalance of serotonin, a sedative and calming  
substance,  which  regulate  the  mood;  and  of  
dopamine  and  noradrenaline,  which  
proportionate  energy  and  disposition.  Without  
them,  or  with  some  unbalance  in  them,  you  
cannot be happy. Literally”5
The message put forward by this script has become a chorus of every sort  of 
media messages, awareness campaigns and books on depression. The quotation touches a 
key aspect of our analysis, namely, that depression today is no longer envisaged as an 
expression of “problems in living” (Szasz 1960). It became literal, an objective reality of 
our hormones and brain functioning, that is,  something ultimately referred to (physical) 
facts.
Indeed, the wave of scientific depression that we have just started to describe has 
carried ‘issues of meaning’ away from the understanding and treatment of depression.
Recently, science advances heavily into depression through the development of a 
new fashionable field: neuroscience. Progress in the treatment of neurological disorders 
or the discovery of neuropathological aspects of mental illnesses no longer represents the 
whole  project  of  neurosciences,  which  becomes  increasingly  more  ambitious. 
Philosophically,  it  envisages  the  knowledge about  the  brain  and about  the  subject  as 
5 I take antidepressants, thanks God! Patients and doctors demystify psychiatric  
treatment (Moraes 2008, cited in Kehl 2009, my transl.).
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forming  a  single  unity,  propelling  the  fusion  between  neurology  and  psychiatry 
(Ehrenberg 2009, p. 189).
However, our ‘brave new brains’ (Andreasen 2001) are still a somewhat unknown 
land and the association between psychiatry and neurology is not free of major tensions. 
Even though  a  great  part  of  the  academic  psychiatric  literature  share  the  excitement 
brought about by the new technologies which, hopefully soon, will purportedly allow the 
discovery of a  sort  of “penicillin  for mental illness” (Andreasen 2001, p.  xi),  critical 
voices are also heard.
Psychiatry  professor  Thomas  Fuchs,  for  instance,  offers  an  explanation  of 
depression in terms of mind as distributed among the brain, body, and environment. He 
claims that neurobiology’s restricted field of vision should be rejected by psychiatrists. 
He is critical of neurobiology’s tendency to regard subjectivity as a by-product of the 
brain’s  activity  and  also  of  the  idea  that  subjective  states,  such  as  depression,  are 
localizable in the brain (Fuchs 2002, p. 261).
As  Gardner  (2003)  notes,  brain  imaging  technology  is  at  the  centre  of  the 
confusions. The visualization of the processing of information by centers in the brain is 
frequently linked to the assumption that the cause of mental illness is, essentially, of a 
cerebral  character.  However,  the  fact  that  researchers  can  see  differences  between 
depressed and non-depressed brains images and biochemical levels, in no way indicates 
that depression is a biological illness, starting from the fact that these changes can be a 
result  of  depressed states  rather  than  a  cause.  Despite  of  this,  conclusions  about  the 
determinant biological root of depression abound, which, according to Gardner (2003), is 
possible only by alienating many variables, assuming a biased mode of thought based on 
the biopsychiatric paradigm.
 Fuchs  (2002)  counters  the  equalization  between  the  mind  and  the  brain  by 
claiming  that,  on  the  phenomenological  level,  a  ‘mental  event’  cannot,  in  any 
circumstances, be isolated from the world and from the stream of conscious experiences 
which is always intentional, that is, a consciousness of something in the world.
Providing concreteness  to  this  critique,  Ehrenberg (2009,  p.  197)  reasons that 
even if a biological mediation to a certain emotion (such as jealousy or guilt) is found in 
the molecular level, the neuronal web would only be triggered if the subject finds reasons 
to be jealous about someone or guilt about something. These reasons can be true or false, 
concrete  or  illusive,  but  they  emerge  in  a  relationship  with  someone  in  a  certain 
environment.
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This may seem obvious. However, the idea that the mind exists only embedded in 
the  world  and  in  the  temporal  process  of  life  is  becoming  increasingly  fuzzy  in 
hegemonic  psychiatric  thinking.  In  fact,  one  of  the  effects  brought  about  by  the 
confluence between neurology and psychiatry is the conception of the mind as a cerebral 
effect (Andreasen 2001), reducing it as an object of biomedicine’s study and treatment 
(Gardner 2003).
This sort of equalization between the subject and the biological body, remarks 
Ehrenberg (2009), implies a particular type of subjectivity in which the criterion of the 
mental is interiority (represented by the internal neuronal mechanisms of the brain) and 
not signification. Returning to Ehrenberg’s example, signification is undermined when 
the future prospects on the biological determination of jealousy or depression neglects the 
(social  and moral)  facts  that we will  continue to find reasons for feeling jealous and 
depressive independently of this understanding.
In  the  particular  case  of  depression,  the  so-called  “biology  of  the  spirit” 
(Ehrenberg 2009, p. 179) is tellingly evident. Progressively, the previous existential and 
moral concerns in regard to melancholia tend to be displaced - in the discourses of health 
practitioners and even of people diagnosed with depression - by worries related to the 
biological body.
Brain-centered explanations for depression are, still, typically associated with the 
valuing of antidepressant as the most efficient resource to address the disorder. Here lies 
another seemingly inexhaustible terrain for theoretical disputes to unfold.
In my opinion, any discussion on the validity of antidepressants use should start 
from admitting that the antidepressant’s success indicates, at least to some extent, the 
positive effects that they have for some of the people shattered by depression.
As Styron’s famous words in  Darkness Visible (1990) express,  when you feel 
yourself going downward to a dark pit of pain, when words become spasmodic and voice 
faint, when the libido is gone as well as appetite (often degraded into mere subsistence 
obligation), when sleepless nights is combined with exhaustion, everything has any savor 
and, after living this miserable life for months without stop, if medication works, it is 
very much understandable that people say ‘medication saved my life’.
There  are,  however,  many  idiosyncrasies  for  each  individual  case.  The 
psychiatrist David Healy (2004b), for instance, who defines himself as being committed 
to pharmacotherapy, points out that there is plenty of evidence that antidepressants can be 
shown to do something in the short term but almost no evidence that things turn out better 
in the long run.
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Similarly, Gardner (2003) remarks that scientists themselves admit they are still 
unsure how antidepressants work and, even though manuals on depression often fail to 
inform, many widely promoted drugs have not been tested for long-term use. He also 
reports studies that tested an array of new antidepressants (including SSRI’s) indicating 
that  62% of consumers  showed no response to  the drug, while  other  studies  favored 
psychotherapy over  drugs  (Gardner  2003,  p.  116).  Yet,  several  studies  claim that  the 
efficacy  of  placebos  in  comparison  to  SSRIs  is  so  strong  that  the  pharmacological 
rationale for the treatment is undermined (Healy 2004b; Ussher 2010).
Phenomenologically, the euphoria with medication, as many users testify, is rarely 
abiding. Often faster than expected, it gives way to frustration, chronicity or to a long and 
wearing trial and error process in search for the best drug.
Ehrenberg  (2010b)  remarks  that  antidepressant’s  success  is  also  linked  to  the 
weakness  of  theory  in  contemporary  psychiatry.  This  weakness  fuels  the  objective 
nosology based on the collection of symptoms listed in the psychiatric manuals, which 
ideally corresponds to the objectivity of the physical body (Martins 2008). Lacking a 
conclusive  theory,  psychiatry  focuses  on  the  somatic  body,  searching  for  legitimacy 
through the purported ‘quick fix of medication’.
Now, antidepressants (and neurosciences) are powerful sources of hope towards 
the control of mental pain. Assumedly, by transforming suffering and mental pain into an 
objective and verifiable fact,  neuroscience would be responsible for the grand feat of 
releasing  individuals  from  the  incalculable,  sometimes  overwhelming  nature  of  our 
psychological lives. However, this model has still to prove its validity and there are some 
realistic motifs to think it will fail to do so.
At this  point,  the concrete  expression of this  difficulty suffices  to defend this 
claim: hitherto,  some years after  the ‘brave new world’ discovered and celebrated by 
neurosciences,  its  rationality  of  factual  precision  is  still  far  from being  able  to  fully 
comprehend or  heal  the  supposed brain  dysfunction that  leads  to  one of  the  greatest 
problems of our era: depression. On the contrary, we have good reasons to believe that 
things are getting worse.
For  despite  the  marvels  achieved by technology,  we still  witness  several,  and 
often tragic social embodiments of our human, fundamental vulnerability, as epitomized 
by today’s ‘epidemic depression’.
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Chapter 2: Understanding depression epidemics
2.1 - Introductory remarks
By 1996, the  World Health Organization had reported that depression was the 
second  greatest  source  of  disability  on  the  planet,  being  surpassed  only  by  cardiac 
disease. According to Healy (2004c), the response from psychiatry to the news appeared 
to be satisfaction that the discipline would acquire now greater importance.
A typical explanation for this is that the staggering growth in depression rates is in 
fact a motif of satisfaction, the direct result of improvement in diagnostic methods and 
treatment.
For instance, a paper cited in the North-American journal  Archives of General  
Psychiatry (publicized in a Brazilian newspaper in 2007) estimates that the number of 
children and adolescents diagnosed with ‘bipolar disorder’ in the United Sates has grown 
40  times  in  a  time  span  of  9  years  (between  1994  and  2003).  According  to  the 
psychiatrists  interviewed,  this  growth merely indicates  that  a  previously undiagnosed 
condition is now identified and treated. In regard to Brazilian rates, another newspaper 
article,  in  the  same issue,  suggests  that  the  lower  increase  in  the  number  of  bipolar 
children and adolescents in the country is due to the lack of diagnosis. Even so, in the 
Department of Psychiatry for children and adolescents in the Hospital of São Paulo, the 
number of patients jumped from 22, in 1995, to 135, in 2007 (Kehl 2009a, p. 51).
But the change in diagnostic practices is by no means the only explanation for the 
increased rates of depression in contemporary times. Rather, scholars from various fields, 
ranging from mental health, bioethics, philosophy of the mind, social work, sociology, 
amongst others, have been presenting different approaches to the phenomenon.
 In this section, we are going to briefly analyze some of the explanatory accounts 
for the inflated rates of depression in contemporary times and specify how the research 
locates itself within the big picture. From the start, it’s worth noticing that our objective is 
not to oppose any of these explanations in order to impose, over it, a superior account of 
the so-called depression epidemic.
Nevertheless, we should also state the thesis’ argument: beyond elements that may 
foster an overestimation of depression’s cases, depression is (in all  its extensions and 
possibly misdiagnosed forms) a concrete expression of contemporary suffering.
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2.2  -  What  statistics  and  epidemiologic  studies  tell  us  about  the  contemporary 
epidemic of depression?
According to  the World Health Organization (WHO), globally,  more than 350 
million people of  all  ages  suffer  from depression,  being the second  leading cause of 
disability  worldwide –  in  terms  of  years  lost  to  disability  -  surpassed  only by heart 
disease (World Health Organization 2012).
It’s  worth  stressing,  here,  that  these  estimations  are  based  on  standardized 
diagnostic criteria, such as those as laid out in The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  
Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems  (ICD). These criteria, as we’ve seen above, imply a view of 
depression as a dysfunction that can be objectively defined and measured, while  issues 
concerning  subjective  perceptions,  or  culture  are  not  taken  into  account  as  a  major 
concern.
Casting doubt over the theory of a ‘world-wide epidemic’, many scholars have 
claimed (Marsella 1978; Kleinman & Good 1985) that several ethno-cultural groups do 
not demonstrate any of the psychological components of depression associated with its 
presence among Western individuals. In this regard,  Ussher (2010) in reference to the 
work of Marecek (2006) notes that “… suffering is signified by bodily or psychological 
complaints as varied as chest pains (China), burning on the soles of the feet (Sri Lanka), 
semen loss (India), ants crawling inside the head (Nigeria) or soul-loss (Hmong)” (Ussher 
2010, p. 10).
Radden  (2003)  remarks  that  only  a  causal  analysis,  which  posits  a  common 
(usually biological)  underlying state serving to unify these disparate traits,  allows the 
consideration of non-Western mental disturbances as cases of depression. Given that this 
biological  underlying  state  is  still  a  hypothesis,  causal  analysis  cannot  substantiate 
conclusions about the prevalence of depression in different cultures.
Jane M. Ussher, in  Are We Medicalizing Women's Misery? A Critical Review of  
Women's  Higher  Rates  of  Reported  Depression (2010) also  observes  that  a  bio-
determinist perspective seem to interfere with the credibility of many epidemiological 
studies. Associated to it, she argues, there is a strong tendency to de-politicize the roots of 
distress (in the case of women highly conditioned by gender inequalities) neutralizing 
differences  and  downplaying  complexities  by  conceiving  depression  as  an  objective 
entity that can be easily measured.
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In effect, echoing and disseminating the ‘medical objectivism’ that pervades the 
field,  widespread epidemiological  conclusions  picture  depression as  a  unitary,  global, 
trans-historical  pathology  (Pilgrim  &  Bentall  1999),  whilst  different  symptomatic 
expressions, moral significations and causal specificities that vary not only from person 
to  person  but  cross-culturally  are  dismissed  and  mistakenly  amalgamated  under  the 
expression ‘world-wide epidemic’.
And whilst the view of a ‘world-wide epidemic’ can be interpreted as a signal of 
progress in terms of the amelioration of diagnostic techniques and its democratization, it 
may also  blind people to  other  culturally specific  aspects  of  the  phenomenon and to 
broader processes of pathologisation of ‘ problems in living’.
Another questionable aspect of epidemiological data on depression is the fact that 
most studies lack reference to contextual factors. For instance, Horwitz and Wakefield 
(2007) cite a study which estimates that, in the United States, Major Depression afflicts 
about 10% of adults each year and nearly a fifth of the population at some point in their 
lives, a number that is steadily growing. In outpatient settings, treatment of depression 
increased by 300% between 1987 and 1997. Also in the domain of psychotherapy the 
rising number of depressed patients is asserted. The overall percentage of the population 
in treatment for depression in a particular year saw an increase of 76% in just 20 years.
Horwitz  and  Wakefield  (2007)  are,  however,  skeptical  in  relation  to  the 
methodological  criteria  behind  these  results.  Ignoring  contextual  conditionings,  they 
claim,  these  studies  amplify  depression’s  boundaries  for  its  inability  to  distinguish 
situational depressive moods from pathological depression.
Beyond methodological  issues,  the amplification of  depression’s  boundaries  is 
fueled, even further, by the broader cultural tendency to pathologise human difficulties 
and problems (often  of  moral  and/or  existential  character),  interpreting  them through 
psychological, psychiatric and/or biomedical terms (Brinkmann 2013).
 Currie  (2005,  p.  12)  also  questions  the  accuracy of  epidemiological  data  on 
depression. According to the author, high depression prevalence rates on epidemiological 
studies  are  often  the  effect  generated  by  simplified  screening  methods  or  diagnostic 
checklists (often created and funded by drug companies). These popular diagnostic tests 
are then conveniently used to demonstrate to the public, healthcare providers and funders 
that depression is not only common but under-treated.
Another important aspect highlighted by epidemiology is that urbanization, the 
increase in social anomie, changes in family structure and the weakening of traditional 
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sexual  roles  all  contributed  to  the  rising  incidence  of  depression  in  our  societies 
(Ehrenberg 2010b; Radden 2007).
For some commentators, as for instance Radden (2007), these results reveal, once 
again,  a  flawed  conceptual  distinction  separating  the  depressive  states  that  are 
pathological from those that are normal responses to misfortune. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains  that  many epidemiological  studies  point  out  a  general  increase of depressive 
experiences (pathological or not) in conditions of social upheaval.
Ehrenberg  (2010b)  summarizes  some of  the  many different  approaches  to  the 
understanding of the statistical data on depression. He asks: “Do such figures suggest an 
increased occurrence of this pathology? A tendency to consult a doctor more frequently 
for a psychological problem? A change in diagnostic practices?” (2010b, p. 109).
As mentioned in the very beginning of this chapter, exclusive answers for such a 
multifaceted issue tend to be simplistic.
2.3 - The era of depression as a problem of method
Among the theoretical  accounts that  attempt to  explain the recent  increase on 
depression, Horwitz and Wakefield (2007), as hinted above, stand out as representatives 
of the argument that this growth is a single result of the blurred conceptual distinction 
between sadness as normal  suffering,  and depression as a  disordered response of  the 
organism.
The authors’ basic claim is that a new definition of depressive disorder that is 
flawed combined with other societal developments has dramatically expanded the domain 
of  the presumed disorder.  Depression’s  rising  rates  are,  therefore,  according to  them, 
more an artefact of these mistaken criteria (that also underlies epidemiological studies) 
associated with vested interests, than a factual reality.
Their thinking is, yet, centrally based on a critique of the DSM’s assumption that 
symptoms  alone  can  dictate  whether  an  individual  has  a  mental  disorder  or  not, 
independently of the context in which they emerge.  Because of DSM’s symptom-based 
nature, they note, sadness responses involving enough of the symptoms specified in the 
manual, for at least two weeks, will be misclassified as disordered depression (Horwitz & 
Wakefield 2007, p.  106).
Contradictorily, the DSM does have a definition for mental disorders. The manual 
presupposes that a disorder is derived from a dysfunction in the individual and it is not an 
expectable response to a stressor (Horwitz & Wakefield 2007, p. viii), an assumption with 
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which Horwitz  and Wakefield  basically agree.  However,  problems start  when natural 
responses  to  stressors  –  which  do not  represent  dysfunctions  –  are  rarely taken  into 
account  in  the manual’s  formulation of the diagnostic  criteria  for  the disorders.  As a 
result, psychiatrists are led to diagnose as depression every condition that corresponds to 
the defined cluster of symptoms independently of being a dysfunction or an expectable 
response of the individual to the vicissitudes of her life.
Horwitz and Wakefield believe in the existence of truly disordered depressions 
and in the difference of the latter from other types of normal depressive states. For them, 
depression as a mental disorder is a completely different category from sadness, even 
when the latter is of devastating character. The difference, they argue, dwells not in any 
exclusive symptomatic  pattern but,  particularly,  in  the fact  that  disordered depression 
presents a picture of immobilizing suffering bewilderingly disengaged from actual life 
circumstances  (Horwitz  & Wakefield 2007,  p.  12).  Symptoms themselves  can be the 
same in both sadness and depression, and even its persistence in time, which renders the 
DSM  criteria  unable  to  offer  a  minimally  precise  basis  for  the  establishment  of  a 
distinction between normal and pathological depression.
 A clear and efficient method for understanding mental disorders is needed, they 
claim, since the conflation between sadness and depression is a conceptual mistake with 
consequences not only for psychiatry and patients, but for society (Wakefield 1992).
That’s  what  Horwitz  and Wakefield  set  out  to  do  in  the  book:  to  recoup  the 
medical truth about depression. Their method implies two main lines of reasoning. The 
first establishes that “…it is the absence of an appropriate context for symptoms that 
indicates a disorder”, since in disordered depression “…the symptom’s severity is grossly 
disproportionate to the sufferers circumstances” (Horwitz & Wakefield 2007, p.14). Their 
second line  of  argumentation  holds  that  pathological  depression is  at  stake when the 
organism is unable to perform its biological function. “In sum, a mental disorder exists 
when the failure of a person’s internal mechanisms to perform their functions as designed 
by nature impinges harmfully on the person’s well being as defined by social values and 
meanings” (Horwitz & Wakefield 2007, p. 17).
The authors’ perspective seems to embrace an idea which is far from being new in 
the field (see Boorse 1975), while complementing it by the acknowledgement that values 
do interfere with what  is  deemed a disorder.  What  is  maintained is  the idea that  the 
normal  is  the  natural,  so  that  if  the  natural  design  of  the  organism  is  secured,  the 
individual will be free of disease.
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Criticisms towards this perspective are numerous (see Cooper 2002; Lilienfield & 
Marino,  1995).  A common  objection  is  that  mental  disorders  are  characterized  by 
intrinsically fuzzy boundaries between normal and pathological, so that normality and 
abnormality are arrayed on a continuum (Lilienfeld 1995).
Horwitz and Wakefield’s response is that a scientific concept of disorder should 
not  necessarily  set  such  precise  boundaries.  The  authors  themselves  admit  that  the 
boundary between normality and disorder is  often subject  to  ambiguities (Horwitz  & 
Wakefield  2007,  p.  17).  Among  these  ambiguities,  they  concede  that  disordered 
depression  might  arise  as  a  ‘normal  reaction’ to  contextual  conditions  (which  only 
afterwards  becomes  disengaged  from  the  original  circumstance  and  persist),  which 
suggests the proximity between what they call normal and disordered depression.
In my opinion, one of the merits of Horwitz and Wakefield is to fly away from 
biological reductionism by asserting that disordered conditions do not necessarily imply 
the existence of physiological causes, or that there is always a brain problem. Yet, they 
claim, psychological or social factors can also lead to dysfunctions, as well as biological 
factors are probably involved not only in disordered depression but also in normal, but 
devastating  sadness.  Their  argument  is  thus  that  distinctions  between  normal  and 
pathological depression should, therefore, be sought beyond causal explanations. That is, 
recognizing the still unresolved status of depression’s etiology, the authors claim that the 
normal-pathological  distinction  is  not  a  question  of  what  leads  to  depression,  but  a 
question of how the organism performs or fail to perform its natural function (Horwitz & 
Wakefield 2007, p. 17).
Putting  it  in  a  way  that  articulates  the  failure  of  an  internal  (biological) 
mechanism and the importance of context to determine a disorder, the authors hold that if 
depression results from a context (loss of a job, difficult living conditions, etc) there is 
normal  suffering.  However,  if  it  lasts  longer  than  the  contextual  conditions  within  it 
occurred, it indicates that there are dysfunctions in loss response mechanisms (which are 
biological),  and  hence,  we  have  a  disorder.  In  other  words,  if  in  an  improved 
environment, the problem persists, we are dealing with a truly disordered depression.
Horwitz and Wakefield even provide sensible advice for doctors, saying that in 
the  presence  of  contextual  triggers,  physicians  should  embrace  a  “watchful  waiting”, 
avoiding  immediate  medication  and  the  misunderstanding  of  normal  suffering  as 
depression (Horwitz  & Wakefield 2007,  p.  223). This is,  admittedly,  a  wise practical 
solution to those concerned with the concept of disorder as a way to avoid engulfing all  
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the problems posed by life in a over extensive concept of pathology. In this sense, it is  
certainly valuable.
But a more problematic aspect of Horwitz and Wakefield’s conceptualization of 
disordered depression is the idea that social conditions sometimes used to understand the 
recent growth in depressive rates tend to explain merely normal sadness reactions and not 
mental  disorders,  which  occur  independently of  any external  factor.   In  their  words: 
“Sociologists persistently fail to distinguish whether high scores on symptom scales stem 
from persons with chronic and recurrent conditions that fluctuate independently of social 
conditions or from those with transitory and situationally induced stress” (Horwitz & 
Wakefield 2007, p. 205).
The authors argue that three processes drive people into distress: 1) low social 
status  2)  loss  of  valued  attachments  3)  inability  to  reach important  goals.  These  are 
normal causes for distress, they argue, and thus, justifiable motives for suffering and not 
pathological conditions (Horwitz & Wakefield 2007, p. 219).
The  definition  of  motives  for  normal  distress  implies  that  if  the  individual’s 
contextual situation does not include at least one of the 3 elements that justify distress, 
their suffering is not situationally induced and thus, it’s a pathological form of suffering. 
Concretely,  we might think that a person with high social status, who hasn’t  recently 
experienced  any  loss  of  valued  attachments  or  frustration  about  reaching  ‘important 
goals’ should not feel depressed. If he feels depressed, it’s because his organism is not 
performing well:  he has disordered depression,  a  state  that,  according to the authors, 
fluctuates independently of social conditions.
To  my  mind,  whereas  the  authors’ argument  that  the  dividing  line  between 
normality and disorder lies in the greater rigidity that depressive feelings acquire over 
time sounds reasonable and even valuable for clinical purposes, the idea that pathological 
depression is necessarily independent of the context is based on a very questionable and 
narrow definition of what is ‘social’.
That is, when Horwitz and Wakefield claim that disordered depression fluctuates 
independently  of  social  reasons,  a  number  of  theoretical  issues  seem  to  be  left 
unanswered. To be very concise, the measurement of an improved environment or even 
the decision about the existence or inexistence of contextual triggers or social conditions 
clearly involves evaluative interpretations. Putting it in the form of a question: How to 
determine whether a social condition can induce distress and suffering or not? Or yet: 
Which factors are regarded as contextual triggers / social conditions for depression? Who 
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decides if the environment improved and the traumatic event ceased and on what basis it 
is done?
Horwitz  and Wakefield’s  response  to  the  latter  question  -  based  on  the  three 
fundamental  reasons  justifying  distress  -  is,  in  my  opinion,  too  narrow  and  clearly 
unfitted  to  address  the  rather  difficult  task  of  determining  what  constitutes  a  `social 
cause`.
Furthermore,  I  agree  with  authors  such  as  Brinkmann  (2013)  and  Ehrenberg 
(2004)  in  their  criticism of  the  essentializing  opposition  between  nature  and  culture 
underlying  Horwitz  and  Wakefield’s  definition  of  pathological  mental  states.  The 
problem with this opposition is that it overlooks the fact that to set apart  cultural and 
natural factors in human lives (Brinkmann 2013, p. 111) is impossible. Facts and values 
are necessarily intertwined as long as the human condition is concerned (Ehrenberg 2004, 
p. xvi).
2.4 - Is this the epidemic of depression or the epidemic of money?
The rise in antidepressant treatment, particularly prescriptions for new generation 
antidepressants or selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) is frequently interpreted 
as a chief causal factor to the emergence of the so-called epidemic of depression.
Direct-to-consumer advertising and other phenomena involving different types of 
incentives  that  pharmacological  companies  offer  to  health  practitioners  so  that  they 
prescribe its compounds (Rosenthal et al. 2003, cited in Hansen 2005) are some of the 
elements underlying this kind of interpretation.
Concerning the statistics  for  antidepressants’ rates  of  sale, medication such as 
Prozac, Paxil, Zoloft etc. are now among the largest selling prescription drugs of any sort. 
During the 1990s, spending for antidepressants increased by 600% in the USA, exceeding 
$7 billion annually by the year 2000 (Horwitz 2002).
A recent article in the New York Times (Rabin 2013) reports that over the last two 
decades one in 10 Americans uses antidepressants, and that among women in their 40s 
and  50s,  the  figure  is  one  in  four.  Such  extensive  use  of  antidepressants  certainly 
suggests,  as the article continues to argue,  that depression is being misdiagnosed and 
antidepressants overly prescribed.  
In  Canada,  between 1981 and 2000,  total  prescriptions  for  all  antidepressants 
increased by 353% from 3 to 14.5 million (Currie 2005).
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Analyzing  the  wholly  complex  interplays  between  psychopharmacology 
companies, researchers, universities and medications, David Healy in his book Let them 
Eat  Prozac (2004b)  claims  that  the  phenomenon  of  the  prevalence  of  depression  in 
extraordinary  and  unwarranted  scale  is  a  reality  fundamentally  created  by  the 
antidepressants’ history. After antidepressants, says Healy (2004b), depression transited 
from a hardly unrecognized condition to a real epidemic.
The  numbers  presented  by  Healy  (2004b,  p.  4)  are  striking.  While   before 
antidepressants, only about fifty to one hundred per million were thought to suffer from 
what was then melancholia, figures today reach the staggering number of one hundred 
thousand affected people per million, and this, despite the availability of treatments.
He  also  presents  data  (Healy  2004c,  p.  8)  which  estimate  that  sales  of 
antidepressants  soared  in  the  UK  and  the  USA through  the  1990s  while  sales  of 
tranquillizers  flattened.  Since  the  volume  of  sales  of  psychotropic  drugs  for  mental 
problems remains approximately constant, this indicates that what is involved, at least in 
part,  is  not  a  detection  of  new  cases  of  depression  but  a  transformation  of  anxiety 
disorders into cases of depression.
Still,  when  depression  becomes  corporatized,  treatment  is  sold  to  everyone, 
including doctors and patients. In his essay  Good Science or Good Business? (2004a), 
Healy  calls  attention  to  the  pharmaceutical  industry’s  highly  developed  skills  for 
gathering and disseminating evidence in consonance to its business interests. Among the 
methods  used  towards  this  goal,  he  mentions  the  convening  of  what  he  terms  as 
“consensus conferences”, the sponsoring of symposia, and of patient groups to lobby for 
treatments.  Over  time,  these strategies  are  able  to  produce significant  changes  in  the 
mentality of clinicians and the public, who learn to recognize many other kinds of cases 
as depression (Healy 2004a, p. 75) and to incorporate the biopsychiatric interpretation of 
depression as the only possible explanation.
The  psychiatrist  Philippe  Pignarre  argues,  similarly,  that as  with  any  other 
product,  a  market  should  be  created  for  antidepressants.  Psychopharmaceutical 
companies, he argues, have been successful in doing that by “recruiting depressives” for 
their  medications,  converting depression into a sort  of fake epidemic (Pignarre  2001, 
cited in Petersen 2011, p. 20).
Japan is an interesting case. Before SSRIs were promoted by a pharmaceutical 
company in 1999,  experiences  such as  melancholia  and fragility were understood by 
Japanese people as part of life, not pathological conditions to be alleviated.  However, 
after the company’s education campaigns, wherein drug company representatives visited 
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doctors  to  promote  the  prescription  of  SSRIs  for  symptoms  like  “heavy  head,  stiff 
shoulders,  sleep  problems,  backache,  tiredness,  laziness  and  poor  appetite”,  a  new 
‘disease’,  kokoro  no  kaze,  was  established,  and  sales  of  SSRIs  in  Japan  quintupled 
between 1998 and 2003 (Currie 2005, p. 11).
Obviously,  this  increase  could  be  credited  to  the  emergence  of  a  welcoming 
awareness  for  a  problem that,  previously,  used  to  be  undiagnosed and under-treated. 
That’s exactly what the product manager for Paxil conveys: “People (in Japan) didn’t 
know they were suffering from a disease. We felt it was important to reach out to them. 
The message was that depression can be cured by medicine” (Currie 2005, p. 11).
What  Paxil’s  product  manager  seems  to  leave  unfocused,  however,  is  that 
Japanese  people  have  been  suffering  severe  pressure  in  work  environments  through 
managerial  practices  that  reveal  the country’s  own assimilation of capitalist  values,  a 
situation that fuels depression and, in many cases, suicide. Besides, at school, wherein the 
system is  extremely competitive,  as  Japanese  authorities  admit,  episodes  of  violence 
(often leading to assassination) have become increasingly frequent. Finally, there is the 
alarming phenomenon of “Hikikomori”6, a Japanese term to refer to the experience of 
reclusive  adolescents  or  young  adults  who  drop  out  of  school  and  voluntarily  lock 
themselves in their rooms, refusing to go out even to have meals or to use the toilet. In 
conjunction, these social phenomena suggest that a biological interpretation of depression 
in  Japanese  societies  (and  the  consequent  adoption  of  the  Western  model  for 
understanding it without further scrutiny) tend to be a gross, perhaps ideological, mistake. 
In this sense, it  rings true that  financial interests of pharmaceutical companies selling 
antidepressants have somehow ‘created’ depression as a medical malady in Japan.
Junko Kitanaka, in his book Depression in Japan: Psychiatric Cures for a Society  
in Distress (2012) analyzes the institutionalization of depression as a medical subject in 
Japan.  Being depression  historically  envisaged in  Japanese  society as  a  phenomenon 
linked to overwork, the “Japanese-style of medicalization” does not deny the cultural 
argument.  Rather,  it  actively  incorporates  this  perspective  setting  forth  a  ‘marriage’ 
between biological and social causes that threatens to blur the distinction between the two 
(Kitanaka 2012).
Kitanaka  remarks  that  even  though  the  incorporation  of  the  social  in  the 
etiological  understanding  of  depression  might  sound  as  a  triumph  of  the  Japanese 
worker’s movement, in social practice, he explains, there seems to be an apparent tension 
between the way by which the social language of depression are being used by different 
6 A documentary about the problem is available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=0RooegHMXFg.
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social actors. While workers and their supporters employ this social discourse as a way to 
vocalize collective discontents and fight for social transformation, the same discourse is 
also used by industry and the state as a way to  quieting such sentiments (Kitanaka 2012, 
p. 10).
Thus, at the end of the day, even if the ‘overwork issue’ and other cultural factors 
are  referred  as  part  of  depression’s  equation,  it’s  medicine,  and  more  particularly, 
antidepressants that should address the problem.
In sum,  depression seems, indeed, to be entangled in an increasingly powerful 
web of economic interests, which implies that any analysis of the startling dimension of 
its  rates  in  contemporary  times  must  acknowledge  the  existence  of  depression  as  a 
profitable commodity.
2.5 - The drug is what tells the diagnostic
The  so-called  “drug  cartography”  (Radden  2003,  p.  38)  is  another  factor 
interfering with the expansion of depression throughout contemporary Western societies.
The  term  stands  for  an  emerging  phenomenon:  before  the  persistent  and 
convoluted etiological difficulties inherent to mental problems, psychiatric categories are 
remapped based on psychopharmacological effects.
In other words, the current research in psychopharmacology is leading biological 
psychiatrists to assert a causal model for psychiatric classification. Through the lens of 
this  new  “drug  taxonomy”  (Kramer  1993)  depression  is  no  longer  determined  by a 
specific  set  of  symptoms,  but  it  is  to  be  seen  as  every  condition  alleviated  by 
antidepressants.
That is, if a certain substance alleviates different mental conditions, one should 
conclude that each of these conditions has a common underlying cause. Hence, even in 
cases where their signs and symptoms are different, they are to be seen either as similar 
or as the very same condition under different guises (Hansen 2003).
For example, Luhrmann (2000, p.49) remarks that if a supposed manic-depressive 
does respond to lithium or another mood stabilizer, a psychiatrist will wonder whether 
after all he is a schizophrenic.
Discussing this issue, Radden (2003) notes that, at a first glance, such an approach 
might overcome controversies on whether to equate conditions manifested in different 
cultures through different clusters of symptoms, as the same pathological condition or 
not.  That  is,  discussions  on  whether  Chinese  and  African  depression,  fundamentally 
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characterized by somatic symptoms should be equated with Western depression, would 
find a direct answer through drug cartography’s perspective. If each of these different 
symptom clusters were effectively treated through antidepressants, they should receive 
the same diagnosis: depression.
Through  ‘listening  to  the  drug’ (Kramer  1993)  in  clinical  practice,  diagnoses 
proliferate  under  the  logic  of  the  drug,  undermining  both  psychopathological  and 
descriptive concerns. Hence, if representative samples of patients who do not necessarily 
meet the current clinical criteria of depression, nonetheless respond well to fluoxetine, 
then  we  may  need  to  reconsider  our  criteria  of  depression.  Kramer  calls  this  “…
diagnostic  bracket  creep,  the  expansion  of  categories  to  match  the  scope of  relevant 
medications” (1993, p. 15).
The ‘drug cartography’ has, however, obvious shortcomings. Since responses to 
the same drug may differ in two patients with the same condition and may be the same in  
two patients with different medical conditions (Zachar 2000), drugs and its effects cannot 
provide a safe ground for resolving diagnostic issues.
Notwithstanding the problems, ‘drug cartography’ has been gaining strength. On 
the domain of depression, given the fact that antidepressants can also alleviate a varied 
set  of  different  pathologies,  the  “drug  cartography”  rationale  implies  that  these 
disturbances  hide  an  underlying  depression.  As  a  result,  many  other  conditions  are 
annexed  to  depression,  such  as  anxiety,  bulimia,  cancerous,  gastric  and  neck  pain, 
alcoholism, constipation, hair loss and others, inflating the rates of depression.
2.6 - Depression as a discursive reality
Another approach to the problem of the alleged ‘era of depression’ is defended by 
social constructivist perspectives.
Pérez-Álvarez, Saas and García-Montes (2008) draw on this perspective to claim 
that  psychiatric  and  clinical  expectations  and  diagnostic  trends  do  influence  the 
presentation of symptoms and the nature of disorders. In the case of depression, people 
would acquire, from the cultural idioms that pervade their social environment, especially 
those  derived  from  the  psychiatric  framework,  specific  codes  to  articulate  certain 
experiential conflicts and other life’s vicissitudes as ‘depression’. As a result, the era of 
epidemic depression flourishes in connection to the “dominant cultural model” for mental 
illnesses (Pérez- Álvarez Saas & García-Montes 2008, p. 216).
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Ehrenberg (2010b) opposes the idea of mental illnesses as a discursive reality – 
that marks the claims of some social constructionist approaches - arguing that individuals 
do not live under a description and that conceiving mental illnesses this way would have 
the epistemological consequence of reducing a psychopathological fact to a by-product of 
the activity of mental health professionals and other social factors.
The  authors’  point  is  that  the  so-called  era  of  depression  is,  ultimately, 
consequence of a cultural process in which people learn to frame certain conflicts and 
painful vicissitudes of life (which in the past would be articulated in religious or moral 
terms)  in  terms  of  a  mental  pathology amenable  to  medical  treatment,  labeling  it  as 
‘depression’  (Pérez- Álvarez Saas & García-Montes, p. 215). It is not, therefore, that 
people nowadays call “depression” a suffering that have always been there but unnamed. 
Rather,  through  the  very  act  of  labeling  certain  conflicts  and  difficulties  of  life  as 
depression - which implies agreeing about its definition, fundamental signs, symptoms, 
prognosis and therapeutics - depression has been socially constructed. As a result, people 
tend to experience as depression (in its socially instituted ways and forms) what they 
would otherwise experience differently.
The idea that discourse determines both the presentation of symptoms and the 
very nature of mental disorders is what, in a nutshell,  Pérez- Álvarez Saas & García-
Montes (2008) are arguing.
The issue of the medicalization and the pathologisation of life's problems is, I 
think, one of the important questions that arguments about the linguistic construction of 
mental disorders in general and depression in particular, may possibly help to address.
Indeed,  there  is  a  large  and  increasingly  widespread  tendency  in  Western 
contemporary societies to construe as a mental disorder (amenable to medical treatment) 
what  otherwise  would  be  experienced  as  problems  in  living  (rooted  in  contextual 
determinants  to  be  addressed)  or  as  no  problem at  all.   “And because  patients  (like 
clinicians)  are  targets  of  marketing by the  pharmaceutical  industry,  they may end up 
having the disorders that the drugs treat” (Pérez- Álvarez Saas & García-Montes, 2008, p. 
219)
This does not mean, however – the authors explicitly concede - to deny the reality 
of pathology and suffering. Pérez- Álvarez, Saas and García-Montes (2008) seem to have 
this  question  in  mind.  The  authors  argue  that  the  question  is  not  really  to  exclude 
psychological, physiological and societal questions, but to determine how much of the 
domain of mental disorder can be understood as being produced by linguistic practices 
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associated  with  medical  /  psychological  expectations  and  diagnostic  trends  (2008,  p. 
213)..
I think this is a reasonable way of putting the issue. That is, on the one hand, 
mental  pathologies,  as  depression,  are  produced  by  the  dominant  linguistic 
representations  of  the  problems  of  life  (as  mental  disorders  with  a  certain  course, 
symptomatology and prognostic). On the other, depression is also a phenomenon rooted 
in  the biological  and psychological  levels  of  human experience which  exist  within a 
broader context of specific sociocultural practices.
2.7 - In few words… how ‘depression epidemics’ is to be understood?
The  study  acknowledges  the  determinant  role  of  all  the  previously  analyzed 
factors  to  the  construction  of  depression  as  a  contemporary  epidemic.  That  is,  the 
epidemic of depression in contemporary times should be critically analyzed and even 
questioned as an objective reality. As Borch-Jacobsen (2002) argue, since there is no such 
a thing like a virus causing depression, the question persists: why its few cases in the 
1950s have expanded into the millions of cases in the 1990s? In search for understanding, 
the  facile  interpretation  of  the  problem  as  a  natural,  objective  and  always  existing 
biological phenomenon which now becomes visible thanks to scientific advancements is 
unconvincing. First, and considering the pathologisation of life problems (which includes 
the marketing  of  depression as  an undiagnosed and expanding reality),  the  idea  of  a 
contemporary  epidemic  of  depression  as  a  biological  phenomenon  sounds  barely 
ideological.  Second,  the  admittedly  concrete  experience  of  anguish,  inhibition, 
meaninglessness that plagues large numbers of people in contemporary times cannot be 
envisaged  as  an  always  existing,  unchangeable  phenomenon  for  the  simple  fact  that 
human  life  is  as  biological  as  it  is  historical  and  social.  Saying  that  means  to 
acknowledge, in consistence to the social constructionist argument, that a   of individual’s 
experiences of suffering, crises and conflicts have been framed as 'depression' because 
the pharmacological, medical and social discourses propagate the view of this clinical 
entity as an objective reality (Borch-Jacobsen 2002).
Kehl (2009a, p. 212) referring to her clinical experience with depressed patients 
points out that when the signifier of depression is generalized, becoming synonymous to 
existential suffering, the neurotic will tend to identify with its symptoms in search for an 
identity and a legitimated place within the discourse of medicine and psychiatry.
44
However, the thesis’ argument is that even though the ‘epidemic of depression’ is, 
to a large extent, a discursive construction, the fact that increased numbers of individuals 
have been fitting into this  “model of being ill”  is  to be considered.  That is,  beyond 
discourse  –  that  characterizes  depression  as  a  cognitive,  emotional  and  physical 
dysfunction whose solution must be technical – or, along with the discursive creation of 
depression, depressive feelings and behavior (and depression’s inflated rates) also refer to 
the phenomenological  experience of  individuals  as  they live  life  in  the  world–  in  its 
biological, psychological, historical and social levels.
In other words, because mental disorders in contemporary times are, to a large 
extent, the social construction of the vicissitudes of life as psychological or psychiatric 
problems,  one  should  not  rule  out  the  existence  of  mental  disorders  as  a 
psychopathological fact. Hence, the large rates of depression in contemporary times, I am 
arguing, not only reveal discursive practices in which certain vicissitudes of life congeal 
into the cultural idiom of depression, but it also refers to individuals’ concrete existences 
(within the time and space where they live). The thesis is an effort to illuminate some of 
these issues, on the sociocultural level of analysis.
The concreteness and empirical reality of depression in the contemporary western 
world  is  suggested  by  one  of  the  most  grave  and  fatal  consequences  of  depression: 
suicide. Even though suicide rates cannot, in any case, be seen as corresponding or even 
indicating the social prevalence of depressive states, it’s very probable that a significant 
number  of  suicides  may somehow be  associated  with  depression.  The World  Health  
Organization (2012) estimates that even though suicide is complex, with psychological, 
social,  biological,  cultural  and  environmental  factors  involved,  mental  disorders 
(particularly depression and alcohol use disorders) are a major risk factor for suicide in 
Europe and North America.
In the same report, we find the alarming statistics that, on a global scale, suicide 
cases  suffered  a  60% increase  in  the  last  45 years,  which  means  that  for  each  forty 
seconds,  one person voluntarily causes her  own death.   Regarding the distribution of 
suicide prevalence in  different  social  groups,  although traditionally suicide rates  have 
been highest among the male elderly, the rates among young people have been increasing 
to such an extent that they are now the group at highest risk in a third of countries, in both 
developed and developing countries. The report remarks, yet, that these already alarming 
figures could be even greater if it included suicide attempts, which are up to 20 times 
more frequent than completed suicide.
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The  growth  in  suicide  rates  is  an  undeniable,  visible  and  dark  signal  of  our 
contemporary hardships. And while the large rates of depression can be interpreted as a 
mere shadow of factors which are external to it as a psychopathological reality, suicide 
suggests (without proving) that depression crescent presence in contemporary societies is 
also a concrete reality.
We argue thus that the phenomenon of “depression epidemic’ would be better 
understood if it is addressed as a complex effect generated by the association of many 
forces alien to the reality of depression as a mental disturbance and a psychopathological 
phenomenon pregnant with the current modus vivendi of contemporary civilizations.
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Chapter  3:  Understanding  and  explaining  depression  as  pathology  of 
meaninglessness in contemporary times: epistemological reflections
3.1 - Are we living in a new epoch? Terminological decisions and its underpinnings
The issue of whether the present era should be seen as a complete distinct epoch 
than modernity or as a radicalization of modern patterns is marked by disagreement.
The variety of terms to refer to the present epoch clearly expresses the lack of 
consensus around this issue. Some authors envisage these transformations as constituting 
a new, postmodern era (Baudrillard 1994; Harvey 1990; Jameson 1991; Lyotard 1984), in 
a consideration of the present epoch as a moment that follows, and is in reference to, 
modernity.  Other  scholars  adopt  expressions  such as “third modernity”  (Carlehedesen 
2001; Wagner 1994) “high modernity”, “late modernity”, “reflexive modernity”, “liquid 
modernity”  etc.  (Bauman  2004;  Beck  1992;  Giddens  1991)  to  describe  the  period, 
emphasizing a relation of continuity between the present moment and the modern era. 
There is  still  a whole variety of  other  terms to designate the current  period,  such as 
postindustrial  or  consumer  society,  the  society  of  the  media  or  the  spectacle, 
multinational capitalism and so on. Another common designation appears under the more 
encompassing rubric of ‘contemporary epoch’, which does not focus on the discussion 
about whether we have entered or not in a new era, the postmodernity.
An interesting claim in defense of the permanence of Modernity (although in a 
deeply transformed form) is proposed by Kaya (2004). He argues that if Modernity is 
characterized by inherent tensions and openness, transformations are an expectable part 
of  the  modern  process  and  thus,  it’s  not  necessary  to  work  outside  Modernity  to 
acknowledge  and  understand  these  (admittedly radical)  shifts.  In  contrast,  he  claims, 
conceptions  that  embrace  a  partial  view  of  modernity  as  an  epoch  fully  based  on 
rationality whilst  modern pluralism is  rendered invisible,  tend to  interpret  the radical 
pluralism that comes to mark contemporary ideas and practices as an indication that a 
new era has begun (Kaya 2004, p. 47).
Indeed, Modernity had, from the very beginning, the seeds of today’s ‘empire of 
doubt’ planted on its  own soil.  Thus, the increasing skepticism towards the totalizing 
nature of metanarratives (Lyotard 1984) - which influences many other postmodernist 
perspectives - seems more an expectable fate than a drastic rupture.
The  conceptual  polarization  among  postmodernist  and  modernist  thinkers  has 
been  losing  strength.  Lately,  even  those  scholars  who  use  the  term  ‘postmodernity’ 
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usually don’t take it literally - as a complete superation of modernity - but as a way to 
illuminate the significance of the transformations which have been impacting our lives 
and societies from around the middle of the last century.
Dufour  (2008),  for  instance,  recognizes  postmodernity as  a  time marked by a 
historical  mutation  in  which  modernity’s  collective  narratives  of  foundation  and 
legitimization are left behind – in this sense a drastic rupture, “ … a crack in modernity” 
as he puts it (2008, p. 15) – whilst acknowledging the permanence of  “…vast zones that 
are [still] modern or even premodern” (2008, p. 12).
Beyond discussions on the internal coherence and doubts about the validity of the 
term ‘postmodernity’, what makes the “modernity/postmodernity” debate relevant is, in 
my opinion,  neither  the  discussion  about  the  best  term  to  label  the  period,  nor  the 
conceptual decision about whether or not recent transformations warrant the analytical 
demarcation  of  a  new era.  Given the fact  that,  generally speaking,  both  modern  and 
postmodern approaches tend to acknowledge that multiple and even hybrid modern and 
contemporary elements seem to be present in both periods - even though the so-called 
postmodernist  thinkers  sometimes  seem to  exaggerate  the  novelties  and to  downplay 
continuities  (Kellner  1992) -  the debate’s relevance lies,  mainly,  in  their  specific  and 
often complementary contributions to the wider discussion and deeper understanding of 
the different aspects of the contemporary condition.
This  mindset  becomes  manifest  in  our  selection  of  the  term  ‘contemporary 
civilizations’ which is the privileged way by which the present epoch is designated in this 
study.  By  selecting  neither  ‘modernity’ nor  ‘post-modernity’ two  main  implications 
follow.
On the one hand, we leave open (or unfocused) the discussion of whether or not 
we are living in a radically new historical moment, investing instead on the understanding 
of the complex and often contradictory nature of these changes. On the other hand, the 
term ‘contemporary Western civilizations’ implies that the transformations recently lived 
in  the  West  are  significant  and  deep  enough  to  justify  the  replacement  of  the  term 
‘modernity’.
Thereby, the thesis envisages ‘Western contemporary civilizations’ as a term that 
points  to  a  cluster  of  shifts,  some  of  which  are  pathogenic,  emergent  pathological 
tendencies  which have been fueling ‘crises  of  meaninglessness’ throughout  the social 
body, calling forth the broadening presence of depression.
In his  Postmodernism, or the Cultural logic of Late Capitalism (1991) Jameson 
interprets  the  pathogenic  traits  of  contemporary  times  as  the  symptomatology  of 
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postmodernism.  Postmodernism,  in  Jameson’s  accounts,  designates  the  cultural  form 
inherent  to  the  logic  of  late  capitalism,  which  works  at  the  level  of  culture  and 
subjectivity.
Among the consequences of postmodernism for subjectivity,  Jameson analyzes 
the production of a new model of subjective formation – a ‘schizophrenic subject’ living 
by a “ ... series of pure and unrelated presents in time” (1991, p. 35) - able to adjust and  
flow in a peculiar socioeconomic world (1991, p. xv). The schizophrenic subject exists in 
a cultural order marked by a series of traits, such as: the weakening of historicity, wherein 
the  historical  past  turns  into  emptied,  commoditized  stylizations  (‘pastiches’)  to  be 
consumed;  a  new  depthlessness  /  superficiality,  which  finds  expression  both  in 
contemporary theory (vis a vis the postmodern rejection of the idea of ‘truth’ beyond the 
surface of ideology) and in the whole culture of image, wherein there is no transcendental 
meaning standing behind image (Jameson 1991), among others.
Jameson’s  symptomatology  of  postmodernism  as  a  function  of  the  epoch’s 
reliance on “the cultural logic of capitalism” wherein multiple spheres of life become 
pervaded by intense commodification is  consistent with the thesis’ general theoretical 
framework.  However,  the  analysis  of  the  pathogenic  features  of  contemporary 
civilizations to be developed in the following chapters are more directly informed – as 
noted in the introduction - by Georg Simmel’s and   Émile Durkheim’s accounts on the 
modern epoch in dialogue with the more contemporary ideas of the French philosopher 
Dany-Robert Dufour.
Now, some of Jameson’s ideas are very much in line – at least in its general tone 
of themes and concerns - with Dufour’s perspective on postmodernity as the decline of 
transcendental values in a societal context dominated by unfettered capitalism.
Both Dufour and Jameson detect the waning of criticism (which characterized 
modernism and the modern subject) and its replacement by a postmodernist cultural order 
in sync with the logic of consumer capitalism. For instance, similarly to Jameson, Dufour 
(2008, 2009, 2013) illuminates the pathogenic impacts brought about by “… the gradual 
ascendancy of commodities – to the detriment of all other considerations – …” (2008, p. 
15) both to culture (leading to desymbolization and thus cultural impoverishment) and to 
individuality. Concerning the latter, Dufour claims that postmodernity’s emergent subject-
form combines with the capital’s demand for malleable, flexible individuals, continuously 
sensitive to new fashions and available for subtle forms of social control; a precarious, 
acritical individual displaying psychotic tendencies “… open to all kinds of fluctuating 
identities   and who is  therefore ready to be plugged into every commodity”  (Dufour 
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2008, p. 12). The idea is, of course, not far from Jameson’s depiction of the postmodern 
‘schizophrenic  subject’,  whose  ability  to  adjust  to  the  flow  of  commodities  aids, 
according to Jameson (1991), the replication and reinforcement of the capitalist logic.
These themes - re-elaborated and re-interpreted in the thesis – will be instrumental 
for the elaboration of our own diagnostic of the pathogenic effects of contemporary times 
marked by intense financialization of culture.
3.2 – Doing research after postmodernism: epistemological decisions
These days, epistemological decisions of a contemporary researcher working in 
the field of social sciences are necessarily affected by the fact that the belief on universal 
standards of truth became, in contemporary times, weary and contested.
In  this  regard,  postmodernism  is  at  the  center  of  the  controversies.  In  its 
consequence for research methods, postmodernist perspectives can to a certain extent be 
considered a methodological critique of conventional quantitative and qualitative social 
science.  Now,  this  may  render  research  a  radically  skeptical,  merely  deconstructive 
venture or, in its more affirmative consequences, it may inspire a non-naïve, and more 
honest attitude regarding claims on ‘truth validation’ and ‘the purity of knowledge’.
However, due to the proclamation of a dichotomic opposition between reason and 
contingency  that  impregnates  some  of  the  themes  raised  under  the  banner  of 
postmodernism, rationality risks being conceived as mere rhetoric. This can foster radical 
skepticism which, in turn, may function as a rhetorical thinking itself, undoing critique 
and social practices that oppose the consensual idea of the ‘end of history’ (Duayer & 
Moraes 1997, p. 28)7.
In sum, epistemological  caution,  refining “…our sensitivity to differences  and 
reinforcing our ability to tolerate the incommensurable” (Lyotard 1984, cited in Kellner 
1992)  sounds  very  reasonable.  However,  the  process  through  which  sensitivity  for 
epistemological complexity shifts into cynicism, political immobilization, the collapse of 
critique,  of  theory  and  the  effacement  of  any  sense  of  shared  humanity  beyond 
individualized discourse is, I think, to be analyzed in its historical roots and challenged.
7 The argument that contemporary culture has reached “the end of history” refers, in the 
work of American critic Francis Fukuyama (1992), to the idea that history had ended or 
"vanished" with the spread of globalization and the achievement of modern aspirations of 
freedom  and  justice;  In  some  postmodernist  accounts,  as  for  instance  in  Jean 
Baudrillard‘s  (1994)  work,  this  end  should  be  understood  as  the  collapse  of  the 
very idea of historical progress and the disappearance of all utopic visions for both the 
political Right and the Left .
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The alternative might be, therefore, to espouse a less extreme consideration of 
knowledge  neither  as  the  mirror  of  truth,  nor  as  a  mere  narrative,  but  instead  as 
perspective,  illumination  and the  search  for  credible  theories  about  reality  (Alvesson 
2002).
As  Alvesson  (2002,  p.  15)  notes,  truth  claims  are  problematic;  yet,  the 
understanding of social issues should be pursued beyond, on the one hand, any totalizing 
attempt to capture all facets of life in a photographic-like manner through a monolithic 
vocabulary and, on the other, the radical negation of theory in favour of mere ‘discourse 
seduction’ and pragmatic consensus.
Further, if doubting the existence of claims to truth outside ideology or textuality 
may defeat dangerous desires for totality (in both epistemological and political levels) it 
may also – in its most radical forms - fit right into the hands of capitalism.
This  ambiguity  is  well  captured  by  Terry Eagleton:  “Its  nervousness  of  such 
concepts as truth has alarmed the bishops and charmed the business executives, just as its 
compulsions to place words like ‘reality’ in scare quotes unsettles the pious Burger in the 
bosom of his family but is music to his ears in his advertising agency” (1996, p. 28).
The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  above  reflections  is  that  neither  a 
full/uncritical agreement nor an outright rejection of postmodernist ideas seems to be the 
best epistemological approach.
Besides,  all  critical  considerations  about  postmodernism do  not  entail,  in  my 
analysis, neither a nostalgic reaction of the “will to order” (Featherstone 1988, p. 204), 
nor it is a sign of filiation to the ‘Marxist utopia’. Rather, it implies the more integrating 
view that the postmodernist intellectual orientation has, in its consequences to sociology, 
both strengths and weaknesses.
3.3  -  Reflections  on  understanding  and explaining  depression  in  the  ‘age  of  the 
brain’
Notwithstanding  the  decline  of  positivist  methodologies  in  certain  circles  of 
scholarly research and the linked rising of the ‘postmodern agenda’ (Wood 1999), the 
epistemological scenario of human and social  sciences is  endowed with contradictory 
aspects.
In a recent article entitled The Human Sciences in a Biological Age (2012) Nikolas 
Rose claims that popular science’s speculations on the supposed capacity to understand 
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and manipulate everything from our cognitive abilities to aging and death constitute “a 
dream of control” (Rose 2012, p. 4).
As  analyzed  in  the  first  chapter,  in  the  area  of  mental  illness  research, 
neuroscientific knowledge is at the center of discussions. In some of its strands, the task 
to understand the mind and virtually all social issues is seen as ultimately dependent on 
developments of experimental knowledge about the brain.
Yet,  the  so-called  medical  naturalism  that  underpins  the  Kraepelinian  shape  of 
contemporary  psychiatric  nosology,  assumes  the  existence  of  a  real  world  of  natural 
disease entities which can be accurately described (Pilgrim & Bentall 1999).
There is nothing more dissonant to the pos-modernist intellectual mindset that we 
have briefly discussed above, than these so-called ‘dreams of control’ - which are, in fact, 
continuously threatened by unresolved downsides and disappointments, especially in the 
mental health domain (Rose 2012).
Expressing the influence of the postmodernist intellectual orientation in the field of 
social sciences, Rose (2012) notes, sociological common sense has long been associating 
the  definition  of  human  life  as  ultimately  biological  (and  amenable  to  control  and 
prediction)  “…  with  essentialism,  determinism,  reductionism,  fatalism;  with  the 
naturalisation of human delinquencies from sexism to warfare; and with a bloody legacy 
of horrors from racial science to eugenics” (Rose 2012, p.1).
However, these two opposite trends share space in the Human Sciences within the 
‘biological age’. Rose goes as far as to claim that ‘constructivism’ is already passé whilst, 
currently, the rhetoric of materiality is almost obligatory (2012, p. 2).
This  opposition  could  be  analyzed  in  several  levels,  including  questioning,  as 
Nikolas Rose does, if the social science’s “negation of biology”- based on its dread of 
determinism,  reductionism,  and  on  the  recognition  of  the  ethical  and  socio-political 
consequences of locating humans among the animals - should not be balanced by a more 
positive consideration to the new ways of understanding the dynamic relations between 
‘the vital’ and its milieu, without losing its critical grip (Rose 2012, p. 16).
But the point I want to highlight here refers not to the problematic of opposition 
but, instead, to the problematic of resemblance. I am referring to the paradoxical fact that 
the polarization of some of the ferocious critics of positivism may, in some aspects, evoke 
the  same  partial  view  of  understanding  wherein  (even  though  implicitly)  only  the 
empirical domain of life is sustained.
This critique is pivotal in the works of authors such as Roy Bhaskar and  György 
Lukács (Duayer 2006) who argue that the impugnation of ontological ideas that marks 
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both  positivist  and  constructionist  approaches,  is  paralleled  by  an  implicit  ontology 
rooted in the empirical domain of reality.
Duayer (2006, p. 124), drawing on Bhaskar’s ideas, argues that by refusing to think 
about  the  world  as  it  is,  empirical  realism –  a  term used by Bhaskar  to  refer  to  an 
ontology  of  Humean  inspiration  which  underlies  both  classical  empiricism,  logical 
positivism and, negatively,  more ‘skeptical strands’ which oppose the latter  - ends up 
limiting  the  understanding  of  the  world  to  its  immediacy and practical  worth.  Thus, 
behind the supposed neutrality of the radical anti-ontology of both positivism and the 
‘postmodern agenda’, there is an occult ontology, in which the world is collapsed into 
experience and sensations.
From the side of postmodernism, the view that there’s no conceivable reality outside 
of language potentially feeds the idea that the privileged aim of knowledge and perhaps 
the sole criteria to assess its worth and accuracy is utility – a notion especially important 
in Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism8.
Now, utility is clearly a term which fits nicely with claims of ‘truth collapse’, but 
also with neuroscience’s ‘dreams of control’.
On  the  one  hand,  social  constructionists’  approaches  to  medical  knowledge 
challenge  the  presentation  of  disease  as  'natural'  by medicine,  as  well  as  the  neutral 
character of the scientific enterprise and of rationality in medical thought and practice. 
Medical definitions are, from this perspective, founded not on reason but on a complex 
web of social relations in a particular point of time. Still, scientific development is seen 
as being rooted not in progress, but in shifting power struggles (Bury 1986). As a result, 
and since rationality is  not to be conceived as something external to  social  relations, 
scientific accounts can only be adjudicated through its usefulness in a particular context.
On the other hand, in the domain of mental health research, the ‘essentialist’ views 
of some of the reductionist versions of biopsychiatry and neurosciences tend to empty all 
the historical, culturally-based, psychological, moral meanings of mental illnesses to the 
sake of allegedly objective and ‘useful’ truths of the brain.
Beyond the domain of epistemological and ontological discussions, the prevalence 
of practice and utility over theory, according to György Lukács, is a problem rooted in the 
broader structures of society. For him, the need to regulate all dimensions of social life 
8 Richard  Rorty  (1997)  argues  that  epistemological  concerns  should  be  replaced  by 
pragmatic  concerns  with  practices  for  coping  with  the  world.  His  ideas,  therefore, 
although sharing  with other  postmodernist  a  skeptical  orientation based on a  kind of 
‘anti-epistemology’  and  ‘anti-philosophy’,  differ  from  some  postmodernist  accounts 
which hold a deconstructionist focus without supporting any claims about the “utility of 
knowledge” (Cruikshank 2001).
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according  to  the  logics  of  capital  represents  some  of  the  central  structures  of 
contemporary  times,  expressed  into  a  philosophy  of  science  circumscribed  to  the 
manipulation of practical life (Duayer 2003, p. 16).
In sum, the crises and controversies in epistemology reflected in the philosophical 
debates surrounding the question of ‘postmodernism’ have meant that in a very important 
sense, the terrain of knowledge has been ceded to a resurgent positivism, empiricism, 
reductive biologism. The latter, by promising to dispense with such obscure and difficult 
philosophical  questions  of  the  nature  of  reality  and  the  conditions  of  possibility  of 
knowledge concerning reality, has filled the theoretical vacuum.  As a result, questions of 
understanding  and  explaining  reality  have  very  often  been  ‘stolen’ away  from  the 
humanities and social sciences,  whilst authority on such questions turns to the secure 
hands of scientists, doctors, pharmaceutical companies and Pharma-psychiatrists.
The aim and challenge of this study is to examine the issue of the increased rates of  
depression outside the logic of usefulness - and linked deflation of the critical worth of 
theory – which often marks both ‘postmodern approaches’ and ‘medical objectivism’.
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Chapter 4:  Reflections on the meaning of ‘meaning’, meaningless and meaningful 
lives
This  chapter  aims  to  specify how the  terms ‘meaning’,  ‘meaninglessness’ and 
‘meaningfulness’ are  understood,  delineating  within  this  complex  field  the  particular 
theoretical perspective of the thesis, aligned to the sociological motivations of this study.
Unlike animals, human beings do not live their lives by merely following what 
their instincts impel them to do. Although instinct plays its part, as conscious beings, men 
and women can behave in manners that contradict basic instinctual laws - at its limits, in 
suicide.
Human  life  is  not  resolved  by  and  upon  natural  impulses.  Men  and  women 
irremediably have to decide what to do with themselves and with life and the answer for 
this is in no way immediately given by nature. They have to find answers elsewhere.
For  while  non-human  animals  and  plants  simply persist  through  time, 
determined by the demands of survival and reproduction, human beings  lead their lives 
in the world (Mulhall 2005, p.15).
It  is  human  beings  alone  who  operate  in  their  everyday  lives  with  an 
understanding of Being (although implicit and imprecise). As Martin Heidegger puts it, 
“Dasein is ontically distinguished by the fact, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for 
it” (Heidegger 1962, cited in Wheeler 2013).
Humans  are  therefore  ‘dual  beings’.  On  the  one  hand,  they  have  a  symbolic 
identity responsible for the search for understanding and morality which place them out 
of  nature  -  or  beyond  mere  instinct.  On  the  other,  immanent  death  is  permanently 
bringing them back to their natural inherence (Becker 1973, p. 26).
Having this peculiar symbolic ability which impels them to question the unknown 
of their origin and fate, humans are marked by a quite ineluctable impulse and need to 
signify existence: “Why am I here? What is it all for?”. Or as Durkheim formulates it: 
“We cannot live without representing to ourselves the world around us” (2005, p. 38). 
Indeed, we cannot avoid, as human beings marked by the duality of nature and symbolic 
identity, to search for narratives about the experiences we live and the objects we come 
across.  These  narratives,  in  turn,  are  formed  through  the  symbolic  interactions  we 
establish with the group, constituting a certain culture. Culture is, in this sense, the shared 
and accumulated transcendence of Nature, or a means to live life beyond instincts.
In  a  classical  sociological  interpretation  of  the  ontological  duality  of 
individuals, Émile Durkheim (2005) critically asserts that the old “Homo duplex” idea 
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was correctly identified but left unexplained by philosophers from Plato to Kant. The 
fundamental key to account for human duality, he claims, would only be found if one 
refuses to merely accept it as a feature of the given nature of man / reality. Alternatively, a 
scientific  understanding  of  the  genesis  of  this  antinomy is  needed.  In  a  rationalistic 
manner, Durkheim claims that just as we now know that our bodily organism is a product  
of a genesis, our dual constitution cannot remain a sort of metaphysical mystery without 
verifiable causes. That’s what he sets out to examine.
Durkheim points out that human beings have always had a strong intuition of their 
dual nature. For instance, duality underpins the division established by distinct religious 
cosmologies at all times between, on one side, the body (forming an integral part of the 
material universe) and on the other, the soul (whose homeland lies elsewhere in the world 
of sacred things) (Durkheim 2005).
Durkheim (2005) adds that this opposition is represented by any ordinary person 
in  a  way that,  if  not identical,  is  at  least  comparable to  the way believers do.  He is 
referring  to  the  fact  that  our  human psychic  functions  are  generally ranked within  a 
hierarchy in which at the bottom lie the functions dependent on our bodies, while the 
function  connected  to  our  symbolic  capacities  (thinking  and  morality)  are  somehow 
conceived as a superior function, inspiring analogous feelings as those of the believer 
before the sacred.
From this observation – making here a long story short – Durkheim argues that 
the duality of our nature is “… only a particular case of the division of things into the 
sacred and profane that is found at the basis of all religions” (2005, p. 42). This division,  
in turn, corresponds to the universal human need of separating individual things from 
those  things  which,  going  beyond  the  individual,  cannot  be  touched  or  contested, 
providing individual life with structure, constraints and yet, elevating and vivifying the 
existence in ways that we are incapable of realizing when reduced to our own forces 
(Durkheim 1976, p. 209).
In sum,  the ‘dual  character’ of  human beings  is,  for  Durkheim, a  function  of 
human beings  social  rootedness.  That  is,  through participation  in  the  social  group,  a 
“collective conscience” emerges  (formed by symbolic  contents such as ideas,  beliefs, 
moral principles etc.). Being internalized by each individual, these symbolic contents are 
felt as part of their ‘second nature’, something other and greater than oneself (Durkheim 
1976) and totally distinct (in its role and worth) from corporal, ordinary functions.
And this is central, according to Durkheim, in terms of meaning constitution. For 
if nature, as we claimed above, does not in itself answer human beings’ questions about 
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existence,  society  –  manifested  in  the  symbolic  side  of  individuals  -  is  the  creative 
accomplishment of life, or to better define it according to Durkheim, the basic, mandatory 
necessity of humanity without which life could not be endowed with meaning. In other 
words, in a Durkheimian interpretation, meaning is fundamentally dependent on things 
beyond the individual in his isolation, things that we have in common with other humans, 
which simultaneously constrains and uplifts human lives. In fact, the very constitution of 
individual is at stake. In his words:
Left to himself the individual would become dependent upon physical forces. If 
he has been able to escape, to free himself, to develop a personality it is because 
he has been able to shelter under a  sui generis force; an intense force since it 
results from the coalition of all the individual forces, but an intelligent and moral 
force capable, consequently, of neutralizing the blind and amoral forces of nature. 
This is the collective force (1974, p. 55).
The symbolic, or in Durkheim’s terms, the social counterpart of human beings is 
essentially rooted in language. If  “… a man could not enter into relations with nature 
without taking account of its immensity, of its infiniteness…”, ideas and concepts that 
may  “substitute  the  obscure  sensation”  that  human  beings  had  of  natural  forces  are 
“impossible without the word” (Durkheim 1976, pp. 73, 74). Now,  it is unquestionable 
that language, and the system of concepts which it translates, is the product of collective 
representations (1976, p. 434), being thus beyond the sphere of the monadic individual. 
Thereby, inasmuch as there is any possibility to represent the world (and thus to render it 
meaningful) unless through language,  meaning is essentially rooted into the reality of 
collective life.
The collective narratives/representations  that  compose culture,  however,  whilst 
helping to ordinate issues of meaning, do not provide absolute rest and fullness. Through 
the fissures of cultural answers, meaninglessness lurks.
Anthropologically speaking, individuals constantly realize – not painlessly - that 
the continuous quest towards overcoming senselessness is not without its downfalls and 
doubts  about  the  meaning  of  existence  are  expectable  destinies  of  its  somewhat 
precarious equilibrium.
But  if  humans  have  a  psychological  vulnerability  to  crises  of  meaning, 
sociologically, problems of meaning are in any way a modern phenomenon. As it is clear 
from  the  very  beginning  of  recorded  history,  humanity  has  lived  through  some 
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troublesome  periods  wherein  meaningfulness  decreases  and  experiences  of 
meaninglessness pervade the social scene.
In his book The Open Society and its Enemies (2002), Karl Popper elaborates on 
the theme. In a nutshell, Popper claims that under conditions of political instability and 
insecurity,  a  fundamental  impulse  of  recovering  a  sense  of  totality  arises.  Thus,  this 
search for totality (and we might add, this yearning for meaning) is not in any way an 
originally  modern  experience;  contrarily,  it  is  found  at  least  since  the  philosophical 
impulses of Plato or earlier, Heraclitus (both of whom attempted to tackle the problem of 
an “unsettled social scene” by positing a law of historical development). More recently, 
Popper identifies “the spell of Plato” in the modern philosophical formulations of Hegel 
and Marx which, among others, attempted to bring historical change under some sort of 
totalizing rational control and large-scale planning (Popper 2002, p. 484).
Hence, to interpret, as I intend to do here, ‘crises of meaning/meaninglessness’ as 
a  social  malady  of  contemporary  times,  may  be  philosophically  seen  as  either  an 
oversimplification, or sociologically, as giving a mistaken accent to an old human burden.
This  caveat  is  in  part  warranted.   Human  beings  are  ‘always-in-search-for-
meaning’ creatures  and  thus  irremediably  vulnerable  to  doubts  or,  metaphorically,  to 
‘existential  stumbles’ on  the  darkness  of  signification  when  threading  in  the  inexact 
grounds of life purpose. As the Romanian playwright Eugène Ionesco puts it: “No society 
has been able to abolish human sadness, no political system can deliver us from the pain 
of living, from our fear of death, our thirst for the absolute. It is the human condition that  
directs the social condition, not vice versa” (Ionesco 1964, p. 91).
That’s not by chance, therefore, that some depressives, from the pinnacle of their 
doubts about existence, often grasp a meaningful link between their experiences and the 
intrinsic human sentiment of abandonment and anguish.
As the philosopher Robert C. Solomon claims, depression can be in some of its 
aspects,  "…our  most  courageous  attempt  to  open  ourselves  up  to  the  most  gnawing 
doubts about ourselves and our lives (…) In depression, we (literally) "press ourselves 
down," force on ourselves the burdens of universal doubt,  the Cartesian method on a 
visceral level” (1977, p. 295).
Indeed, and beyond any caricatured pessimism about the absurdity of existence, 
the inherently (but latent) human anguish in regard to the meaning of life is timeless, 
pervasive and irremediable (in its limits).
In  the  scope  of  sociological  analysis  –  as  we  are  going  to  elaborate  in  the 
following lines – there is any final, complete answer to the issue of meaning which is not 
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permanently available to doubts and change. However, even though the ignorance about 
the definitive meaning of existence is a burden for all human beings so that either a kind 
of personal ‘symbolic paralysis’ or (usually linked) cultural periods of collective meaning 
crisis can be seen as expectable ‘accidents’, there are possible outlets to meaning in life.
The anthropological impulse to understand and signify life through the creation 
(or encounter of) forms such as thinking, art, religion, philosophy, science, sociability, 
values and ideals reveal the collective ways humanity found in order to overcome, or at 
least to handle this precariousness.
Georg  Simmel’s  accounts  in  his  The  Conflict  in  Modern  Culture (1971b)  are 
paradigmatic on this respect. Simmel interest is not to discuss how the ‘meaning of life’ is 
to be understood in a general way but to analyze how  what he designates as  “the free 
flow  of  life”  needs  to  conform  into  specific  objective  formations,  expressing  and 
realizing itself by incarnating into laws, works of art, religions, science, traditions, etc. 
(Simmel 1971b, p. 375). These formations, according to Simmel, by providing provisory 
rests or incarnations for the intense, inherently formless and creative dynamism of life, 
deliver structures of meaning which endow life with form, order and content.
The  search  for  meaningfulness  is  thus,  simultaneously,  a  continuous  striving, 
something that,  as life itself,  “… streams on without interruption” (Simmel 1971b, p. 
376),  and  it  is  also  embodied  into  cultural  synthesis.  In  Simmel’s  words,  “Life  is 
inseparably  charged  with  contradiction.  It  can  enter  reality  only  in  the  form  of  its 
antithesis, that is, only in the form of form” (1971b, p. 392).
Historically, in the West, many collective formulations of the answer for the quest 
for meaning were attempted through forms such as Judeo-Christian traditions of belief, 
Platonic Idealism, Transcendental Idealism, Romanticism, the different forms of Utopia, 
or more recently, in a Nietzschean fashion, in the sheer affirmation of life premised upon 
the absence of  metaphysical  meanings.  In  the societal  life,  these ideas  incarnate  into 
‘sacred entities / forms’ such as God, Nature, Society, The Father Land, History and so 
on, which served, at least for a while, to guide humanity. I will return to this discussion 
later.
For now, I want to keep with the idea that the awareness of death as a limit of life 
leads human beings to a continuous search for significance to their trajectories.
In Simmel’s  The View of Life (2010) - which he wrote while he was struggling 
against cancer, considering it to be his ‘testament’ – the author presents the account of 
death as constitutive of life. This entails a conception of death, similarly to Heidegger’s 
notion  of  Being-towards-the-end  (2010,  p.  293),  wherein  finitude  is  not  seen  as  an 
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external, independent sever of the thread of life. Rather, death is inherently conjoined to 
life, shaping its entire course towards the need of transcendence.
Life  gets  its  form –  cultural  forms  such  as  those  previously  referred,  in  art, 
religion, philosophy, traditions and so on – first of all from its antithesis, death. In other 
words, it is for the fact that it ends, that life strives towards transcending itself through the 
forms, ends, in a word, meaning.
It  is  therefore  the  limit,  the  temporal  boundary of  life  that  impels  humans to 
overcome life as mere (chaotic) flux, motivating direction and meaning. In his words: 
“Death limits,  that is,  it  gives form to life,  not just in the hour of death,  but also in  
continuing coloring all of life’s contents” (Simmel 2007, p. 74).
But the idea of limit (in this case death) as the existential impulse for endowing 
transitory life with meaning also applies, in Simmel’s accounts, to the constitution of 
meaningful experiences in everyday life.
For  Simmel,  limits  are  embodied  and  realized  through  cultural  forms  which 
assume an independent existence, establishing standards and symbolic sources that react 
upon  life,  enriching  it.  The  projection  of  forms  creates  a  context  of  inter-subjective 
cultural meanings which constitute and express (for a certain time) the significance of 
things for a certain community. This meaningful social order provides a collective basis 
in terms of values and ideals upon which individuals either for or against orient their lives 
in the world.
 Limits, either death or cultural forms are thus boundaries without which life is 
empty in its restlessness, leaving individuals to their own devices, a situation which, as 
Durkheim famously argues throughout his oeuvre, tends to invigorate egoistic, conceited 
and meaningless goals.
Both Simmel and Durkheim understood – despite their different views on either 
their  conception  of  society  or  the  specific  ways  by which  this  process  works  -  that 
meaningfulness depends on a contradictory, but basic move by which the sheer impulse 
of life is engaged with something which goes beyond it, providing life with structure and 
form.
A secondary effect of the presence of transcendence in life is  revealed by the 
consideration  of  the  somewhat  counter-intuitive  and  uncomfortable  reality  that  even 
individual pleasure depends on constraints, that is, things that can limit it. For Durkheim, 
it is so because human beings are marked by the distinct and opposed sides of egoistic 
(which want to realize all individuals appetites) and social impulses (the need of every 
human to raise above herself and to regulate his passions), so that any of these parts can 
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find complete realization without the other (Durkheim 1976, p. 316). Simmel, in turn, 
would  explain  the  tension pleasure-limit  by way of  the fact  that,  in  his  words,  “The 
attraction of things is not the only cause of practical activity intent on gaining them; on 
the contrary,  the kind and amount of practically necessary endeavors to acquire them 
often determines the depth and liveliness of their  attraction for us” (Simmel 2005, p. 
257).
Meaningful  engagement  with  life  involves  thus  a  measure  of  freedom and  a 
measure of endeavor / sacrifice. Unless bearing this, the free individual (free from roles, 
traditions, values, principles, obligations) and dedicated solely to his own pleasures, is an 
empty shell that tend to fall under the weight of the lack of the other / of objects.  
In a sense, he tends to fall by the lack of resistance against his freedom, for only 
through its opposite, liberty may go beyond the mere “liberty from something” to become 
“liberty to do something” and thus, a meaningful liberty (Simmel 2005, p. 403).
Now, the process through which life expresses itself into objective forms which in 
turn enrich one’s subjective culture is in no way without its own tensions. In his view, the 
interaction between life and form is not, by principle, meant to achieve resolution into an 
ideal configuration wherein the first finally sees itself fully mirrored and realized into the 
former (Weinstein & Weinstein 1990).
Instead, life is, as he beautifully describes, irremediably marked by the tension of 
being “… at once fixed and variable, of finished shape, and developing further; formed 
and ever breaking through its forms; persisting yet rushing onward; circling around in 
subjectivity,  yet  standing objectively over things  and over itself…” (Simmel 1971, p. 
364).
In Durkheim (1974, p. 36), this idea finds resonance – even though the appeal of 
society as something external to and imposed upon individuals is fundamental for him 
and rejected  by Simmel  -  in  the  equally irreconcilable  tension  he  describes  between 
society and individual in which the former constrains and obliges (which could suggest 
that individuals would want to break free from it) but also protects and enlighten (and for 
this, individuals love and sought after it). Another way of stating the same contradiction, 
even closer to Simmel’s “…circling around in subjectivity, yet standing objectively over 
things and over itself” is imbued in Durkheim’s idea that individuals neither can belong 
altogether to themselves, nor they can live altogether to others. In his words: “To think, 
one must  be,  one must  have individuality.  But  on the other  hand, the self  cannot  be 
altogether and exclusively itself, for then it would empty of all content. If to think one 
must be, one must also have things to think about” (Durkheim 2005, p. 37).
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In any case, through this conflict, life unfolds into the movement of our personal 
biographies – the continuous engagement with life that impels humans to create, to act, to 
live – and, more broadly, in the movement of history. So, if the tension life-form, as with 
any human act,  never  achieves  fullness  and complete  understanding,  this  is  not  bad. 
Following Simmel’s wisdom, it is exactly the yearning, the expectation and the struggle 
needed to reach valuable things which form the mystery of value (Bauman 2004).
Meaningfulness is  thus  the  fundamental  impulse  of  life  in  which  the 
overwhelming  human  thirst  for  its  complete  realization  is  as  insatiable  as  it  is  the 
determination to continue the search. As Simmel notes: “..the happiness of anticipation is 
not an illusion in which we pretend to contain the uncontained and are stimulated by 
phantasy rather than reality;  instead, quite legitimately and undeceivingly, the hope of 
happiness turns into the happiness of hope” (Simmel 1991, p. 56). Paraphrasing Simmel, 
we should say that the search for meaningfulness,  quite  legitimately and undeceivingly, 
turns into the meaningfulness of the search.
The forms created in the interactions we establish with one another, that is, the 
forms we encounter through art, science, values, morals, sociability, institutions - cultural 
forms forged upon the infinity of the ‘flow of life’ - are the various concrete ways people 
find, or live by the hope of meaningfulness.
Yet, if human beings are, through the tension life-form, capable of acting in a 
purposive manner, this very tension renders non-purposive actions possible, that is, the 
ability to elevate oneself above end-oriented actions (Joas 2000, p. 78). This may inspire 
a view of meaningfulness neither dominated by sheer individual impulsiveness, nor by a 
too teleological approach in which meaningful experiences are necessarily purposeful and 
assume objectified forms.
Meaningfulness is, thus, not only a function of individuals’ projects or ends but 
also of their ability to experience things, to be touched or transformed by impressions, to 
be open to the other, to the world, including therefore domains of experience which are 
not foreseeable or  predetermined as goals.
From  such  a  perspective,  meaningfulness  is  concerned  not  only  with  “the 
objectification of life into forms”, but with life itself. In other words, not only we may 
find  the  meaning of  life  (embodied  in  forms)  but  we also (and simultaneously)  find 
meaning in life (Solomon 1977) which involves not only the worth of our desires and 
affects but also the intrinsic worth of non-purposeful experiences in the world.
Simmel himself submits that even though “the specific meaning of culture” exists 
where “… the path of the soul leads through values and scales that are not themselves 
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subjectively psychological”, “…culture is not the only determinant of value for the soul” 
(2000c, p. 57). Thus, the relationship of the individual with her own subjective powers, 
with nature and with other people personally significant to her can – to a certain extent – 
induce  the  experience  of  meaningfulness  despite  the  fact  that  these  ‘objects’ are  not 
cultural  forms. But it  seems that the objectively created constructs of culture “… are 
stations  through which  the  human subject  must  pass  in  order  to  acquire  the  specific 
personal value known as its culture” (2000c, p. 57-58). Without the latter, the continual 
flowing  of  life,  the  “unstoppability  of  its  mere  course”  cannot  take  on  cultural 
significance and hence would not be fully realized. In turn, the objective values of the 
culture, he continues, its constructs and constraints, must be included, cannot simply exist 
as  objective  values  but  must  exist  within  the  individual  self.   That  is  exactly  the 
continuous  tension  (and  paradox)  between  the  subjective  soul  and  its  products  that 
constitute culture.
Concerning the notion of ‘experience’, Heidegger states:
To undergo an experience with something—be it a thing, a person, or a god - 
means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and 
transforms us. When we talk of undergoing an experience, we mean specifically 
that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we 
endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it. It is this something 
itself that comes about, comes to pass, happens (1982, p. 57).
Now,  the  ability  to  undergo  experiences  is  not  a  function  of  the  individual 
capacity as if he lived in a monad. Contrarily, and even though ‘experience’ can be seen 
as something particular to each human being, the broader social  environment may, in 
many ways, obstruct the capacity of experience.
If  it  is  true that  experience -  not only in Heidegger but since the Greeks  -  is 
something  which  human  beings  have  to  suffer  and  not  something  to  be  constantly 
searched for “…the exclusively positive, activist and subjective conception of experience 
is  untenable”  (Szakolczai  2010).  Hence,  the  performance-driven  and  self-centered 
contemporary subject will only with difficulty enter the domain of experience and thus, 
of meaningfulness.
Moreover,  as Walter  Benjamin (1973) famously notes,  the character  of life  in 
modern conditions leads to a paradoxical situation: whereas humanity have never saw a 
time when so many things happen, experience is increasingly rare in a context in which 
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life becomes a relentless succession of shocks, breaks and collisions (Benjamin 1973, p. 
328).  Benjamin’s  analysis  on  this  point  is  in  many  ways  consistent  with  Simmel’s 
accounts on the modern metropolis’ multiplication of stimuli and objective knowledge to 
a point in which individuals cannot coherently interiorize it (Simmel 2000b).
Benjamin’s conception of experience has a particular, illuminating connotation. 
This is so because Benjamin refers to ‘experience’ (not in Heidegger’s sense of ‘lived 
experience’) but as “… a matter of tradition … the product less of facts firmly anchored 
in memory [Erinnerung] than of accumulated and frequently unconscious data that flow 
together in memory [Gedachtnis]” (Benjamin 1973, p. 314). Experience entails, thus, a 
sort  of  continuity  of  subjective  life  from  the  past  to  the  present  which  combines 
individual and collective past (Benjamin 1973, p. 316). Still, the notion of experience is 
also  connected,  in  Benjamin’s  formulation,  with  the  communication  of  experience, 
something which is only possible with the persistence of a collective transmitted culture 
(Jedlowski 1990).
The awareness of  impressions  made possible  in  an era of  shocks remain thus 
limited,  in Benjamin’s standpoint,  to the superficial  level of punctual, intellectual and 
utilitarian implications. For each impact that could establish a mark in the human mind 
(having thus a worth to be communicated and transmitted) is quickly followed by another 
impact, without ever advancing into a deeper level of experience wherein impressions 
could settle, lending themselves to the work of association (Jedlowksi 1990, p. 136).
What Walter Benjamin can teach us, in the present discussion on the ‘meaning of 
meaningfulness/meaninglessness’ is the fundamental worth of memory in the constitution 
of a concrete, accumulated, meaningful experience. For beyond the mere collection of 
impressions deprived of inner continuity, experience is fundamentally a narrative that can 
accumulate  inside  the  individual  to  be  later  communicated,  transmitted  to  others. 
Negatively, to the subject of stimuli, everything excites, or agitates, but nothing really 
happens. Rather, each situation is exhausted as soon as it occurs, thereby not becoming a 
memory and making meaningful experiences barely impossible.
It is worth noting that a sense of continuity with the past seems to be an inherent  
part of every society. As Durkheim puts it, “…we speak a language that we did not make, 
use  instruments  we  did  not  invent,  invoke  rights  we  did  not  found,  a  treasure  of 
knowledge is transmitted to each generation that it did not gather itself”  (1976, p. 212). 
And since society is the complex amalgamation of acts and beliefs formed by men and 
women  through  successive  generations  (Durkheim  1974),  a  society  lacking  memory 
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tends  to  undermine  itself  and  thus,  the  very  foundation  of  meaningful  experiences 
collapses.
For Durkheim (1974), even though memory is an inherent part of civilization, 
there is a sense in which collective memory, that is, the sense of social heritage, needs to 
be cultivated as a fundamental source for social cohesion, as well as to self-transcendence 
(the  transcendence  of  monadic  individuality  through collective  consciousness  without 
which meaning constitution, in Durkheim’s perspective, is not possible).
One  of  the  ways  by  which  self-transcendence  can  be  staged  in  social  life  is 
through public rites and ceremonies which help to shield the communities’ sacred ideals 
from the effacement of the passage of time by returning to these ideals “…a little of the 
force  they  tend  to  lose  to  egoistic  passions  and  everyday  personal  preoccupations” 
(Durkheim 2005, p. 43). Benjamin also highlights the role of these rituals in producing 
the amalgamation of individuals and collective memories (Benjamin 1973, p. 316).
However, rituals should be understood, as I read both Benjamin and Durkheim, 
not only as a set of voluntary practices of recollection but, in a broader manner, as all 
those societal processes through which the past is preserved, for instance, by representing 
it  in  words  through  literature,  oral  stories,  conversation  wherein  ‘people  remember 
together’, or even in habitual conduct and linguistic expressions perpetuated by cultural 
tradition.  Still,  all  cultural  forms are vehicles  through which past  memories  meet  the 
present  beyond  commemorative  rituals.  Benjamin  beautifully  highlights  the  role  of 
stories in this process, as something which “…does not aim to convey an event per se,  
which  is  the  purpose  of  information;  rather  it  embeds  the  event  in  the  life  of  the 
storyteller in other to pass it on as experience for those listening” (Benjamin 1973, p. 
316).
 Memory resources (which amalgamate individual and collective impressions) are 
associated with meaningfulness inasmuch as it provides not only a sense of identity but 
also a sense of rootedness and thus direction, belonging and richness - where we come 
from, where I am going to– which structures experience by locating it in a continuum of 
broader, collective experiences pervaded by beliefs and values. This, in Durkheim, as in a 
relatively  analogous  sense  in  Benjamin,  means  not  a  conservative  valuing  of  the 
maintenance of tradition, which can be, as often is, synonymous of unjust and oppressive 
power  relations.  What  memories  promote  is  the  actualization  of  a  rich  collective 
imaginary with which people can link their individuality, and from which they can extract 
and recreate meaning.
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The  maintenance  of  a  sense  of  historical  continuity  does  not  entail  thus  the 
conservative maintenance of what was there before, but the preservation of the collective 
past (and the  personal memories which contains it) as a rich source of symbolization that 
warrant the attribution of meaning to the present. Collectively, of course, it is important 
not only to maintain but also to transform society.
Dissipating doubts about the conservative overtones of his thinking, Durkheim 
declares: “I recognize very willingly the right of the individual to live in the society of his 
choice” (1974, p. 56) or yet: “…it is life itself and not a dead past which can produce a 
living cult” (Durkheim 1976, p. 427). In sum, for him, to preserve memory is not to 
preserve  society  as  it  once  was,  but  to  preserve  society;  even  if  it  is  necessary  to 
transfigure it into new forms.
The  lack  of  societal  cultivation  of  memory  and  a  myriad  of  other  cultural 
vicissitudes linked to the symbolic impoverishment of life may disrupt the open (and 
always incomplete) search for meaningfulness.
Going back to the argument set in the chapter’s outset, this is so because, while 
animals, lacking a symbolic identity, act and move reflexively and pause only physically, 
the half animal, half symbolic (Fromm 1964, p. 116) - or in Durkheim’s terms the half  
individualized (as a sheer organic life), half social human being - is always vulnerable to 
become symbolically paralyzed and empty in the search for a motivation to act and to 
lead life.
Some of us, at a certain point of our lives, and for certain reasons, feel paralyzed 
and painfully empty in the middle of the struggle. In these circumstances, no yearning, 
expectation or even the spontaneity of experience (as we have just defined it) seem to 
stand. That’s when the underlying anguish rooted in the ignorance about our predicament 
in the world, the ‘meaning of it all’ and more specifically, a ‘motivation to go on with 
one’s projects’ emerges, often more powerfully than one may safely endure. In such a 
condition, life is felt as senseless and depression becomes, in the empty place, a painful 
reality.
In the  next  chapter,  the  different  cultural  developments  and its  effects  on  the 
relationship of individuals with meaning throughout Western history will be analyzed. 
Hopefully, from this analysis, a coherent picture of how the order of meaning evolved 
throughout  Western  history  will  emerge,  backing  the  subsequent  reflections  of  the 
specificities  of  the  current  problem of  meaninglessness  in  contemporary  civilization, 
which, today, underlies the ‘symbolic paralysis’ that assaults the collective social body, 
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fuelling  the  expansion  of  various  forms  of  typical  subjective  difficulties  such  as 
depression.
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Chapter 5: The shifting order of meaning, melancholy and depression: from pre-
modern to modern civilization
This chapter is going to provide an overview on how particular historical shifts 
conjured up distinct socio-cultural patterns of meaning throughout pre-modern and, more 
recently,  in  modern  Western  civilizations.  Within  this  broader  analysis,  I  will  give 
attention to the shifting cultural understandings and conceptualizations of melancholy in 
its relations with the order of meaning culturally dominant in each period. This step will 
help  to  substantiate  the  subsequent  discussion  on  the  present-day  ‘epidemics  of 
depression’ in its interplays with ‘crises of meaninglessness’ spreading throughout the 
social body of contemporary Western civilizations.
One of the central controversies in the history of ideas about depression lies in the 
question  of  whether  depression  is  a  new  term  for  what  we  historically  knew  as 
melancholy,  or  if  it  constitutes  a  new  pathology.  Jennifer  Radden  is  a  well-known 
commentator of the issue. In The Nature of Melancholy: from Aristotle to Kristeva (2000) 
she claims that the equation between depression, melancholy and melancholia (the last 
two terms were used interchangeably until the nineteenth century) is problematic, often 
based on a thoughtless and superficial  continuity oblivious to the methodological and 
ontological issues involved in such an equation (Radden 2003).
For  Radden  (2003),  descriptions  of  depression  and  pre-nineteenth  century 
melancholia  have  similarities,  but  they  also  hold  substantial  differences.  First, 
melancholia  of  the  past  eras  encompassed  much  more  than  modern  conceptions  of 
depression.  Hallucinations,  obsessions,  compulsions,  paranoia,  delusions,  a  greater 
emphasis  on  anxiety  and  apprehension  symptoms  were  commonly  referred  in  the 
description of melancholic experiences. Second, until the eighteenth century, melancholia 
was a condition that provided certain social status to the sufferer, being associated with 
intellectual brilliance, artistic sensitivity and even geniality, which are undeniably absent 
in today’s descriptions of depression. A third difference clearly correlated to the later, 
concerns  the  fact  that  whereas  melancholia  was  ‘a  disorder  of  the  man’,  both 
epidemiological studies and the cultural imaginary suggest the correlation of depression 
with women.
However, Radden does not have the last word here. As she herself remarks, the 
leading historical figure on melancholy and depression, S. Jackson, asserts the existence 
of a remarkable consistency among these experiences (2003, p. 39)
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Moreover,  Radden  admits  that  her  comparison  between  depression  and 
melancholia is based on descriptivism, which means that the criteria used to determine 
whether  an  unchanging  condition,  once  named  melancholia,  was  later  renamed 
depression  are  based  on  the  similarities  and  differences  between  the  descriptions  of 
melancholy  and  depression.  By embracing  a  causal  ontology,  in  contrast,  we  would 
assume that depression and melancholy does not only refer to its observable signs and 
symptoms but to the underlying causal conditions. Since causes of either melancholia or 
depression are basically unknown, the hypothesis of a cause that unifies those mental 
disturbances into a single whole remains viable (Radden 2003, p. 42).
Hansen  (2003)  for  instance  argues  that  even  though  the  difference  in  the 
symptoms  between  melancholia  and  depression  is  significant,  it  only  leads  to  the 
conclusion that they are fundamentally different illnesses if  one considers, as Radden 
does, that descriptivism (rather than extra-descriptivist or causal models) is the proper 
model to psychiatric nosology. Hansen counters this conception, arguing that even though 
it’s true that we are not in a position of asserting what causes depression, the possibility 
of finding causal classifications, particularly causes that are rooted in social, political, and 
psychological realities should not be dismissed (2003, p. 61).
Moreover,  as  we  hope  to  make  clear,  in  addition  to  the  similarities  between 
depression and the old melancholia  in  terms of  symptoms and subjective experience, 
melancholy and depression (in its sociological aspect) seem to importantly relate to each 
other in their role as social symptoms emerging from specific features of the collective 
state of affairs prevalent in different historical times, translated to the symbolic language 
of the individual.
The basic idea implied in such analysis is the understanding that what melancholy 
represented  from  Antiquity  until  the  20th  century  (through  its  different  forms)  has 
significant  parallels  with  what  depression  represents  today  (Kehl  2009a).  From  this 
assertion  does  not  follow  the  intention  to  untangle  the  controversy  on  whether 
melancholy was the term previously used to refer to the depressive states of today – a 
psychopathological problem beyond the aims of this study -. Instead, it is based on the 
acknowledgement of the correlation between these states, not only in terms of its physical 
and psychological symptomatology but in their role as “social symptoms” (Kehl 2009a, 
my transl.)  which,  becoming apparent in the ‘individual body’ (always subject  to  the 
singularity of each experience) also  indicates conditions of broader social  pathologies 
that pervades the ‘collective body’ of culture.
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Kehl (2009b) notes that to consider either melancholy or depression as a social 
symptom of  a  particular  context  implies,  firstly,  that  all  mental  conditions  are  social 
(which, as claimed above, does not preclude other dimensions of the problem). Secondly, 
it means  that these conditions reveal (or at least suggest) what is found wanting in the 
collective  state  of  affairs,  or  yet,  the  adjustments  between  the  individual  and  the 
environment in which he/she constitutes herself.
Nevertheless, depression of present times has, for sure, much specificity, as had 
melancholic states at each period of history. This suggests that even though depressive 
states can be seen as an intrinsic human burden (as claimed earlier, a function of the 
intrinsic human vulnerability in regard to meaning crisis) it also changes throughout time. 
This is true both in its fundamental motifs and implications for individuals and in the 
forms  by which  it  is  represented.  Concerning  the  former  aspect,  it  implies  that  the 
appropriate  analytical  categories  to  understand  a  particular  expression  of  pathology 
should necessarily be specific to the vicissitudes of the general state of affairs of each 
historical time in its relation with individuals. Thus, nowadays, the so-called ‘depression 
epidemic’ is in various ways a new, specific phenomenon which should be understood 
within the particular conditions of life in Western contemporary civilization. In regard to 
the  latter aspect, the following analysis will show that either melancholy or depression 
have been often understood and represented in the social imaginary in ways that clearly 
reveal the broader patterns of meaning that characterize each epoch.
5.1 - The pre-modern unity of meaning
The story of meaning, as hinted by the above considerations,  is  as old as the 
primeval story about the origins of human beings.
After Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge, as the first 
book of the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Old Testament tell, they become incomplete 
creatures, expelled from the paradise and thus unable to experience the divine powers and 
virtues, the harmony with nature, knowledge of God and communion with him. From this 
first  act  of  transgression,  the  biblical  myth  tells  us,  Adam  and  Eve  (and,  as  their 
ancestors,  all  humanity)  experience  culture  (firstly  manifested  in  the  couple’s  shame 
before their natural nakedness) and become subject to mortal life: they are humans.
Out of the “… anxious possibility of being able” (Kierkegaard 2000, p. 141), the 
couple moves from the quality of possessing no sin to the quality of sinful. This is a state 
in  which  completeness  is  forever  lost  and  in  its  place,  humanity  falls  into  the 
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incompleteness of historical time “… where the spirit is no longer at one with itself as in 
the Garden of Eden” and where the unity of all things is forever split into opposites, such 
as: “… good and evil, past and future, God and Man … present being and his future 
possibilities of becoming” (Kearney 1988, pp. 40-41).
Lacking completeness, humanity finds itself  before the challenge of crafting a 
solution  to  the  great  question  of  how to  overcome  this  sense  of  separation,  how to 
transcend his own individual life and find unity (Fromm 1964), or yet, how to live with 
the  unavoidable  anguish  (Kierkegaard  2000)  of  having  to  transcend  ‘what  is’ in  a 
continuous quest for ‘what might be’ (Kearney 1988, p. 42).
What the myth of the fall captures and establishes is the notion that in its very 
genesis, humans are split apart from the immediacy of the unity of meaning and thrown 
to  a  free-floating  existence  with  its  infinite  horizon  of  possibilities.  Meaning is  thus 
founded as an inherent problem of human life. Answers for this primordial question as we 
have already pointed out, assumes a variety of different forms throughout history.
In the Hebraic imagination,  the ‘passion for the possible’ (which according to 
Kierkegaard motivated the transgression in the first place) was ‘an evil impulse’, one that 
makes  men lose all  sense of  belonging and direction.  Hence,  this  is  an  impulse that 
should be countered either by self-denial and other ascetic practices or, in a more positive 
interpretation, as a drive to be sublimated and oriented towards the divine (Kearney 1988, 
p.  46).  The origin of meaning was thus,  never to be found in the infinite horizon of 
possibilities of a sinful man but in the Yahweh, the Father of all creation.
The wisdom of the founding cosmology of Western civilizations fits therefore to 
the previous discussion on Simmel’s and Durkheim’s accounts on the need to offset the 
restlessness, the infinity of life by containing it within the borders of ‘something greater’, 
an external  construct -  be it  material  or ideal -  which may relate  to  the “… flowing 
liveliness,  the  inner  self-responsibility  and  the  changing  tensions  of  the  subjective 
psyche”  (Simmel  2000c,  p.  55).  This  idea,  in  the  Hebraic  vocabulary,  correlates  the 
purely individual life in its infinity of possibilities with evil, whilst meaning could only 
emerge from the external relation with the constraining (and structuring) relationship with 
an external structure, here, God.
Along with the biblical tradition, the archaic Greece had an equally fundamental 
and enduring influence upon the development of the Western patterns of meaning.
In  Pre-Socratic  Greece,  there  was  no  original  God  and  no  original  principle 
guiding and determining the  world  or  truth.  Instead,  the  early Greeks  lived  within  a 
mythological,  polytheistic  and  anthropomorphic  religious  view in  which  a  variety of 
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gods, usually represented in human form and not without contradiction, determined the 
order of meaning. As such, the early Greek order of meaning based on myths and the 
Olympian world of gods, implied a very distinct notion of the signification of all things, 
one which was not premised either upon the idea of truth x untruth, faith x disbelief or 
upon  dogmas which people must either attack or defend with their very lives. Instead, 
they looked upon their gods as self-evident entities “… no less certain than the reality of 
laughter and tears, the living pulse of nature around us” (Snell 1982, p. 25).
It was thus a time when, in Lukács words, “… the world is wide and yet it is like 
a home, for the fire that burns in the soul is of the same essential nature as the stars” 
(Lukács  1971,  p.  29)  and  hence,  as  Snell  notes,  a  time  when  every human  act  or 
experience reveals the ultimate meaning behind it (Snell 1982).
When  the  sacred  pervade  all  things,  life  is  not  possible  without  continuous 
connection  with  the  transcendent,  the  center  around  which  life  is  ‘organized’  and 
‘structured’ against chaos and formlessness.
Mircea Eliade, in his classic work  The Sacred and the Profane (1987) develops 
the issue through an anthropological analysis of the existential situation of human beings 
in different archaic societies. Eliade claims that for the ‘homo religious’ of primitive, pre-
modern cultures, there is the felt need to exist in a total and organized world, a cosmos 
which  is  the  center  of  all  meaning  (1987,  p.  44).  For  instance,  he  describes  the 
connections between the sacred and “a cosmicized world” as experienced by the nomadic 
Australians, the Achilpa tribe. The tribe is organized around a sacred pole fashioned by a 
mythic divine being that firstly created their institutions and cosmicized their territory. 
After anointing the pole with blood, the god climbed it and disappeared into the sky. The 
pole represents therefore a “cosmic axis” so that it is only around it that a certain territory 
becomes habitable and is transformed into ‘a world’. During the tribe’s wanderings, the 
pole is always carried and the direction towards which it bends determines the route that 
the group should take. The sacred pole is an absolute fixed point, a center which connects 
the tribe with the sky wherever they might be and, by this connection, founds their world 
as a meaningful cosmos with determined aims and directions.  The pole to be broken 
denotes catastrophe, the reversion to the chaos (1987, p. 22, p. 30).
 Plato’s philosophy moves beyond myth and towards reason. In his philosophy, 
the  center  of  gravity of  meaning is  dislocated,  and “…  substance  was reduced from 
Homer’s  absolute  immanence  of  life  to  Plato’s  likewise  absolute  yet  tangible  and 
graspable transcendence” (Lukács 1971, p. 35). Meaning continue to be referred, thus, to 
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a given Ideal, a superior and pre-existent order dwelling outside the individual, but one 
now posited as belonging to the domain of reason.
Reason, in Plato’s philosophical thinking, was realized only in the perception of 
an external Good which,  lying outside subjectivity,  would determine what all  mortals 
should emulate, know and love. Hence, the work of reason was to find (and not to make 
as  it  would  be  later  argued)  the  supersensible,  immutable  things  and  meanings 
independently of individual beliefs or perceptions (Kearney 1988; Taylor 1989).
Beyond the ancient Greek world, throughout the pre-modern era, meaning was 
externally referred,  firmly rooted in  an order  outside human beings  and perceived as 
something beyond discussion or doubt (even though each particular subject could either 
adjust to or refuse allegiance to the Good).
In medieval times, the Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics of Being was brought 
together with the Judeo-Christian notion of a Divine Creator, in particular through the 
philosophical ideas of the Christian theologian Augustine. Understanding (of the original 
truth of Being) and faith (in the biblical God) were thus advanced by Augustine as allies 
or even, as a single reality upon which the pursuing of truth should be based (Kearney 
1988, pp. 115-116).
In  social  practice,  in  the  long  years  of  the  medieval  epoch,  the  Good  was 
determined by the church. Thereby, medieval subjects either conformed to or struggled 
against clear-cut and socially unified symbolic references and boundaries for what was 
considered right and wrong, good and evil, possible and impossible etc, which revolved, 
mainly, around the unity of the divine.
It was also a time of mechanical solidarity, when social cohesion was achieved by 
the force of similarity / lack of differentiation among individuals, associated to pervading 
agreement  about  the  various  issues  of  life  and,  ergo,  to  great  predictability  of 
consequences for either complying or rebellious behavior (Durkheim 1984). A time when 
all  spheres  of  life  were  intrinsically  and coherently connected,  binding the  whole  of 
human personality and not only a part of it, as it would be the case in modern conditions 
(Simmel 2000b). Outside the boundaries of this inviolable origin of all meaning was, in 
the religious understanding, the domain of blasphemy and, according to linked traditional 
rules, the domain of legitimate repressive laws and social exclusion.
Under the influence of medieval Christian doctrine, melancholy no longer carried 
glamorous  associations  of  intellectual  depth  and  geniality  as  in  Aristotle’s  famous 
accounts in his book of  Problems  (Radden 2000, p. 91), being instead conceived as a 
feeling of despondency and inertia known as acedia.  Melancholy was conceived as an 
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illness  of  the  soul,  later  identified  with  the  sin  of  sloth,  one  of  the  eight  vices  that 
assaulted, in particular, hermits and solitary monks in the monasteries (Solomon 2001; 
Radden 2000, p. 66).
As the Brazilian psychoanalyst Maria Rita Kehl (2009a) analyzes, in a time when 
the  church  had the  monopoly of  the  Good and the  Truth  (and thus  of  meaning)  the 
Christian monks were those who were supposed to know what “the Other” (in this case, 
God) expected from them. Now, however disagreements on the most faithful version of 
the desire of the Other existed (even within the ecclesiastic domain), divergences were 
embedded within a broader, encompassing unity of meaning that determined that the will 
of  those  devoted  to  the  Christian  faith  should  resist  all  temptations  and  doubts. 
Conversely, disruptions in the relation of subjects with the supreme overarching meaning 
could lead to the evil of acedia (Kehl 2009a, p. 66).
Even though medieval melancholy was not seen by all as a state over which the 
sufferer could exercise full control, being instead in the midway between disease and bad 
habit  (Jackson 1986, cited in  Radden 2002, p.  20),  the weakness of  the spirit  or  the 
temptation  of  the  flesh  were  important  representations  of  the  problem.  The  frequent 
associations between the melancholic suffering and a disruption of the relation with God 
leads Kehl (2009a) to claim that the medieval melancholic suffered from a disagreement 
with the Other, in a word, God.
From the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries upward, this unity of meaning was to be 
unsettled. The development of the cities, the international trade and the gradual formation 
of an emerging class started to bring a new vitality to the possibilities of earthly life in 
many European cities.
Firstly  in  Italy of  the  fourteenth  and fifteenth  centuries  and later,  by the  16th 
century, in the rest of Europe, the significant accomplishments in a variety of fields, such 
as  literature,  philosophy,  art,  music,  politics,  science,  religion,  and  other  aspects  of 
intellectual inquiry characterized what became known as the Renaissance9.
9 The term “Renaissance” was firstly introduced in the nineteenth century by the French 
historian  Jules  Michelet  and,  some  years  later,  popularized  through  the  Jacob 
Burckhardt’s ground breaking “The civilization of the Renaissance in Italy” (1878). This 
work disseminated and founded the traditional and still influential view of the period as 
bringing about the end of the Middle Ages and introducing Modernity (Cracolici 2007). 
This view has been revised, especially by medievalists, and criticized by several scholars 
(e.g.  Burke  1998;  Cracolici  2007;  Martin  2004)  for  being  Eurocentric,  oblivious  to 
previous historical accomplishments, minimizing continuities and adopting a teleological 
narrative according to which a break with the past inaugurated a fully original new epoch 
which, in turn, is used to explain the present.
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Given this  caveat,  and assuming the persistence of  wide contradictions,  either 
within  Renaissance  itself  or  backwards,  traditional  patterns  of  meaning  centered  and 
organized around the unity of God would come to be unsettled: meaning started to make 
its movement inward.
By this I don’t want to imply either that individuality, as we understand it today, 
was an indisputable emerging notion then or that the abdication of religious values and 
explanations was at stake. As Burke (1998) remarks, religion was still a strong symbolic 
reference at the time: humanists’ enthusiasm for classic texts and knowledge did not lead 
to indifference to Christianity but instead to the attempt to harmonize these references 
into  a  single,  coherent  whole.  In  respect  to  the  category  of  ‘individuality’,  the 
disseminated view of the Renaissance as the age of the ‘birth of the individual’ has been 
recently described by some scholars as a myth or, less radically, as an incomplete truth, 
inasmuch  as  the  dominant  type  of  individuality  throughout  the  period  was  still  the 
communal type (Martin 2004).
Certainly, however, and not without contradictions for sure, the weight of each of 
these  elements  were  to  be  progressively  altered  within  the  emerging  new  web  of 
meanings which were progressively condensing.
The scope of politics, for instance, was standing out as a domain of its own, being 
established, as Machiavelli’s classic and innovative The Prince (2005) epitomizes, within 
the specific affairs of earthy life. Machiavelli claims that there is no possible resource to 
the supernatural, no divine intercession which may solve the problems of politics. Yet, 
and beyond politics,  Machiavelli’s  ideas  implied  that  earthly affairs  were  not  always 
governed by chance or mysterious wills of God, luck, or fate but “… at least in one half 
of the cases” he notes,  humans can master circumstances through the use of wisdom 
(Machiavelli 2005, p. 84).
Thereby,  while  the  depiction  of  the  so-called  Renaissance  period  as  a  fully 
original new epoch might be oversimplified, a multiplicity of happenings and novelties 
generated a perplexing coexistence of viewpoints and symbolic references (both old and 
new).
The previous relatively unified meaning could not survive undisturbed. In science, 
Copernicus  was  studying  the  skies  and  Leonardo  dissecting  bodies;  Renaissance  art 
departs from medieval iconography’s aim of ‘being a window to another world’ towards 
the purpose of a communication between man and man as epitomized in Caravaggio’s 
paintings; the rediscovery of the Greco-Roman world; the invention of the printing press, 
allowing the circulation of new ideas; the intensification of the navigations and trade, 
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shattering the comparatively closed world of the Middle Ages; the onset of urbanization, 
disturbing  the  predictability  and  slow  pace  of  the  communitarian  medieval  life;  the 
discovery of  the ‘New World’,  unsettling the traditional  image of  human nature as a 
single  unity,  are  some  few  examples  of  the  bewildering  range  of  transformations 
witnessed by people living during the  Renaissance. These shifts, if not fully disarranged, 
certainly impacted previous structures of meaning premised upon the authority of religion 
(Kearney 1988; Kehl 2009a; Scliar 2003).
Melancholy was to  assume specific  representations  in  this  context.  Whilst  the 
medieval melancholic subject suffers from what was seen then as the illness of the soul, 
the shameful effect of the weakness of faith and the debility of one’s surrender to God, 
the  Renaissance  subject  suffered  from the  “..  pain  of  living  in  a  world  wherein  the 
symbolic field has become indecipherable” (Kehl 2009a, p. 69, my transl.). This is not by 
chance, thus, that many representations of the melancholic affliction during the period 
associated suffering with thinking or with excess of ideas (Radden 2000)
The questioning of the religious motifs as the single cause of private afflictions 
associated to the rediscovery of the classic Greco-Roman knowledge would also revive 
Hippocratic ideas about the humoral fluids in the body explaining melancholy as well as 
the Aristotelian perspective that associated melancholia to intellectual capacities, artistic 
vision and profundity (Solomon 2001, p. 295)
Yet,  and  beyond  the  reference  to  classical  thinking,  if  to  the  melancholic  is 
rendered  the  prestige  of  a  genius,  this  can  be  read  as  a  clear  resonance  of  the  new 
humanistic principles dominant at the time that proclaimed the worth of the will to know. 
According to such principles, the melancholic anguish that often accompanies the venture 
of those who search for wisdom were expectably seen as a sign of personal status, as if 
the gravitas required and made possible by the intellectual dives of great scholars, artists 
and intellectuals would come at a price.
But the will to know was, in the Renaissance period, as we have hinted above, 
intertwined with what we might call ‘the will for the totality and unity of God’. It is not 
surprising that melancholy was to be read by some as an effect of the contradictions 
between these two distinct  yearnings or yet,  as  the anomic  effects  brought about  the 
abrupt transitions and linked norm pluralization to a point wherein “… the limits are 
unknown  between  the  possible  and  the  impossible,  what  is  just  and  what  is  unjust, 
legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate” (Durkheim 1951, pp. 252- 
253).
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Thereby,  Kehl’s  sociological  interpretation  of  Renaissance  melancholy  as  the 
‘anguish of subjects before an indecipherable symbolic world’ makes sense. Kehl builds 
upon  the  interpretation  offered  by  the  authors  of  the  influential  book  “Saturn  and 
Melancholy” (1964) under the lens of her own psychoanalytic perspective.
One  of  the  most  expressive  and  widely  known artistic  representations  of  the 
Renaissance melancholy is the famous 16th century figure by Albrecht Dürer, Melancolia 
I (1514). For Kehl (2009a), the figure gives further expression to the interpretation of 
Renaissance melancholy as a problem of the indeterminacy of meaning.  
The engraving is organized around several tensions (all of which referring to the 
main tension between the hopefulness of knowledge/wisdom and the despondency before 
a disenchanted world). The tension is immediately revealed by the figure of the winged 
being, half angel, half woman that stands out in the picture, announcing the symbolic 
intertwining of the heavenly domain of angels and the human world. But this relationship 
does not seem fully harmonious, at least not to melancholics as suggested by the gloomy 
disharmony that dominates the picture.
The winged woman is  capable of  flight,  to  reach the heavens of  transcendent 
wisdom (represented by the glowing sky on the backdrop and, also, by the wrath that 
adorns her head - usually a symbol of superiority (Panofsky 1955, p. 163). However, the 
overall gloom of the scene and, more explicitly, the bat-like creature warns melancholy is 
on the way. Hence,  flight does not seem possible at all and the complete opposite of 
movement dominates.
The woman-angel’s gloom and paralysis  stand in the picture in parallel  to the 
numerous symbols that surround her, instruments of knowledge and wisdom about the 
world  which,  instead  of  the  (expected)  transcendence,  foster  mental  exhaustion  and 
confusion. The picture seems thus to suggest that, being required to discern meaning out 
of the immensity of the possibilities of knowledge, individuals suffer from “nostalgia for 
the revealed truth” (Kehl 2009a, p. 70, my transl.)
This interpretation of Dürer’s Melancholia I is also suggested by Walter Benjamin 
(1984) who notes  that  the  tools  of  scientific  research  lie  unused by the  disconsolate 
woman-angel, seating inert before the objects of human achievements in science, as a 
sign of the uselessness of knowledge to achieve transcendence.
Another  tension  is  identified  by  Erwin  Panofsky in  his  The  Life  and  Art  of  
Albrecht Dürer (1955). It involves, on the one hand (in contrast to previous, medieval 
representations  of melancholy as  laziness) the super-awake stare  of the woman-angel 
suggesting an intent of knowing and, on the other, the sentiment of fruitless searching 
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(Panofsky 1955, p. 160) embodied in her overall despondent appearance. In his words: 
“… her energy is paralyzed not by sleep but by thought” (1955, p. 160).
Later,  the  great  Italian  illustrator  Cesare  Ripa  elaborates  on  the  same  theme. 
About his portrait Melancholicus (1603) – which shows, in a single portrait, a main figure 
of a scholar reading a book and behind it, a man about to throw himself into the river - 
Ripa himself comments: “… the open book represents the melancholic man’s tendency to 
be a scholar,  engrossed in all  sorts of studies” while,  the suicidal man represents,  he 
notes, the melancholic’s “… tendency to gloom and a sense of futility and despair” (Ripa 
1971, cited in Radden 2000, p 11, p. 15).
From the Renaissance period onwards (as I will discuss in the ongoing sections) 
problems  related  to  the  abandonment  of  the  safety  of  religious  doctrines  (and  the 
metaphysical unity of meaning it implied) would rear up regularly. Still, the elevation of 
‘reason’ as the new promised source of meaning and the existential effects of the linked 
complexification  of  structural  and  normative  levels  of  societal  life  would  incarnate, 
recurrently, as either confusing ambiguity or promised liberation, hovering between the 
opposites  of  self-affirmation  and  self-deprecation,  power  and  despair,  control  and 
barbarism.
5.2 - The modern turmoil of meaning
In  the  16th and  17th centuries,  congruently  to  the  anthropocentric  tendency 
introduced in the period of the Renaissance, many different levels of life and phenomena 
which were previously understood on the basis of the principles inherent to religious 
metaphysics  comes  to  be  conceived  through  the  parameters  of  science  (or  in 
relation/consonance  to  it).  After  Galileo,  Descartes,  Hobbes  and  later  Newton, 
experimentation  and  the  analysis  of  the  simpler  parts  of  phenomena  were  the  basic 
standard running through all types of inquiries, including those of theological scope.
Further,  the previous account  of truth in terms of a  self-revealing reality with 
which one should be attuned to by means of reason (like for instance in Plato’s ‘world of 
Ideas’)  gives  way  to  an  internalization  of  the  source  of  knowledge.  As  Descartes 
emblematically declares:  “I  can have no knowledge of what  is  outside me except  by 
means of ideas I have within me” (Descartes, cited in Taylor 1989, p. 144), which also 
implies that  truth no longer consists of the correct correspondence between subject and 
object but  of the reflexive conformity of the subject to his own thought.
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The Cartesian perspective is, in the seventeenth century, foundational not only in 
terms of methods of inquiry but also in the development of a historical turning point 
whereby the sovereign individual arises, the typically modern subject, able to reason, to 
disengage himself from the world and his body, to think and transcend the traditions and 
structures divinely established, providing thus an anthropological foundation for meaning 
which helped to pave the way to modern idealism (Hall  2000; Kearney 1988; Taylor 
1989).
From such emerging new perspectives and after new impetuses provided by other 
intellectual  figures  such  as  Hume,  Kant,  the  German  idealists  and  the  so-called 
Romantics, not only knowledge but also moral parameters were to be found ultimately 
within individuals. The concept of the Good – previously a function of either rational 
contemplation of  the cosmos, or of divine revelation -  is  replaced by the notion of 
‘value’, carrying an ineradicable reference to the valuing subject (Joas 2000).
If previously human subjectivity was subsidiary to an order of meaning beyond 
man  so  that  human  understanding  and  conduct  had  to  conform  to  ‘Being’  (the 
transcendent origin of meaning), the modern epoch hails meaning, in Kantian Fashion, 
as a transcendental product of human mind (Kearney 1988, pp. 155-158).
Advancing here in broad lines what we are going to see later, while in Kantian 
terms, the idea of a valuing subject would not harm the universal validity of either 
objective  knowledge,  moral  or  aesthetics,  modernity  would  soon  take  the  whole 
consequences of this move, contemplating value as a subjective and fully contingent 
phenomenon above any claims of objectivity (Joas 2000, p. 20).
Another primary chain in the emerging new webs of modern patterns of meaning 
was the valuing of freedom. From Descartes, Locke,  Hobbes, and later, Rousseau and 
Kant, to name but a few, freedom was envisaged as the basic and fundamental human 
trait.
In  social  life,  following the  process  of  transformation  of  individuality  which 
begun in the Renaissance period, the late 17th and the following 18th centuries would see 
the development of more effective individualistic values by which the naturalization of 
hierarchical differences between people, reminiscent of medieval times, gives rise to the 
conception of  a  natural  equality between free individuals.  Inequality has  then to be 
understood not as inherent according to a divine unquestionable order but as something 
to  be  tackled  and  finally  defeated  through  correct  management  of  the  (arbitrary) 
accidents of birth and social divisions (Simmel 1950).
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These ideas were rooted in the shifts brought about by the cultural, intellectual 
and political movement known as the Enlightenment, stretching roughly from the mid-
decades  of  the  seventeenth  century  through  the  eighteenth  century.  Following  the 
scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the dramatic success of 
the  new  science  in  accounting  for  a  wide  variety  of  phenomena  feeds  the 
Enlightenment’s ‘faith’ in the human potential of challenging the old and constructing 
the new independently of theological constructs.
Hence,  previously dominant medieval  parameters of meaning such as religion, 
descent, locality and traditional knowledge were progressively seen as in need of being 
replaced  by  the  idea  that  reason  should  be  the  privileged  mediator  between  the 
individual  and  the  world.  Still,  in  the  modern  mindset,  epitomized  in  Kant,  the 
conditions of knowing the world are not in the world itself but in the subject. No longer  
was God or the immanent world that would be the foundation of meaning, intervening 
upon every aspect of humans’ lives. As Kant famously puts in the first lines of his essay 
An  Answer  to  the  Question:  What  is  Enlightenment, enlightenment  should  be 
understood as humankind's release from its self-incurred immaturity,  that is,  “… the 
inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another” (Kant 2010, 
p.1).
In the political scope, the immediate translation of the eighteenth century’s belief 
of the free, rational nature of individuals was the ideal of economic freedom, the basis 
of liberalism. As Simmel notes, liberalism can be seen either as the economic projection 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ philosophical individualism or, conversely, 
these  philosophical  aspects  may be  the  “… sublimations  of  the  concrete  economic 
forms of production of the period” (Simmel 1950, p. 83).
In  modern  conditions,  the  valuing  of  freedom  and  equality,  either  in  its 
philosophical  formulation,  or  in  its  correspondent  political-economic  promotion  of 
unlimited  striving  for  individual  advantage  as  the  path  towards  the  harmony  of  all 
interests, was not a move – borrowing Bauman’s (2004, p.16) metaphor – either towards 
the “nobody’s land” of sub-determination (meaning lack), or to the “disputed land” of 
over-determination of meaning (pluralism).  Rather, it  was (or intended to be) a move 
towards certitude through the correct projection of knowledge from within the rational 
subject.
For if the Enlightenment intelligentsia aimed to counter religious authority and 
traditional knowledge towards universal freedom, this was done based on the belief that 
individuality was valued only within the general parameters of reason. Plus, individuals’ 
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conducts  were  also to  be  governed by the  (liberal)  state  /  collectivity to  which  they 
belonged (Bauman 2004).
Hence, the fading power of God was not giving way to a lack of answers for the  
questions of life. Alternative (and also universally binding) responses were purportedly to 
be found through the objective unveiling of all the hidden secrets of nature. The scope of 
questions to be answered was wide, ranging from the realm of mathematical sciences and 
sciences  of nature,  to  the political,  aesthetic  and normative troubling questions  about 
existence (Berlin 1999, p. 22).
From the perspective of the enlightened intelligentsia, the fact that it was human 
cognition - and no longer God or tradition - that was to guide answers for meaning, didn’t 
mean any threat to objective truths. On the contrary, in a Kantian rationale, cognition was 
the single safe road for the attainment of objective meaning.
As Simmel notes (1950, p. 69-70), this was so because cognition was seen by 
Kant as a resource belonging not to the individual, accidental, psychological ego (that 
may vary from one man to the other), but by the pure, fundamental, unchangeable and 
universal ego that is present - although sometimes in an underdeveloped manner – in the 
‘general man’ lying at the core of all rational human beings. As such, the good man was 
the one who resisted to his personal inclinations and acted for the sake of his universal 
duties.
The Enlightenment aimed to illuminate the darkness of ignorance,  superstition 
and mystery and replace the asymmetry of doubt and confusion for the symmetry of truth 
and objective knowledge. In this sense, it was a fundamentally optimistic (and for many 
utopic) ideal of progress from blindness to sight, from illusion/ appearance/ semblance to 
essence and being (Rocco 1997, p. 37).
Now, the permanence of a new kind of universally valid responses to all issues of 
existence (which, as mentioned, would concern not only the human control over nature, 
but also normative questions about our position in the world, what true values are, what’s 
right  and  appropriate  to  do  and  so  on)  indicates  that  if  the  ‘bewilderment  of 
meaninglessness’ existed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, it did as 
an unwanted and potentially corrigible pathology. Seeking what Newton accomplished in 
the realm of physics – organizing the field and clearing it up from contradictions–, it was 
reasonable  to  hope that  even the  apparently chaotic  issues  subject  to  human opinion 
(politics, morality, aesthetics etc.) were also destined to perfection. After the correct and 
effortful  application  of  reason  they  could  be  wholly  understood  and  distilled  from 
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confusion and obscurity (Berlin 1999, p. 24). Ambitious as it may seem, that was the 
ideal of the Enlightenment.
Indeed, a certain awe and reverence surrounded reason as a critical power (Taylor 
2007,  p.  9)  against  superstition,  illusion  and  also  against  meaninglessness,  since  the 
period witnessed a quite widespread belief that the correct management of this superior 
force could place individuals in the meaningful world of truth and happiness.
As one might presume, a lack of meaning was not relevant or at least not apparent 
in such a utopia.  Instead,  inherently laical things such as Reason, the Fatherland and 
Liberty become, under the impact of general enthusiasm, elevated to the status of sacred 
things.
The  migration  of  the  metaphysic-theological  category  of  sacredness  from  its 
original sphere to become applied to worldly categories is apparently paradoxical in a 
secular modern context wherein enlightened reason was,  fundamentally,  the reason of 
self-determination and thus, a reason without God.  The paradox can be understood, as 
scholars  such  as  Durkheim  (1976)  or  Eliade  (1987)   do,  as  a  telling  indication  of 
societies’ need and aptitude for creating gods and linked dogmas, symbols, altars and 
feasts in either religious or secular forms (Durkheim 1976, p. 214).
However, whilst the proponents of the Enlightenment promised us that a world of 
certitude  would  replace  the  preexisting  phantasies  of  tradition,  what  Modernity  has 
actually brought to humanity was the imperative of reflection and doubt, which leads 
Anthony Giddens (1990, pp. 36-45) to prefer the term “reflexivity” over reason as to 
describe the substratum of the modern condition. Since the nature of the scientific method 
implies  that  knowledge  is  always  open  to  reflection  and  discussion  in  the  light  of 
incoming information – “… including reflection about the nature of reflection” (Giddens 
1990, p. 39) -, the unifying power of reason as a source for meaning was revealed as 
illusory.
In modern conditions, to know is no longer something referred to and instilled by 
the cosmic order or something shaped by God (Taylor 1989, p. 143) and for this reason, 
no longer  a  place of certainty.  At most,  modern reason is  a  promising land of unity, 
security and moral orientation which soon reveals itself  as it  is:  a disputed terrain of 
plural and competing meanings.
Furthermore,  the  unfolding  of  the  Enlightenment’s  logics  –  epitomized  in  the 
desire  to  correct  every aspect  of  life  and the  world through calculative thinking -  is 
paralleled by the unfolding of the mercantile logic, which means that modern reason was 
from the beginning implicated with market reasons. This reciprocal influence is analyzed 
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by Simmel  (2000b)  as  the  mutual  determination  between the  modern  intellectualistic 
mentality and the money economy,  both rooted in the soil  of the modern metropolis. 
Reciprocity lies in the fact that if the enlightenment ideal aims to overcome all obscurity, 
despising along the way all the uncertain, ambiguous and imprecise objects of belief and 
traditional  motifs,  money exists  by  weakening bonds based on the  ties  of  kinship or 
loyalty whilst entailing a process of rationalization based on weighing, calculating and 
reducing qualitative values to quantitative ones.
 When money (and the linked modern intellectualization of experience) becomes 
the main link between people,  replacing personal ties anchored in diffuse feelings by 
impersonal,  objective relations limited to specific purposes, it  opens space for greater 
differentiation  between  subjective  and  objective  culture.  As  a  result,  individual 
development and personal freedom are greatly potentialized (Simmel 2000b).
However,  in  Simmel’s  (2000b)  mind,  the  emphasis  on  individualization  and 
freedom  triggered  by  the  use  of  money  -  that  dominates  life  in  the  great  modern 
metropolis  -  is  paralleled by the risk of intense depersonalization,  objectification and 
instrumentalization of social relationships. That is, living in the monetized metropolis, the 
individual is as free as he is isolated from others.
Learning  to  live  by  way of  the  intellectualized,  abstract  rules  of  the  modern 
money economy, individuals lose sight of the qualitative worth of things, experiencing 
them as insubstantial and losing “… the feeling for value differences” (Simmel 2005, p. 
257). Further, they become inclined to be indifferent towards others and also to withhold 
commitment to objective cultural forms. Life becomes then increasingly dominated by 
anonymous interactions so that freedom tends to imply in “… a vapidity of life and a 
loosening of its substance” (Simmel 2000b).
Max  Weber  also  sensed  the  impersonal,  calculative  character  of  modernity, 
submitting a strong critical analysis of the power of reason to assign meaning and goals 
to history. For him, science cannot replace religion as a secular ideological source able to 
appoint meaning. As he famously states: “The fate of an epoch who has eaten of the tree 
of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the 
results of its analysis” (Weber 1949, p. 57).
According to Weber, the purported worth of science to address issues of meaning 
is fully problematic. First,  every scientific ‘fulfillment’ raises new questions and soon 
become surpassed and outdated (Weber 1946, p. 138). Thus, science’s immanent logic, he 
argued, would compel it to renounce the project of creating and defending values and 
meaning (Seidman 1983).  Modern individuals have to create meaning for themselves.
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Second, drawing on Tolstoy’s formulation, Weber recognizes that science cannot 
give an answer to the “… only question important for us: what shall we do and how shall 
we live”? (Weber 1946, p. 143), having therefore no ethical value. Third, it cannot offset 
the fact that “… the various value spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict 
with each other” (Weber 1946, p. 147) having thus no socially unifying worth.
Modern individuals face polytheism of values with no decisive criteria to inform 
decision between them. In such conditions, meaning constitution comes to depend on a 
personal relation to values pursued in the different (mainly occupational)  institutional 
spheres: a matter of choice therefore and not of any transcendent category (Vandenberghe 
1999, p.66).  
Complicating  matters,  in  the  Western  modern  context  of  rapid  urbanization, 
bureaucratization,  market  expansion  and  rationalization,  the  realization  of  meaning 
through voluntary institutional association may be undermined by a bureaucratic world of 
technical means and utilitarian ideals.
Thereby, if modernity is an epoch of freedom to choose among values, coercive 
cultural tendencies - mostly represented by the bureaucratic modern organizations but 
also pervading all spheres of life – leads to a situation wherein “… everywhere the house 
is ready-made for a new servitude” (Weber 1946, p. 71).
In such a context, reason has become a functional organon of the will of power, 
defining stated useful goals and calculating the most efficient means to achieve them 
independently of ethical concerns. As Weber puts it: “An empirical science can teach no 
one what he should do but only what he can do – and under certain circumstances, what 
he wants to do” (Weber 1985, cited in Vandenberghe 1999, p. 60).
The enlightenment’s ambitions of imposing the correct and effortful application of 
reason  distilling  the  world  from  all  obscurity  incarnates  in  rationalization,  “...the 
tendency to calculate as carefully as possible the most efficient means, and to implement 
them methodically in order to achieve control over nature, society, and the self” (Muller 
2002, p. 240). However increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of production - and 
thus being a basic nexus of industrial capitalism that allows unprecedented domination of 
man over the world of nature (Coser 1977, p. 232) - rationalization also has its darker 
facets.
Roughly put,  taking place in all  areas of human life from religion and law to 
music and architecture, rationalization means a historical drive towards a world in which 
“… one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (Weber 1946, p. 139). For 
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instance, modern capitalism is a rational mode of economic life because it depends on a 
calculable process of production. 
At this  point,  Weber’s analysis  bears  a distinct resemblance to both Marx and 
Simmel (although certainly with a more pessimistic overtone) in its consideration of both 
the impersonal and value-deprived, as well as the de-humanizing, alienating character of 
rationalization and bureaucracy. In his words: bureaucracy’s “… specific nature, which is 
welcomed  by  capitalism,  develops  the  more  perfectly,  the  more  the  bureaucracy  is 
‘dehumanized’ the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, 
hatred,  and  all  purely  personal,  irrational,  and  emotional  elements  which  escape 
calculation” (Weber 1946, p. 216).
It  is  thus the utilitarian character and complete independence from values that 
forges the dehumanizing aspect of rationalization. Against the Enlightenment’s optimism, 
Weber foresaw a cold, bureaucratic future world wherein men and women would feel 
themselves trapped into an ‘iron cage’ dominated by technical means and obligations 
stripped of ethical justifications (Weber 2008).
Historically, claims Weber (2008), if once the protestant Calvinist inner-worldly 
ascetism  provided  ethical  impulse  to  capitalism’s  advancement  through  the 
rationalization of conduct with the general escalation of Western rationalization, these 
otherworldly values and commitments would gradually lose their metaphysical credibility 
and  motivational  significance.  Hence,  individual  participation  in  institutional  spheres 
which was, previously, religiously enjoined becomes bereft of transcendent motives in a 
process wherein individuals become increasingly dominated by the very product they had 
created  for  their  spiritual  liberation.  In  the  utilitarian  setting  of  highly  bureaucratic 
organizations, ‘vocationalism’ previously indicative of the ‘grace of God’ comes to refer 
only to  itself.  That  is,  the idea of  duty in  one’s  calling  incarnated in  the methodical 
dedication to work which used to be value-laden “… prowls about in our lives like the 
ghost of dead religious beliefs”, tending to become associated with “… purely mundane 
passions, which often actually give it the character of sport” (2008, p. 182)
Pursuing means without  regard to  substantive considerations  and relegating to 
obscurity  or  indifference  the  worth  of  ends  these  means  are  supposed to  lead  feeds, 
Weber believes,  increasing abstraction, impersonality and the quantification of values, 
which in conjunction, increasingly threatens the human need for meaning (Elliott 1998). 
For  by  prioritizing  efficiency  above  ethical  justifications,  the  task  of  personal 
commitment to values and their translation into worldly goals (constitutive of meaning in 
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modern conditions  according to  Weber)  can boil  down to meaningless compliance to 
utilitarian procedures (Seidman 1983).
Later, certainly impacted by “… the mysterious willingness of the technologically 
educated masses to fall  under the spell  of any despotism” -  as Nazism was fearfully 
typifying at the time - in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno would 
powerfully argue that  the process of rationalization,  to which Max Weber  had drawn 
attention, realized not reason, but its very distortion (2002, p. xvi). The authors define 
their critique as aiming “… to enlighten the enlightenment about itself” (Horkheimer & 
Adorno  2002,  pp.  xi–xvii). In  any  case,  they  would  not  realize  it  without  a  fierce 
denouncement of the dark shadows of meaninglessness behind the lights.
One of the central targets of Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique is the formality of 
‘reason’ as emblematically developed by Kant’s postulation of practical reason as wholly 
indifferent to contextual conditionings, singularity, sentiments, desires and inclinations, 
obeying instead only to the universal, rational moral duty, whilst being neutral relatively 
to its ends. Their argument, in a nutshell, is that after nature (either internal or external)  
became wholly disenchanted within the gears of calculative reason, these transcendental 
categories end up naturalized themselves, constituting a new form of mythology. In their 
words: “In the belief  that without strict  limitation to the observation of facts and the 
calculation of probabilities the cognitive mind would be over receptive to charlatanism, 
that  system is  preparing  arid  ground  for  the  greedy  acceptance  of  charlatanism and 
superstition” (2002, p. xv).
For a ‘slave of facts and procedures’ is alienated from critical judgment and thus 
paradoxically  vulnerable  to  irrationality.  This  is  made  explicit,  for  instance,  in  the 
complete availability of reason for “… the purposes of the bourgeois economy both in 
factories and on the battle field” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, p. 2).
In the Kantian optimistic understanding – as Horkheimer and Adorno term it - 
moral actions are “… reasonable even when base ones are likely to prosper” (Kant 1968, 
cited in Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, p. 67). The darkness in the heart of the optimism is 
however spotted by the authors who argue that if ethical forces are to be as neutral and 
indifferent  to  ends  as  it  is  the  procedure-oriented  mentality of  scientific  reason,  they 
ultimately lose their  intrinsic meaning whilst  becoming fully available to relapse into 
barbarism.
Further, concrete life is plenty with opposing forces to Kant’s optimism. That is, if 
it is true that Kant wants to derive from reason the duty of mutual respect and a (formal  
and universal)  moral law that determine our actions,  in real life,  “… the citizen who 
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renounced a profit out of the Kantian motive of respect for the mere form of the law 
would nor be enlightened but superstitious - a fool” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, p. 67). 
On the literature realm, the dark face of the blind obedience to moral duty would be 
revealed by writers such as Sade and Nietzsche who “…did not pretend that formalistic 
reason had a closer affinity to morality than to immorality” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, 
p. 92).
Even as a means, instrumental reason is, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, 
self-defeating. Despising the place of language and impressions for the sake of neutrality, 
reality - in many senses a narrative irreducible to numbers, graphics and probabilities - 
cannot be adequately described. That is, by divinizing technical procedures and ignoring 
social concerns, the gradual mastery of nature will inevitably stifle progress.
The acuteness of Horkheimer and Adorno’s analyses are confirmed in hindsight 
through the multiple ways by which the logic of numbers and the ‘brutality of facts’ still  
prevails today. Modernity and contemporary epoch are replete with instances of the ways 
in  which  a  ‘purely  rational’ decision  –  of  an  instrumental  type,  that  is,  a  ‘factual’ 
rationality  disconnected  from  the  emotions,  the  community  and  the  context   -  can 
paradoxically lead to a fragmented and very narrow form of reason which, not rarely, 
fuels irrationality. I shall go back to this later.
Here,  it  is  enough to point  out  that,  in  the (neoliberal)  contemporary context, 
instrumental  reason  tends  to  become  the  default  cultural  value  in  societies  wherein 
generating capital and consuming resources becomes the supreme rule.
Indeed, in a system ultimately premised upon the domination of nature towards 
the  pursuit  of  self-preservation  and  profit,  the  instrumental,  technical  reason 
independently of any social concern is the greatest tool for the system’s legitimation.  As 
the authors  note,  technical  reason “… is as democratic  as  the economic system with 
which it evolved. Technology is the essence of this knowledge. It aims to produce neither 
concepts nor images, nor the joy of understanding, but method, exploitation of the labor 
of others, capital” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, p.6).
The legacy of the Dialectics of the Enlightenment is therefore, as I see it, the idea 
that  the  promised  harmony  and  happiness  purportedly  embedded  in  the  ‘victory  of 
reason’ over  myth  could  become  a  mythology  itself,  and  a  dangerous  one.  For  the 
reduction of all meanings to reason as a “brutal fact” implies the systematic negation of a 
myriad  of  distinct  aspects  of  life  which  cannot  be  mathematically  grasped  and 
enunciated. The effect of this is dangerously embodied in the impoverishment of both 
thinking and experience, feeding, among other things, a constant sentiment of meaning 
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loss at  the heart  of modernity.  Putting it  differently,  the  search for the domination of 
nature by man through the application of this brute factual and calculative rationality 
forges  enlightened  reason  as  a  cold,  objective,  universal,  totalitarian  and  ultimately 
nihilistic Reason threatening nature with destruction and men with meaninglessness.
Nevertheless, in the heights of the modern epoch, even though some people would 
complain  about  the  appalling  emptiness  and  purposelessness  of  life,  they  were, 
comparatively, as Isaiah Berlin claims, a minority. The major position of the age was that 
“… we were progressing, we were discovering, we were destroying ancient prejudice, 
superstition, ignorance and cruelty, and we were well on the way towards establishing 
some kind of science which would make people happy, free, virtuous and just” (Berlin 
1999, p. 30).
Melancholy was, in this context, mostly conceived as self-indulgency. No longer 
rooted in the temptations of the flesh (as in medieval accounts), or in the Renaissance’s 
tension  between  multiplicity  and  unity  of  meaning,  but  a  sign  of  the  prevalence  of 
passions over the rational mind.
 Following Kant’s elaborations on the idea of melancholy as a disorder essentially 
based  on  a  disarranged  thought  processing  (Radden  2000,  p.  198)  and  other  similar 
approaches, melancholy becomes largely represented within the modern social imaginary 
as a sign of weakness of those not sufficiently disciplined in the methodic and voluntary 
application of the accessible power of rational thinking.
 In  the  century  of  the  Enlightenment,  those  who  lost  their  reason  were  not 
‘subjects of law’. Unreasonable, irresponsible and unable to work, insane people cannot 
be  subject  to  the  same  punishing  system  determined  for  those  who  voluntarily 
transgressed the law. Still,  the order was to be imposed and the insane ‘administered’ 
(Castel 1991).
This was to be realized by isolating these people in the multiple madhouses which 
arose throughout Europe in the 18th and 19th century. In these places, people suffering 
from melancholia and other mental conditions were commonly submitted to ‘treatments’ 
more akin to punishment  than to  any kind of therapeutic technique.  Segregated from 
society in institutions such as Bedlam (in England) and Bicêtre (France),  exposure to 
physical pain (as a way to ‘distract’ from mental pain), drowning, induced swoon and 
vomit were the common lot of many melancholics (Solomon 2001, p. 309).
In sum, generally speaking, in the Age of Reason, the melancholic occupied the 
place of exception of those in disagreement with the modern “Good”, in one word: reason 
(Kehl 2009a).
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Chapter 6: Modern meaning and its fissures
“Christ knew that by bread alone 
you  cannot  reanimate  man.  If 
there  were  no  spiritual  life,  no 
ideal of Beauty, man would pine 
away, die, go mad, kill himself or 
give  himself  to  pagan fantasies. 
And  as  Christ,  the  ideal  of 
Beauty in Himself and his Word, 
he  decided  it  was  better  to 
implant the ideal of Beauty in the 
soul. If it exists in the soul, each 
would be the brother of everyone 
else and then, of course, working 
for each other, all would also be 
rich.  Whereas  if  you  give  them 
bread,  they  might  become 
enemies  to  each  other  out  of 
boredom” 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky
This  chapter  focuses  on  the  analysis  of  the  fissures  on  the  modern  order  of 
meaning  in  the  heart  of  the  eighteenth  century  Enlightenment  and  further,  in 
Romanticism. In a second step, some representative modern intellectual formulations and 
reactions to the problem of meaning in the modern epoch - as philosophically elaborated 
in  the  works  of  Fyodor  Dostoyevsky,  Friedrich  Nietzsche  and  György Lukács  –  are 
examined in dialogue with the classical sociological accounts of  Émile  Durkheim and 
Georg Simmel.  
6.1 – ‘The individual’ at the center of meaning
The rational consensus of the Enlightenment would not last long, cracking after 
intellectual and artistic assaults against the moral philosophy of reason and, also, by its 
own development in the concrete lives of human beings.
The eighteenth century was not a harmonious, symmetrical,  tidy time wherein 
‘solid reason’ and thus, unified meaning, prevailed in an undisturbed manner.
On the contrary,  even during the eighteenth century,  the apparently solidity of 
modern meaning had its fissures. Indeed, worries about the ‘evils of civilization' emerged 
almost  in  parallel  to  the  great  excitements  evoked  by the  promises  of  freedom and 
rationality. A typical example was Rousseau’s direct appeals to nature and linked critiques 
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about the corruptive effects of science and civilization on the moral life of communities 
(Rousseau 1968).
The cracks on the man-made order of the Enlightenment were therefore, we might 
think, permanent thorns in the heart of the ‘century of light’.  This means that while a 
belief  in  universal  truth,  reason  and  equality  was  asserted,  malleability,  difference, 
sensibility,  imagination,  possibility  and  even  skepticism  also  excited  modern 
consciousness from its very beginning. The latter incarnates, for instance, in Montaigne’s 
(1993) attack against ethnocentric views of life and, later, in Hobbes’ (2008) skeptical 
view of knowledge as resting not on any kind of divine intelligence or inner voice of 
consciousness, but on agreement about shared terms.
Further,  Simmel (1950) reasons, Enlightenment’s own formulas (epitomized in 
the  ‘quantitative  individualism’ of  reason  and  equality)  would  expectedly  lead  to  its 
contrary: the 19th century ‘qualitative individualism’. If in the first mode of individualism 
the emphasis  was on the universal,  free and equal  individual,  the  second,  qualitative 
mode, will value its opposite: difference and personal expression. As Simmel famously 
puts it:
It  seems that,  as soon as the ego had become sufficiently strengthened by the 
feeling of equality and generality, it fell back into the search for inequality. Yet 
this new inequality was posited from within. First, there had been the thorough 
liberation of the individual from the rusty chains of guild, birth right and church. 
Now, the individual that had thus become independent also wished to distinguish 
himself from other individuals (Simmel 1950, p. 78).
The  emphasis  on  ‘difference’  against  the  idea  of  a  ‘general  man’  of  the 
Enlightenment also became manifest within several reactions emerging in the literary and 
artistic field of late 18th century Germany, when reason frontally clashed with a context of 
a strong pietistic tradition still  dominant in the period (Berlin 1999). These reactions, 
although  not  constituting  a  fully  unified  new order  -  since  not  all  exponents  of  the 
movement  can  be  rightfully  linked  to  counter-Enlightenment  commitments  (Millan-
Zaibert 2000; Taylor 2007) - share a set of attributes that warrant their designation as 
Romanticism. Critical responses were also noticeable in Britain’s urbanized, industrial 
cities, and soon in most other Western cultures between the end of the 18th and early 19th 
century.
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In a context wherein urbanization,  industry and commerce were becoming the 
driving forces of existence and reason continuously and progressively advanced towards 
‘territories’ which until recently were outside its reach, explicit reactions against the new 
rational order start to emerge, radicalizing, so to speak, the ambiguous grounds of the 
symmetrically arranged order of the Enlightenment.
Romanticism became popularly known for its questioning of the inadequacies of 
the mainstream views of the Enlightenment project. Against reason and rational systems, 
the  so-called  romantics  defended  passions,  and  the  inextricable  spontaneity  of  all 
unclassifiable aspects of lived experience. A series of oppositions emanate from this one: 
philosophy was opposed by art, artifice by nature, objectivity by subjectivity, the sense of 
universality by the sense of uniqueness and lived experience, order by spontaneity, the 
mundane by the visionary, the emphasis on future by the emphasis on roots, the valuing 
of the rational reordering of life and the optimism before the powers of technology by the 
valuing of ‘things as they are’ and by a grand sensitivity or pessimism concerning the 
destructive potentials of the Industrial Revolution (Berlin 1999; Kumar 1995).
Melancholy, in such a context, was again associated with greatness, an experience 
of those able to come closer to the sublime, to feel more deeply and see more clearly, as 
celebrated  in  Goethe’s  The sorrows of  Young Werther (Radden 2000,  p.181).   In  the 
romantic perspective, in a world wherein the experience of the metropolitan life is “… a 
perpetual  clash  of  groups  and  cabals,  a  continual  flux  and  reflux  of  conflicting 
opinions…” wherein "… everything is absurd, but nothing is shocking, because everyone 
is  accustomed  to  everything…"  (Rousseau  1761,  cited  in  Berman  1988,  p.  18), 
melancholy is insight (Solomon 2001, p. 314).
Rousseau’s literary depiction of the intense (and quite despairing) versatility of a 
world in which "… the good, the bad, the beautiful, the ugly, truth, virtue, have only a 
local and limited existence" (Rousseau 1761, cited in Berman 1988, p. 18) is also deeply 
felt by Charles Baudelaire, although he ‘responds’ to it in a very different style and even 
opposing perspective. To Baudelaire, writing from within the concrete life of Bonaparte 
and  Haussmann's  Paris  with  its  spectacular  urban  innovations  and  “seething  chaos” 
(Baudelaire  1970, p.  94),  the obsession of progress and collective happiness was the 
“treacherous light” of the ‘modern theology’. In real life, this obsession boiled down to 
loss of control,  the end of certainties,  acceleration and melancholy at  the core of the 
modern metropolis (Baudelaire 1855, cited in Berman 1988, p. 139).
Further, melancholy is, in Baudelaire’s poetic formulations, not only a dark effect 
but  also  (as  Walter  Benjamin interprets  it)  a  more  productive  form of  refusal  of  the 
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symbolic conditions of this brutal time, recollecting all that the big city disposed and “… 
looking for a refuge for the hero among the masses of the big city” (Benjamin 1983, p. 
66).
In  Germany,  the  early  Romantics’  central  concern  was  rooted  in  a  profound 
skepticism about the viability of traditional attitudes towards truth, leading to the idea 
that philosophy was inherently incomplete, in the sense that it was not founded in any 
kind of primary principle (Norman 2002, p. 502). In other words, the movement attacked 
not reason itself  but philosophy’s capability to articulate absolute truths and establish 
absolute validity to moral and ethical commitments, an ambition that, in its hubris and 
pride, they argued, could lead to destruction (Dudley 2007; Taylor 2007). This inherent 
incompleteness, they believed, was related to the inescapable embeddedness of truth in 
language,  so  that  philosophy is  in  inescapable  contact  with  aesthetic  experience  and 
poetry (Millan-Zaibert 2000; Norman 2002).
In the moral domain, commitments should be based on the inner rhythm of the 
incomparable character of each specific claim. As such, the romanticist basically found 
the sense of their individual and social existences in the uniqueness of his nature and 
activities (in comparison with others) and no longer in any external, objectively given 
ideal (Simmel 1950)
These  epistemological  and  moral  mindsets  continued  to  reverberate  and 
importantly inform the intellectual European tradition from the nineteenth century to the 
present  day (Existentialism,  the  so-called  German Lebensphilosophie  movements  and 
Friedrich  Nietzsche  are  importantly  heirs  of  Romanticism).  Still,  it constituted  a 
fundamental change of both consciousness and social existence in Western civilizations 
which greatly impacted issues of meaning.
Whilst the eighteenth century’s webs of meaning were – or at least in its dominant 
forms attempted to be - organized on the basis of either the truthfulness or falsehood of 
causes, now it is the individual character of the person who accomplishes a certain deed 
(how it is expressive of his nature or not) which ultimately determines the value of an 
action. In Goethe’s words "Your general culture and all its institutions are fooleries. Any 
man's task is to do  something  extraordinarily well,  as no other man in his immediate 
environment can" (Goeth, cited in Simmel 1950, p. 80). If the cause one fights for is true 
or false, valuable or invaluable, or in the aesthetic realm, if an art oeuvre is beautiful or 
not in itself, becomes secondary or even impossible to decide outside the particular voice 
of the individual who expresses herself in it (Berlin 1999; Taylor 1989, 2007).
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The  primary  factor  for  the  meaning  of  experiences  becomes,  therefore,  the 
expression of  the  inner,  authentic  self  that  would  replace  the  previous  accent  on the 
neutral truth. The expressive individual thus emerges, from the Romantic mindset, as the 
ultimate element around which all values and commitments would either gain or lack 
vitality.
Kearney (1988) describes the romantic manoeuver towards interiority as a kind of 
defensive reaction before the perceived insufficiency of the political order, in particular, 
in its dehumanizing social effects and the visible betrayal of the idea of a better future for 
all. Hence, the antagonistic conditions of reality were no longer to be tackled with the 
enlightened  furor  for  transformation  and  perfection  but  to  be  ‘pacified’  within  an 
imaginative realm relatively split  from the real world. Modern demands for universal 
freedom,  beauty and unity were  thus  internalized:  the romantic  individual  sought  for 
harmony within and through his creative imagination.
Further, in such an internalized, singular, spontaneous, passionate order posited by 
Romanticism,  the  notion  of  a  single  ideal  for  all  mankind,  mirrored  in  the 
Enlightenment’s  ambition  of  finding  coherent  and universal  answers  for  all  kinds  of 
questions, becomes problematic. The romantic impact on modern consciousness renders 
the  vision  of  ideals,  as  a  kind  of  synthetic  truth  that  works  for  all  humanity,  as 
increasingly senseless.
Romantics taught us that ideals are (and should be) localizable human constructs, 
creations  emerging  from  a  context.  In  Herder,  Berlin  (1999)  observes,  this  idea  is 
developed  to  its  limits  through  his  passionate  appreciation  and  defense  of  roots  and 
belonging. For him, every ideal is justifiable and admirable in terms of the environment 
in which it is constituted and should remain just as it  is.  Positing ideals as particular 
businesses of a certain cultural group, Herder’s romanticism disseminates the idea that all 
final and overarching answers to the question of how to live is meaningless and that truth, 
despite desires of completeness, is fundamentally what appears to each group to which 
one belongs (and even to each individual in a particular situation) as being true (Berlin 
1999, p. 64-65).
In  reality,  since  the  Enlightenment’s  insistence  on  replacing  the  premodern 
acceptance of traditional authority by the rational decisions of ‘the general man’ until 
Romanticism’s skepticism and linked inflation of subjectivity, the issue of overarching 
meanings and, to a certain extent, even of external foundations (rooted either on God, or 
society) become problematic and start to fade. For, if with Kant and the German idealists, 
each individual should dispense with all worldly and heavenly mediations becoming the 
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immediate  source  of  meaning,  Romanticism goes  a  step  further:  the  idea  of  God  is 
somehow projected into the idea of man, so that the ‘divine spark’ was now to be sought 
in the inner depths of human will and desire.
 As Simmel (1950) pointedly notes, the apparent opposition between these two 
ideals dissolves in the common accent on the cultivation of rational or irrational, general 
or unique, the grandiose individual.
Now, ‘the individual’ as a foundation was once described by Durkheim as the “… 
crucial conviction of modern societies” (Durkheim 1974, p. 59), a sign of the persistence 
of the sacred (and thus of socially cohesive factors) in the heart of the modernity, that is, a 
sign that ‘collective consciousness’ (1976, p. 423) changed but did not collapsed after the 
emergence of individualist principles. Concerning individualism, he writes, this is not to 
be understood as a mere antagonism between individual and society since “… it is society 
that instituted it and made of man the god whose servant it is” (1974, p. 29).
Durkheim’s point is  that with the complexification of modern societies,  which 
increasingly expand and diversify in its geographical, occupational, cultural and personal 
boundaries, “… nothing remains which man can love and honor in common if not man 
himself” (1973, p. 52).
However,  a  correct  understanding  of  what  Durkheim  means  by  the  sacred 
character of ‘the cult of the individual’ (in its capability to grant social integration) is 
needed in order to avoid a complete misunderstanding of his ideas.
 Indeed, since his early  The Division of Labour in Society (1984) until his last 
major work,  The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1976) Durkheim maintains that 
what is at stake in modernity is in any way the collapse of a “common conscience” but a 
transformation  of  its  nature.  This  becomes  no  longer  based  on  commonalities  of 
meanings and beliefs, or on resemblances between individuals, being founded instead 
upon functional interdependency in the division of labour; specialized rights and duties; 
and  its  moral  counterpart:  the  sacralization  of  “humanity”  (Durkheim  1984,  1976; 
Giddens 2005).
This affirmative view of modernity does not mean an uncritical  acceptance of 
modern  individualism,  one  which  is  oblivious  to  its  potential  risks  and  pathological 
vicissitudes. A permanent concern for Durkheim was, it is widely known, how modern 
individuals and social actions could be ordered and controlled as to avert egoistic forms 
of individualism which does not constitute a ‘true social link’. Durkheim was aware – in 
a sense agreeing with both Marx and Weber - that the recreation of a meaningful and 
morally coherent social life was a challenging task in modern conditions. The challenge 
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would be overcome, he recognized, only by addressing three major problems. First, the 
disintegrating forces of either excessive/anomic division of labour (caused by dislocation 
between means and ends and juridical indetermination of the relations between capital 
and labour); second, the inequities of a forced division of labour (an expression of class 
inequality);  and  third,  the  paradoxes  imposed  by  the  sacralization  of  the  individual 
(Durkheim 1976, 1984).
The later paradox dwells at the contradictory situation in which if it is true that 
modernity found its own form of sacredness in the shared, socially unifying beliefs of a 
new “cult of the individual” (taking issue with the Weberian claim of the dissolution of 
sociocultural unity and his secularization thesis), it is also true that the object of this cult 
is not a social one. That is, whilst the very ability to consecrate something comes from 
society, the thing which is sacred for the modern collective conscience (the individual) 
does  not  bind  us  to  the  collective  but  to  ourselves.  And  since  it  does  not,  in  itself, 
articulate  positive  obligations  uniting  individuals  in  a  common moral  life,  it  may be 
undermined  in  its  worth  as  a  shared,  socially  structuring  belief.  In  a  very  revealing 
passage, Durkheim depicts the paradox:
…  if  the  faith  is  common  because  it  is  shared  among  the  community,  it  is 
individual in its object. If it impels every will towards the same end, that end is 
not a social one.  Thus it holds a whole exceptional position within the collective 
consciousness. It is indeed from society that it draws all the strength, but it is not 
to society that it binds us: it is to ourselves (1984, p. 122)
The passage bespeaks Durkheim’s old and abiding concern with the development 
of individualism (Giddens 2005). Later, in his Individualism and the Intellectuals (1973), 
Durkheim establishes that the sacredness of the individual is indeed the only possible 
foundation of moral unity in modern conditions. But he also stresses that its worth as a 
socially unifying force dwells upon the valuing of man in the abstract, a value therefore 
linked  to  an  altruistic  ethic  of  obligation  and  social  responsibility  that  far  surpasses 
individuals as particular beings. Otherwise, by lacking its character as a shared, collective 
belief which simultaneously acknowledges and surpasses difference, the modern ‘religion 
of humanity’ would boil down to monadic isolation, self-interest, egoism and anomie.
In concrete terms, while ‘the individual’ is the new sacred object - so that respect 
towards individual  difference becomes a  social  virtue – its  ‘sacredness’ resides in  its 
containment within a social framework of moral ideals that surpasses the individual in 
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his/her isolation. These moral ideals – originating from strong collective belief in notions 
such  as  equality,  freedom and  justice  -  incarnate  in  institutions  protecting  individual 
human  rights,  including  the  rights  of  free  inquiry  and  private  property  and  being 
embodied, in its political dimensions, in modern democracy (Carls n.d).
In  order  to  avoid  anomie,  thereby,  modern  societies  should  not  combat 
individualism but extend and organize it (Durkheim 1973) providing the types of social 
organization in which individuals can feel purposively committed and attached.
This is so because autonomy, Durkheim certainly recognized, is a very abstract 
and different form of foundation in comparison to traditional foundations (Carleheden 
2006, p. 60).
This abstractedness can lead to liberating and even exhilarating feelings before 
the possibility to decide between multiple options. However, the dissipation of references 
and limits and the associated need to continuously make sense of the new and unfamiliar, 
may feed a ‘bewilderment of meaninglessness’ when every option is just an option among 
others,  and  hence,  always  open  to  change.  From  this  point  of  view,  modern 
meaninglessness  refers  to  a  condition  of  bewilderment  –  or  anomie,  going  back  to 
Durkheim’s  terminology -  brought  about  by the  loss  of  traditional  references,  limits, 
structures, values and ideals from the outside or from above, without any new limits and 
regulations being imposed, so that the individual has therefore “to create its normativity 
out of itself” (Habermas 1987, cited in Carleheden 2006, p. 60).
In  the  same  line  of  reasoning,  on  the  one  hand,  Durkheim  recognized  that 
‘autonomous reason’ was a central belief of the modern cult of the individual, so that any 
form of authority should be rationally grounded in order to retain its value (Carls n.d.). 
On the other hand, he was certainly critical of the modern scientific paradigm leading to 
naturalist and utilitarian views in which the sole source to guide human beings would rest 
within a virtually disengaged, atomic individuality and its  rational procedures – as in 
forming a single irreducible unit independent of external influences (Durkheim 1973).
In sum, ‘individual’ and ‘reason’ could constitute, in Durkheim’s view, cohesive 
factors  in  modernity  provided  that  these  notions  were  to  become  operative  within  a 
background of social interchanges and duties to social ideals.
Charles Taylor also deals with the paradox between, on the one hand, what he 
deems as the affirmative side of modernity – based on the moral ideal of authenticity, 
according  to  which  individuals  should  be  free  to  determine  what  is  the  ‘good  life’, 
cultivating and expressing what is unique and original inside them. On the other, Taylor 
recognizes  the  ‘shadows’ of  the  modern  ideal:  moral  subjectivism and  linked  value 
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relativism, “the atomism of the self-absorbed individual” (Taylor 1991, p. 09) and the 
“liberalism of neutrality” (Taylor 1991, p. 17).
In a nutshell, Taylor’s argument is that the modern ideal of authenticity retains 
moral worth – embodied in the idea (which few of us are, presently, willing to resign) that 
individuals are unique and should be left free to choose their own paths in life. This, he 
claims, should not be confounded with “… the non-moral desire to do what one wants 
without  interference”  (1991,  p.  21),  “rejecting  the  past  as  irrelevant,  or  denying  the 
demands  of  citizenship,  or  the  duties  of  solidarity,  or  the  needs  of  the  natural 
environment.” (1991, p. 22).
 As  Durkheim,  Taylor  is  not  oblivious  to  the  danger  that  this  ‘self-choosing 
individual’  becomes  a  disengaged,  self-absorbed  person  whose  values  are  defined, 
merely, by his subjective preferences. In Taylor’s mind, this has problematic effects on 
individuals themselves. For unless freedom is rooted in values and ways of living which 
are valuable not only because one happens to feel drawn to them, but because they have 
objective worth (defined through dialogue within social practices), freedom collapses into 
meaninglessness. That is, if values are experienced as merely subjective, there is the risk 
of  the  trivialization  of  all  values,  so  that  ‘the  self-choosing  individual’ ends  up  not 
knowing what ‘really matters’ becoming thus unable to choose in any meaningful way 
(Taylor 1991).
In the political realm, when it is established that “…  a liberal society must be 
neutral on questions of what constitutes a good life”, the danger is that questions about 
values become banished “to the margins of political debate” (Taylor 1991, p. 18). As a 
result, all values – beyond mere preference and subjectivist choice - that could avert the 
degraded developments of authenticity and of instrumental reason and its effects in public 
matters  become inarticulate,  leading to  detrimental  consequences.  Detrimental  effects 
appear,  for  instance,  when  today’s  logic  of  unconstrained  economic  growth  find  no 
collective  values  to  hamper  its  legitimation.  In  Taylor’s  words:  “Because  the  only 
effective counter to the drift towards atomism and instrumentalism built into market and 
bureaucratic state is the formation of an effective common purpose through democratic 
action, fragmentation in fact disables us from resisting this drift” (1991, p. 117).
The challenges (and dangers) of the ideal of authenticity are potentialized towards 
infinity when the two sacred objects of modernity, Reason and the Individual become, to 
a certain extent,  ‘dogmas’ of the contemporary political-economic theology of market 
fundamentalism, so that reason becomes limited to ‘rational choice’ and ‘authenticity’ 
boils down to a new form of domination based on social deregulation.
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6.2 - Intellectual concerns and formulations on the modern problem of meaning
The two fundamental  projects  of  modernity (Enlightenment  and Romanticism, 
materialized  in  political-economic  terms  in  liberalism)  evoked,  from  different 
perspectives, worries about the fate of meaning after the blurring of various limits by way 
of the ascension of the two beloved ‘sons’ of modernity: disengaged / instrumental reason 
and autonomy.
Doubtlessly, the new fate of meaning as ‘an individual business’ evoked not only 
new arrangements at  the level of the concrete everyday lives  of individuals,  but also 
motivated  the  production  of  an  extensive  and  in  many  cases  influential  intellectual 
elaboration  of  the  possible  implications  of  individualism -  either  in  its  emphasis  on 
disengaged  reason  and  order,  or  in  its  opposing  qualitative  version  emphasizing 
difference and individual sensibility - on issues of meaning.
 A full account of these analyses surpasses both my intentions and the space I 
have  available.  The  phenomenon  was  envisaged  from  many  different  and  often 
contradictory standpoints which differ both in the understanding of its causes and in the 
‘solutions’ proposed. If there is however, a point of contact between these multi-faceted 
approaches to the problem, it is the common concern with the fate of meaning when God, 
traditional  bonds  and  the  certitude  of  a  mind-independent  reality  give  way  to  the 
sovereignty of the individual.
In the sociological domain, the so-called founding fathers of sociology were all, in 
one way of another, greatly concerned with the issue of meaning in modern conditions. 
Among  them,  the  position  of  Max  Weber  was  explored  in  the  last  chapter,  in  his 
formulation of the modern problem of meaning as associated to the disenchantment of 
life, the ensuing pluralization of irreconcilable value spheres and the emergence of a free 
subject  enjoined  to  create  meaning  for  himself  within  a  context  of  widespread 
rationalization and bureaucratization. In the present topic, I will develop Durkheim’s and 
Simmel’s  stances  on  the  theme  a  little  further,  in  dialogue  with  the  philosophical-
existentialist-psychological  formulations  of  this  tension  as  developed  by  Friedrich 
Nietzsche and, in the literary domain, by Fyodor Dostoyevsky. The accounts of György 
Lukács in the domain of critical and aesthetic theory, especially represented in his short 
but illuminating work The Theory of the Novel (1971) also raises some interesting issues 
for the purposes of the analysis intended here.
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These authors neither represent the whole realm of discussions on meaning in 
modern conditions,  nor  I  am assuming,  by focusing on them, that  they are the  most 
important voices in this discussion.
In fact, several and distinct voices brought contributions to the theme. The choice 
of  these  figures  are  justifiable,  as  I  hope  to  make  clear,  for  their  answers  represent 
succinct forms which have special worth for the particular focus I want to give to the 
subject.
Dostoyevsky  is  widely  known  by  his  literary  treatment  of  human  values.  In 
particular,  many  of  Dostoyevsky’s  stories  dealt  with  the  tragedy  evoked  by  the 
dissolution  of  values  in  the  context  of  the  troubled  political,  social  and  spiritual 
atmosphere  of  19th-century  Russia. Beyond  Russia’s  particular  state  of  affairs  in  a 
tumultuous period of its history, Dostoyevsky goes deep into the modern soul, depicting 
in an ingenious exploration of the psychology of the characters in his widely read novels, 
the deep existential  torments and disastrous consequences of modern meaninglessness 
which, in its limits, engendered crime and perversion.
The Brazilian philosopher (and a scholar of Dostoyevsky’s literature) Luis Felipe 
Pondé explains that at the core of Dostoyevsky’s oeuvre dwells the idea that there is no 
human life without transcendence: either man transcends to God or to nothingness (Pondé 
2009).  
From this perspective, Dostoyevsky sees the humanist-naturalist dogmatism that 
dominates  Western  modern  thinking (and is  assimilated  by Russian  liberalism)  as  an 
illusion.  For in its  aspiration for  an earthly destiny of  free and sovereign individuals 
beyond  yearnings  for  the  absolute  of  eternity,  modernity  mistakenly  idealizes  the 
ontological viability of human beings through de postulation of the subject as his own 
foundation, an idea oblivious to the presence of transcendence in man (Pondé 2003, p. 
258).
In  the  words  of  Albert  Camus:  “All  Dostoyevsky’s  heroes  ask  themselves 
questions about the meaning of life … In Dostoevsky’s novels the question is propounded 
with such intensity that it can only invite extreme solutions. Existence is illusory or it is 
eternal” (Camus 1991, p. 104).
Through  his  mystical-materialist  critique,  opposing  the  rational  nihilism  of 
Modernity to  the  mystics  of  suffering  of  the  Russian  orthodox  Christianity  (Oliveira 
2012; Volpi 1999), Dostoyevsky is greatly disturbed by the deification of the individual 
which was dominant at the end of the nineteenth century. Against it, Dostoyevsky reacts 
by condemning and predicting the failure of Promethean ambitions typical of Western 
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modernity. For him, modern reason was nothing more than a nightmare of the divine-like 
individual who turns himself  into an “overly conscious mouse” who succeeds “… in 
creating around it so many other nastinesses in the form of doubts and questions” that he 
ends up, not despite but exactly because of his acute consciousness, losing every ground 
of belief (Dostoyevsky 1996, p. 11).
Friedrich Nietzsche, another acute thinker of the cultural, social and moral crisis 
in  the modern era is  also  in  the epicenter  of  the nineteenth century’s  discussions  on 
meaning. Nietzsche’s intent was enormous: not only to offer a diagnosis and explanation 
but also a kind of ‘therapeutic solution’ to the meaninglessness crisis which, he believed, 
would haunt humanity from his time on.
For sure, I cannot do justice here to the complexities and even ambiguities of 
Nietzsche’s accounts on meaning. Thereby, I will limit the focus to the discussion of his 
most  prominent  claims  on  the  subject,  seeking  a  panoramic  understanding  of  his 
(fundamental and widely influential) role in the domain of the intellectual reactions to the 
predicament of meaning in modern conditions.
 For  Nietzsche,  the  moral  optimism  of  the  modern  Western  man  was  not 
endurable.   After  rejecting all  immutable values (as those inherited from the Western 
Judaeo-Christian  moral  traditions)  and  tutelary  forms,  Modernity  erected  Reason,  as 
we’ve seen, as a new form of the Absolute, hoping that through science, existence could 
be perfected over history. This was a gross illusion from Nietzsche’s perspective. It was 
clear,  for  him,  that  modern  reason  was  inherently  self-determining  and  therefore 
incompatible with any absolute determination, or utopia. Soon, he warned, the sentiment 
of  meaningless  would  penetrate  the  modern  soul  that  awakes  from  the  ‘dream  of 
progress’ (Nietzsche 1994).
But Nietzsche was not to lament the advent of meaninglessness. Instead, he would 
in  many  senses  embrace  the  whole  consequences  of  what  he  considers  to  be  the 
awakening of humanity in  the West  from two great  historical  nightmares:  the ascetic 
project of Christianity and the (apparently opposite) rationalist project of Modernity. For 
Nietzsche, the opposition is merely apparent: both dwell on abstractions and claim to 
possess the ownership of a truth above and beyond human life by which the world can be 
corrected and improved (Casey 2002). This is a logic deeply resented by Nietzsche as the 
very incarnation of nihilism. Thereby, nihilism is understood by Nietzsche not as a form 
of conducting life without values and ideals, but on the contrary, a form of life enslaved 
by transcendences, moral principles, all “metaphysical crutches” which are imposed upon 
life’s immediacy and flows. And by hovering over and above life they constitute, for  
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Nietzsche,  fundamentally nihilistic mental models or,  as he provocatively calls it,  ‘an 
anti-morality’ which is deeply hostile to life (Nietzsche 1995, p. 7).
 In other words, the modern rational project is only a form of projection of the 
same totalizing conception of meaning as the one promoted by Judaeo-Christian moral 
traditions: in modernity, the worship of God is replaced by the worship of truth. In both,  
the world and the subject are treated as under the command of either God or Reason, a 
logic that threatens to “… confine the individual man in the narrowest circle of soluble 
problems” (Nietzsche 1995, p. 62). This common approach is ‘against life’, he reasons, 
for the fact that it despises the wisdom of the tragic nature of all things greater than any 
divine or rational truths, disrespecting “… the bashfulness with which nature has hidden 
behind riddles and iridescent uncertainties” (Nietzsche 1974, p. 8) also lying about the 
inherently problematic and insoluble character of human existence.
Nietzsche stands, therefore, as Dostoyevsky, fiercely against the modern ambition 
that promoted the idea that reason should measure up the compelling enigma of life. 
However, in full opposition to the Russian writer, he powerfully rejects the transcendence 
of God as equally false, a harmful and unnatural path in the search for a meaningful 
existence.
Against  the  ascetic,  unified  truth  of  the  Judeo-Christian-Platonic  tradition, 
Nietzsche submits that  when the hope for a ‘better life’ either on Earth or in Heaven 
dissolves, after a liminal, temporary period of nihilistic negation of all values, humans 
may realize the opportunity to make themselves anew as a work of art (Nietzsche 1994).
This may sound as a decidedly romantic formulation, in particular in its rebellion 
against  the  universalizing  ambitions  of  modern  rationalism in favor  of  an  alternative 
valuing of existence as an aesthetic experience. But Nietzsche would radically differ from 
Romanticism, at least those strands which advocated a return to the past or any form of 
‘pacification’  within  imagination.  Alternatively,  the  way  out  of  ‘the  sepulchers  of 
meaninglessness’ should, for him, to be found in a ‘this-worldly reign of the Übermensch’ 
in which man shall live well ‘under the volcano’ as the sole master of himself, imposing a 
man-made meaning upon life.
Nietzsche’s  words  could  not  be  more  contrasting  to  either  Dostoyevsky  or 
Romantic pessimism:
The overman is the meaning of the Earth. Let your will say: the overman shall be 
the meaning of the Earth! I beseech you my brothers, remain true to the Earth, and 
do not believe those who speak to you of extraterrestrial hopes! They are mixers 
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of poisons, whether they know it or not. They are despisers of life, dying-off and 
self-poisoned, of whom the earth is weary:  so let them fade away!” (Nietzsche 
2006, p. 6).
As he  described  himself,  Nietzsche  was  the  dynamite  “… against  everything 
hitherto believed, demanded, hallowed” (Nietzsche 2007, p. 88), daring to announce the 
promises embedded within the “death of God” and the end of unified, abstract meaning 
and all invented idols.
Thereby, on the one hand, Nietzsche took the full consequences of the radical 
contingency and perspectivism of subjective valuation. On the other, the disseminated 
view of Nietzsche as a thinker who celebrated or even promoted nihilism (in its common 
sense  of  lack  of  ideals)  and  denied  the  need  for  meaning  is  opposed  by  several 
commentators (e.g. Giacóia Júnior 2005; Nehamas 1985; Solomon 2003) who embrace a 
more  affirmative  view  of  his  work.  From  this  point  of  view,  Nietzsche’s  oeuvre  is 
motivated by moral  concerns and targeted not  towards the promotion of nihilism but 
instead the elaboration of an answer to the existential nihilism that dominated Europe at 
the end of the nineteenth century.
The issue becomes thus, for Nietzsche, which kinds of created meanings are life-
promoting or life-denying (Nietzsche 1994) and not the negation of meaning per se.
But  for  Nietzsche  the  metaphysical  meanings,  which  have  so  far  sustained 
humanity, are way far of being good ‘nourishment’ for life. Besides, they were surpassed 
by moderns themselves. In Nietzsche’s famous formulation of the problem: “Where is 
God? ; I will tell you! We have killed him, you and I! (...)” (1974, p. 120).
Thus, he reasons, after we have “… climbed the highest and most dangerous peak 
of current thought and looked around from up there” (Nietzsche 1974, p. 8) we are at 
least potentially free enough as to acknowledge the fictional character of all meanings 
and artistic enough as to overthrow the unified truths of the Christian-Platonic tradition. 
Hence, after a period of temporary convalescence of suspicion and doubt, at least those 
freer, higher, noble types of human beings will find themselves capable of self-control 
and  self-legislation  and  will  actively  help  to  overthrow  the  old  values  no  longer 
responsive to their wills and desires, creating for themselves “… a goal, a why, a new 
faith” (Nietzsche 1980, cited in Carr 1992, p. 42).
Now,  although  Nietzsche  talks  about  the  creation  of  new values  he  also 
(paradoxically) recur, as mentioned, to the old polytheist universe of myths. Against the 
truthful world of Christianity based on the logics of negation (wherein for ‘x’ to be true,  
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‘y’ must be false) in myths,  one god is never considered a denial  of other gods,  nor 
blasphemy against him (Casey 2002, p. 15). As he exultantly exclaims in anticipation of a 
world  that  has  finally  transcended  nihilistic  ideals:  “How  many  new  gods  are  now 
possible!” (Nietzsche 1980, cited in Carr 1992, p. 50).
For Nietzsche, this would be a richer and healthier existence permeated by values 
for the sake of which one may endure life, a logic which does not deny men’s quest for 
meanings and convictions – recognized by Nietzsche as a human need when he states: 
“… man must from time to time believe he knows why he exists; his race cannot thrive 
without a periodic trust in life, without faith in the reason in life!” (Nietzsche 1974, p. 
29). Yet, myths have the merit (in contrast to the abstract truths of reason and religion) 
not to lie about what life is ultimately about: “…appearance, art, illusion, optics, the need 
for perspective and for error” (Nietzsche 1994, p. 7).
The Nietzschean resort to myths can, to a certain extent, sound as consistent to 
Durkheim’s (1976) ideas that the future of ‘modern religion’ was to accept its cultural 
foundation,  realizing  the  fictional,  collectively  created  nature  of  its  beliefs.  But 
Nietzsche’s project seems to grow distant from the French sociologist by his association 
of a ‘this-worldly’ meaning wherein ‘many gods are possible’ with absolute individual 
sovereignty independently of collective morality. And whereas Durkheim conceives the 
sacred x profane dichotomy inherent to religious life as stemming from and constitutive 
of  society  and,  also,  as  being  integral  of  both  social  cohesion  and  the  individual, 
Nietzsche attacks all religious structure of thinking. For him, all rationality which divides 
human life  in  two,  opposing  spiritual  and mundane things;  good and bad;  right  and 
wrong; ideal and real are feeble ‘dichotomous solutions’ which have crumbled (or should 
crumble) after the ‘death of God’.
Simmel describes the Nietzschean philosophical project as being at the epicenter 
of a cultural / philosophical trend of the affirmation of life as entirely self-determining 
and the utmost origin of all meaning. That is, life can only find meaning within itself, “… 
in relation not to any definable goal but purely to its own development” (Simmel 2000c, 
p. 79).
In Simmel’s  mind,  this  is  a problematic  move.  By rejecting the idea that  any 
‘transcendental  meaning’  may  impose  itself  upon  the  sheer  intensification  of  life, 
Nietzsche risks stripping order from life, projecting one against the other.
Simmel’s argument against Nietzsche is that life itself is a “… living call to be 
something ‘more-than-life’ constantly set against the equally vital facts of life” (Lee & 
Silver 2012),  which means that life and form are neither antithetical forces,  nor they 
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belong to separate and opposing realms, but stand in a reciprocal polarity between flux 
and  fixed  (Lash  2005;  Weinstein  &  Weinstein  1990).  As  such,  what  the  person  is 
(actuality)  and  what  she  should  be  (ought)  are  intrinsically  related  domains  of  the 
individual life. In Simmel’s words:  life is “… as ethical… as it is actual” (Simmel 2010, 
p. 100).
In  his  fervent  rejection  of  the  external,  universal  values  in  favour  of  life, 
Nietzsche condemned the “Ought” as a demand alien and even opposing to life itself, 
whilst for Simmel the latter is nothing else than a form of the actuality of life. Thus, the 
‘conventional notion’ (to which Nietzsche, even though negatively, subscribes) is that “… 
life is an unfolding subjective actuality which is confronted by the ideal demand of the 
Ought and that this demand issues from a different order from that which life springs…”. 
However,  Simmel argues, “… the Ought does not stand altogether above life or over 
against it, but instead is precisely a mode by which life becomes aware of itself” (2010, p. 
100).
Concretely, one of the problems of affirming life itself (despite or against order) is 
that, as Taylor notes, “Life itself can push to cruelty, to domination, to exclusion, and 
indeed does so in its moments of most exuberant affirmation” (2007, p. 373).
Nietzsche  was  apparently  aware  of  the  daring  of  his  undertaking  –  he  was 
threading on a “vast and dangerous land” (Nietzsche 1994, p. 2) as he himself put it -. But 
daring was a sign of excellence and courage, an explicitly noble virtue for Nietzsche. 
Hence, he went as far as his fury against the traditional Western conceptions of the ‘moral 
individual’ and his will to dare led him. Yet, perhaps guided by the oppositional nature of 
his endeavor, he submits (not without contradiction, especially if one takes his oeuvre as 
a whole) that to affirm life is (also) to rehabilitate “… destruction and chaos, the inﬂiction 
of suffering and exploitation, as part of the life to be affirmed" (Taylor 2007, p. 373).
Darker consequences of Nietzsche’s answer to the modern problem of meaning 
were  sensed  by  Dostoyevsky.  The  existential  crisis  that  is  repetitively  portrayed 
throughout his oeuvre is one in which the powerfully attraction to locate oneself ‘beyond 
the good and evil’ and the feelings of power that this position provide, cannot set aside 
the anguish and even despair before ‘the emancipation towards nothingness’ granted by 
reason without transcendence. As such, “… for him, the Nietzschean overman would not 
be anything more than an underground dream” (Girard 2009, cited in Felipe 2012,  my 
transl.).
The fate of Raskolnikov, the protagonist of his novel Crime and Punishment is a 
good example of how Dostoyevsky treats the issue. Applying the “(a)moral perspective” 
104
inherent to the scientific dogma of the vanguard intelligentsia of that period, Raskolnikov 
longed to be part of an elite of masterful man, those few capable of putting themselves 
above good and evil, or yet above the ‘herd of common people’ destined to obey socially 
imposed norms. To prove himself worthy of this, he plans to commit a murder without 
being  affected  by the  self-condemnation  of  ‘a  bad  conscience’.  In  fact,  Raskolnikov 
didn’t suffer out of regret or guilt, both voided by his rational mentality, but from an “… 
inner void which cut him off from all human beings without any hope of ever finding an 
outlet from this cosmic isolation” (Lavrin 1969, p. 165).  And even though the idea of 
crime was really senseless in his godless logic, Raskolnikov decides to confess surrender 
himself  to  the  authorities;  that  is,  in  the  end,  the  ‘above  of  good  and  evil’ man, 
supposedly independent from all social norms, voluntarily decides to submit himself to 
the socially established laws.
If murder, and later, isolation was the fate of Raskolnikov, in Dostoyevsky’s novel 
Devils, suicide is the outcome of the lack of self-transcendence and belief. In the chilling 
reasoning of Kirillov, suicide was the highest (or sole) act of self-assertion for a true 
unbeliever that feels he is the only God. What Dostoyevsky seemingly leaves implicit 
here is the tragic connection between self-assertion, on the one hand, and self-destruction, 
on the other (Lavrin 1969, p. 167).
What the Russian writer may help us to realize – through the magnifying lens of 
his tortured characters and of a perhaps too dark view of humanity as permanently hunted 
by evil - is the self-delusive aspects, or at least, the perils of modern pretentions of ‘total 
freedom’ that have shaped the Western view of life. The tormenting inner condition of 
characters such as Ivan Karamasov, Kirillov, Stavrogin and Raskolnikov tells therefore 
not  only about  the  supposed irremediable  consequences  of  a  world  without  religious 
transcendence.
Beyond  Dostoyevsky’s  seemingly  overstated  worries  with  the  chaotic  and 
anarchic  effects  potentialized  by the  absence  of  an  undeniable  (divine)  authority,  his 
literature presents us with some pause and wisdom before accepting the idea of a wholly 
sovereign ego, an idea that negates the fact repeatedly portrayed by Dostoyevsky that we 
are in many ways ‘strangers-to-ourselves’. As Claude Lefort states, “… the individual 
hides from himself by referring only to himself that he is up against an unknown” (1988, 
cited in Ehrenberg 2010b, p. 7). Still, I would add, self-reference is oblivious to the fact  
that we are animals of ‘transcendence’ having an insatiable thirst for completeness and 
meaning which can hardly be sustained self-referentially.
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In Durkheim’s sociological perspective, the impossibility to sustain meaning self-
referentially is rooted in a view of human nature not at all distant from the one portrayed 
by the Russian writer. For Durkheim, human nature is the site of an unlimited number of 
impulses and needs which can lead to malaise if a process of self-transcendence does not 
take place (Elchardus & Siongers 2001). Transcendence, however, is understood by the 
sociologist not as a prerogative of divine truths as such but as a fruit of membership to 
groups and the linked internalization of collective representations (Durkheim 1974).
Society is thus the fundamental and needed “pair/counterpart” of human nature; 
that is, it is from society (through its collectively defined social norms and beliefs) that 
humans’ unlimited impulses and desires may gain the structure and limit that they lack. In 
other  words,  in  the  Durkheimian  rationale,  without  transcending  themselves  through 
integration  in  a  collective  social  body,  with  its  specific  symbols,  values  and  ideals, 
individuals suffer and pathologies thrive.
The process by which individual sovereignty tend to degrade from self-assertion 
to self-destruction is thus, in a  Durkheimian perspective,  not to be understood as an 
outcome of the “death of the (religious) God”, but as the effect of a more general neglect 
of the collective / cultural dimension of human beings. For since our constructions of self, 
moral order, and of the world are rooted within our linguistic interactions in collective 
life  (as  discussed  in  chapter  4)  meaning  depends  on  the  continual  affirmation  of  a 
collective moral consciousness which transcends the individual, that is, the cultivation of 
collective  representations  which,  once  internalized,  assume  the  ethical  functions  of 
religious moral principles in the modern secularized world.
Conversely, by withdrawing into the interior of consciousness as the sole ground 
or  reason  for  existence  (as  projected  by  fundamental  modern  currents,  from 
Enlightenment, to Romanticism and Liberalism) individuals are left without purpose and 
meaningful engagements, whilst le mal de l'infini – which Dostoyevsky brightly explores 
upon his characters’ existential confusion and nihilism – comes back from its exile to 
haunt human souls. Socially,  this cultural  neglect and symbolic impoverishment feeds 
unrestricted competition (in dangerous consistency with market reasons), various forms 
of unconcern or abuse of the other and in its limits, violence and death.
The point at which Durkheim diverges from Dostoyevsky is that he espouses a 
less tragic view of modernity as capable of developing a system of social cohesion which 
ensures moral unity after the ‘death’ of the (religious) God. As we’ve analyzed already, 
for Durkheim, religion never really leaves us, at least if one considers, as he does, that its 
essence  does  not  lie  in  supernatural,  divine  incarnations  of  the  religious,  but  in  the 
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various symbolic or representational  forms of collectively empowered sentiments and 
ideals.  For him, what should subsist is moral authority,  a force that goes beyond our 
existence  as  individuals  and  provides  guidance,  which  is  in  no  way  a  privilege  of 
religious or traditional principles. In one sentence: “What is a moral authority if not the 
characteristic we attribute to a real or ideal being that we conceive of as constituting a 
moral power superior to our own?” (Durkheim 1974, p. 56).  
It  is  therefore  not  the  wane  of  the  transcendent  God,  of  traditional  forms  of 
consensus  which,  according  to  Durkheim,  should  concern  us,  but  the  most  general 
disruption of institutional conditions associated to the cultivation of collective beliefs, 
symbols and values which endow individual freedom with boundaries and constitute a 
foundation to morality. As he puts it, whilst Kant postulates God (and universal Reason), 
without  which  morality  is  unintelligible,  “We postulate  a  society specifically  distinct 
from individuals, since otherwise morality has no object and duty no roots” (Durkheim 
1974, p. 52).
 For  it  is  for  him the  permanence  of  the  ‘sacred’ in  society,  in  the  form of 
relatively  uncontested  norms  which  are  simultaneously  obligatory  and  desirable 
(Durkheim 1974), that protects modern people from utilitarian  egoism. The later, lacking 
the  both  limiting  /  structuring  ‘venerable  respect’  engendered  by  collective 
representations (Durkheim 1976) is “an ideal without grandeur” (Durkheim 1973, p. 44), 
that is, a degraded form of individualism. In this degraded form, autonomy and reason 
travel all the way down from the collective defense of individual dignity and rational 
lucidity  to  cold  calculation,  self-centeredness,  ‘the  war  of  all  against  all’  and 
meaninglessness.
The disagreement between Durkheim and Nietzsche becomes, thus, even clearer. 
Nietzsche understood that all ideals beyond life would infuse it with meaning and thus 
succeed  “… in  shutting  the  door  on  a  suicidal  nihilism by giving  humanity a  goal: 
morality” (Nietzsche, 1994 [1887]: xxvi). Nevertheless, he was also absolutely convinced 
that men and women could live much better without these created ‘beyonds’. Nietzsche 
envisages this improved existence, as we hinted above, through an existential solution: 
living life as an “oeuvre of art” wherein the individual himself should be the responsible 
to create and impress character over existence. Durkheim, in turn, without asserting any 
eschatological meaning bringing redemption or salvation, was much less positive about 
the possibilities of a Nietzschean ‘sovereign life’ lived in its ‘immanence and instants’ 
irrespective to the borders of obligatory and desirable cultural norms.
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The Hungarian Marxist  philosopher  and literary historian  György Lukács  will 
also be deeply concerned by the issue of meaning when “… man became lonely and 
could find meaning and substance only in his own soul” (Lukács 1971, p. 103).
The issues which tormented the Hungarian philosopher were not at  all  distant 
from those that concerned Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche, while his style of analysis was, 
for sure, closer to Dostoyevsky’s. The initial lines of his The theory of the novel suggest 
the proximity: “Happy is the age which can read in the starry heavens the mapped out 
paths which are open to it and which it may follow! Happy is the age whose paths are lit 
by the light of the stars!” (1971, p. 29)  
What Lukács apparently regrets in this passage is the fading of the anchorage of 
life in a ‘beyond’ so that a “ready-made”, “ever-present meaning” could be known and 
even “grasped” by anyone “in a glance” (Lukács 1971, p. 32).
This  heaven of  meaning once  existed,  in  Lukács’ perspective,  in  times  of  the 
archaic  Greece,  when  the  question  of  meaning  was  answered  even  before  it  was 
formulated. But heaven was not destined to last forever.
When foundations of belief  are progressively questioned in modern times,  life 
becomes uncertain,  individuals speculate endlessly and the new open universe causes 
totality  to  collapse,  evoking  an  experience  designated  by  him  as  “transcendental 
homelessness”  (Lukács  1971,  p.  62).  Before  the  immensity of  a  universe  now unlit, 
illuminated solely by the tentative light of reason, “… a mere glimpse of meaning is the 
highest that life has to offer, and that this glimpse is the only thing worth the commitment 
of an entire life, the only thing by which the struggle will have been justified” (1971, p.  
80).
Throughout the Theory of the Novel, either in his comments on what he terms as 
“abstract  idealism”,  or  on  the  nineteenth  century’s  “romanticism of  disillusionment”, 
Lukács identifies a threat dwelling right at the center of modern subjectivity (1971, p. 97, 
p. 112).
Whilst the first values the individual as the carrier of transcendent worlds, so that 
the risk arises of becoming “maniacally imprisoned in himself” so that “a maximum of 
inwardly attained meaning becomes a maximum of senselessness and the sublime turns to 
madness, to monomania” (1971, p. 100), in Romanticism, “… the inner importance of the 
individual has reached its historical apogee” (1971, p. 117). The “a priori utopianism” of 
idealism goes thus a step further through Romanticism which posits the individual self as 
the sole source of ideal reality. The result, in Lukács’ view, is tragic. In his words: “… the 
futility of the soul’s existence in the totality of the world is exposed with an equally 
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immoderate ruthlessness; the soul’s loneliness, its lack of any support or tie, is intensified 
until it becomes immeasurable” (1971, p. 118).
Lukács  seems  to  agree  with  Dostoyevsky and  Nietzsche  that  the  longing  for 
totality remains (even though Nietzsche would hope for a future when humanity could be 
indifferent  to  it).  In  contrast  to  Nietzsche,  Lukács  envisaged,  with  little  trust,  the 
possibilities of this isolated subjectivity as the access route to a meaningful life. On the 
other side, the return or resurrection of the previous state of totality was seen by him as 
unthinkable (and here he agrees again with Nietzsche), and this not only by irremediably 
external conditions of life but for humanity’s own ‘choice’. In Lukács words: “… we 
cannot breathe in a closed world” (1971, p. 33). This is so, he explains, because “We have 
invented the productivity of the spirit: that is why the primaeval images have irrevocably 
lost their objective self-evidence for us, and our thinking follows the endless path of an 
approximation that is never fully accomplished” (1971, p. 34)
The ideas of The theory of the Novel may appear as a kind of literary nostalgia for 
a  supposed  Golden  Age  -  as  Jameson  (1971,  p.  179)  puts  it  -,  and  even  utopian  in 
hindsight  -  Lukács  himself  will  later  refer  to  his  work  as  “romantic  anti-capitalism” 
(Lukács 1971, p. 19), regretting the too abstract character of his analysis.10
However,  the book has, I think,  at  least two major merits. First,  it  reveals the 
illuminating power of Lukács’ reflections on the problematic character of meaning in 
modern conditions (touching several elements also analyzed by Durkheim, Simmel and 
Weber on the subject). Secondly, he skillfully highlights the compelling ambivalence at 
the  core  of  Western  modern  minds.  In  that  regard,  with  clear  resemblances  to 
Dostoyevsky, and even Nietzsche, Lukács illuminates a very contemporary issue. That’s 
the fundamental ambivalence of (late) modern individuals who, as finely expressed in 
Torgovinick’s depiction of Lukács’ notion of the “transcendental homelessness”: “… are 
secular, but yearning for the sacred, ironic, but yearning for the absolute, individualistic, 
but  yearning  for  the  wholeness  of  community, asking  questions,  but  receiving  no 
answers, fragmented, but yearning for immanent totality” (Torgovinick 1990, p. 188).
10 In his 1962 preface, Lukács declares: “It was not until a decade and a half later (by that  
time, of course, on Marxist ground) that I succeeded in finding a way towards a solution” 
(1971, p.17). Indeed, from  History and Class Consciousness the problem is no longer 
conceived by Lukács within the scope of an ontological relationship between the self and 
the world. Instead,  it  comes to be understood in a concrete historical perspective and 
realized through concrete mediation of the material world.
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In sum, what Lukács since his young years was able to problematize was, once 
again, the ontological viability of a fully independent, grandiose, self-sufficient being, a 
vital issue in these times of (purportedly) liberal and liberated individuals.
The issue is also vital for the aims of the present study. As we are going to argue 
in the next sections, the rampant rates of depression in contemporary times, among other 
subjective  difficulties,  reveal  the  problems  at  the  heart  of  a  new  form of  collective 
transcendence  which  promotes,  paradoxically,  the  idea  of  a  ‘sovereign  individual’ 
dependent on nothing but himself.
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Chapter 7: The contemporary order of meaning
7.1 - Introductory remarks
Which  historical  transformations  affect  the  collective  order  of  meaning  in 
contemporary times? In view of these transformations, are we living in a contemporary 
epoch wherein meaning grows radically fragmented, leading to limitless and meaningless 
lives? These are the fundamental questions that this chapter brings to discussion.
As analyzed in the last chapter, after Descartes, Kant and many others and, also, 
by  the  incorporation  of  this  paradigmatic  shift  by  Romanticism  and  the  German 
Lebensphilosophie movements in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, if meaning 
still has any source it lies, fundamentally, within human beings.  
This tremendous shift in the order of meaning is not only a modern prospect in 
terms  of  philosophical  and  abstract  thinking.  Structural  transformations  such  as 
population  growth,  the  advance  of  mass  communication  systems,  transportation, 
intensification  of  urbanization,  industrialization  (and  the  linked  division  of 
labour/specialization),  the  emergence  of  a  fluctuating  but  continuously  expanding 
globalized  capitalist  market  associated  with  increasing  self-sufficiency  in  terms  of 
material survival led, in conjunction, to a myriad of changes in social life.  Among them, 
the amplified access to all kinds of people, to multiple points of view and stimuli imbued 
in  the  multiplication  of  social  circles  of  interaction  which  are  value-specific,  have  a 
significant role to play in the increasing sense of individualism affecting meaning in the 
inherently pluralistic modern metropolis.
In the nineteenth century, Western societies were already living into a much more 
complex  situation  in  terms  of  the  load  of  information  that  affected  the  perceptual 
apparatus of individuals. In his  The Metropolis and Mental life (2000b), Georg Simmel 
famously explores  the  issue  of  how the  mental  life  of  the  metropolitan  individual  is 
greatly intensified  due  to  the  “… swift  and continuous shift  of  internal  and external 
stimuli” given the “… rapid crowding of changing images” which stands in contrast to 
the more smooth rhythm of the small town (Simmel 2000b, p. 175).
In the face of such a varied and constantly shifting stimuli, the modern reservoir 
of meaning becomes increasingly complex and open to change. In the modern metropolis, 
wherein  “… the  relationships  of  human  beings  with  one  another  and with  objective 
culture are coloured by monetary interests” (Simmel 2005, p. 237), the role of common 
beliefs,  symbols  and of  personal  sentiments  for  the  regulation  of  exchanges  between 
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people becomes less central, having its intrinsic, qualitative, specific worth subordinated 
to  objective  and  abstract  rules  originating  from  the  universe  of  quantities  (Simmel 
2000b).
As a result, since intellectualized and abstract rules are less capable of prescribing 
rules for daily life, the range of decisions commanded by individual consciousness tends 
to grow (Durkheim 1984).
The situation is radicalized and in many ways transformed, once again, with the 
advent of the contemporary epoch. With the huge development of communication means 
and the increment of globalization processes connecting local, specific realities to global 
and distant ones (Giddens 1991), reality becomes irremediably under construction and 
continuous questioning.
Clearly,  from  the  greater  geographic  mobility  and  the  development  of 
communication technology, national borders – and the individual’s borders as well - are 
pervaded by news and a myriad of parameters of conduct from ‘the outside world´. This 
condition allows, according to Giddens (1991), the institutional extension of Modernity 
and its penetration within our daily lives, amplifying limits of information, patterns for 
personal identification and values.
After the Second World War, and in particular in the 1960s, liberation and the idea 
of “doing your own thing” (Taylor 2007, p. 475) become current and generalized. With 
post-war  affluence,  previous  forms  of  mutual  help  declined  and  people  come  to 
concentrate more on their private lives, contributing to the development of a new ethics 
according to which life should be the effect of individuals’ choices in favor of their own 
self-realization (Rose 1999).
Generalized processes of individualization gain further prominence through the 
collective counter-cultural movements of the 1960s decade which, progressively, mingled 
with the capitalist ideology.
 The movement started in a context of moral height: the hope of racial equality 
promoted  by Martin  Luther  King,  the  passage  of  civil  rights  acts,  the  campaign  for 
nuclear disarmament, protests against the Vietnam War, causes such as environmentalism, 
freedom  of  speech  and  anti-poverty  programs  were  some  of  the  highlights  of  the 
collective rebellion that marked the so-called counter cultural movement. Yet, in various 
Western countries, the movement struggled against all forms of oppression and injustices 
of  what  was  then  considered  the  elitist  and  autocratic  world  of  Modernity.  For  if 
modernity promulgated a free and equal individual, endowed with reason and ability to 
take ownership of the things of nature, these movements denounced, behind the alleged 
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universality,  the  dominance,  sometimes  oppressive,  of  certain  groups  and  social 
categories over others (Vaitsman 1994).
Further, unparalleled economic conditions were followed at the time by criticism 
against materialism, competition and also by a struggle for sexual freedom, ushered by 
the invention of the contraceptive pill. The sexual liberation discourse envisaged social 
institutions such as marriage and monogamy as passé and, more generally, struggles were 
developing,  in  many guises,  against  all  institutions and authorities  that might  contain 
individual choice (Ehrenberg 2010b, p. 228).
The movement was also marked by the emergence of a youth culture organized 
around pleasure and image. Andy Warhol’s famous declaration: “there is no message” 
and  his  paintings  of  iconic  figures  (by  which  even  the  revolutionary  Che  Guevara 
becomes revealed as nothing but an iconic symbol of the 1960s fashion) set the tone of a 
wider move within the 1960s countercultural movement. That’s the change from criticism 
to fashion, random rebellion, hedonist consumption, and the glorification of the private 
self, revealing the capitalization of liberation in an age of an intense commercialization of 
culture.
As  it  is  well  known,  in  some  aspects,  the  1960s  dream  fell  short  into 
disillusionment. Martin Luther King and Kennedy assassinations; the internationalization 
of the economic marketplace and the advance of consumerism; the infamous Charles 
Manson murders and the killing of a member of the audience at Altamont Free Festival 
revealed the violent face of the ‘peace and love’ movement conflated with a ‘non-delayed 
gratification’ life-style which was impelled by drugs and sex. Still, capitalism’s capacity 
to incorporate  goals of total  liberation into its  own development would soon become 
clear.
As  Charles  Taylor  puts  it,  “…  to  the  extent  that  the  goals  of  integral  self-
expression, sensual release, equal relations, and social bonding cannot be easily realized 
together … the attempt to realize them will  involve sacrificing some elements of the 
package for others” (2007, p. 477). Among the things lost in the original project, Taylor 
claims,  was  social  equality:  among  the  US  upper  classes,  emerge  a  synthesis  of 
‘bourgeois’  and  ‘bohemian’  who  retaining  the  sense  of  the  importance  of  self-
development and self-expression, made peace with “…the Reagan-Thatcher revolution, 
the slimming down of the welfare state, and increasing income inequality” (2007, p. 477).
In  such  a  context,  and  after  two  World  Wars,  Auschwitz,  the  collapse  of  the 
‘socialist dream’, dictatorships replacing utopias, the ecological crisis and the seemingly 
113
uncontrollable rise of the apparently neutral power of the market, it became difficult to 
believe,  with the same degree of surrender  as before,  in the old,  grand discourses of 
legitimation.
Thereby, in addition to the bewildering complexity of the unbounded access to 
information,  contrasting  world  views  and  options,  contemporary  people  experience  a 
highly individualized life after the ‘end of grand narratives’ (Lyotard 1984). This is a time 
when the previous,  grand enunciators of Modernity and earlier  eras,  in  particular  the 
religious and political narratives become exhausted and tend to fade (Dufour 2008) as 
guiding sources of meaning for contemporary life.
 The debate on the waning of these grand narratives stresses the idea that while in 
modern conditions, meaning no longer stems from a divine but from a human source, this 
is  a  situation  that,  however  new,  maintains  the  submission  to  various,  sometimes 
concurrent, transcendental principles lying at the center of the modern symbolic order 
(Dufour 2008, p. 20).  
In  contemporary times,  several  scholars  submit  (Dufour  2008;  Jameson 1991; 
Lyotard 1984) that any of these previous metaphysical categories of meaning resisted 
intact, enduring undeniable decline. Previous ‘soteriological narratives’ that used to bring 
order to ‘the modern chaos’ are relatively absent, says Dufour (2008, p. 28). This leaves 
contemporary  subjects,  he  claims,  without  any  convincing  collective  discourse  of 
foundation able to answer the useless, but still  fundamental human questions such as 
“what it’s all for?”, “why and how should I live?” (Dufour 2008, p. 66).
Indeed,  the  modern idea of  a  ‘sacred  individual’ manifested in  the  valuing  of 
human life, honor, liberty - as Durkheim (1973, p. 46) once described – is ‘profaned’ after 
Auschwitz  and  all  other  violent,  criminal  actions  against  humanity  that  marked  the 
twentieth century in the West.
To decide what remained sacred seems, thus, to be the uncomfortable question 
that bothers the spirits of contemporary man and woman (even if at unconscious levels).
7.2 - The social role of the sacred and its contemporary vicissitudes
In order to discuss the blur of the sacred in contemporary times, it is necessary, 
first, to briefly explore how the notion of the ‘sacred’ is being conceived in this study.
In her book Purity and Danger (1980), the British anthropologist Mary Douglas 
contributes  to  the  understanding  of  the  role  of  the  ‘sacred’ in  societies  through  her 
analysis of rituals of purity and pollution found in most primitive societies. In modern 
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societies,  she  claims,  this  role  is  transposed  into  secular  ideas  about  hygiene  and 
cleanliness.
Douglas claims that the secular modern notions and ‘rituals’ of cleanliness are not 
mere  rational  strategies  based  on pathogenic  and hygienic  notions  as  common sense 
suggest, but the expression of symbolic systems which discriminate and classify, on one 
side,  what  is  appropriate,  and  on  the  other,  what  is  not.  In  her  view,  these  ‘rites’ 
symbolically express an aspiration (not only of individuals but also, and perhaps mainly, 
of social structures) to condemn objects, ideas and experiences able to through us into a 
state of confusion and ambiguity: “In short, our pollution behavior is the reaction which 
condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict  cherished classifications” 
(1980, p. 36).
Among  Douglas’s  main  insights  is  the  idea  that  the  quest  for  purity  and  the 
rejection of pollution (and also the notions of ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ related to it) implies, 
in all  its  forms, a positive movement towards the organization of the environment in 
search of unity and meaning for experiences.
In a similar perspective, Eliade describes how in various different cosmogonies of 
archaic  societies,  the  sacred  represents  “…  the  passage  from  the  virtual  and  the 
amorphous to that which has form” (19877, p. 55) and fundamentally, a reference point, a 
center from which ontological reality and meaning originates. In opposition, the profane 
is the domain of homogeneity (where there is no qualitative difference between things) 
and relativity (where everything and anything can be). In his words, the profane is a “… 
homogeneous and infinite expanse, in which no point of reference is possible and hence 
no orientation can be established” (1987, p. 21).
Now, modern experience has taught us that the search for order can become, in 
Bauman’s words, a “… particularly bitter and relentless war against ambivalence” (2004, 
p. 3). Bauman points out that while in the past, ‘order’ was a natural, transcendent reality 
of a world intrinsically organized and hierarchically commanded by a ‘reality’ beyond 
itself, modernity represented the discovery of order  per se. Order was now to be built 
through careful planning; over time, he claims, order (and the desire to discriminate ‘the 
pure’ from ‘the polluted’ through an overarching system of classification) turned into a 
modern obsession. A myriad of violent outcomes ensued.
As  we’ve  seen  above,  Horkheimer  and  Adorno  were  among  those  who  first 
spelled out that Enlightenment and thus, modern civilization is “mythic fear [of disorder] 
turned radical”  (Horkheimer  & Adorno 2002,  p.  16)  leading to  ‘slavery to  facts  and 
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procedures’  in  search  for  an  universal  order  that  weakens  critical  judgment  and, 
paradoxically, feeds irrationality and disorder.
Indeed, within a linear perspective of a certain type of modern thinking predicated 
upon an equally linear, evolutionary and ambitious conception of progress, the aspiration 
for order could be transmuted into violent discipline, as it was historically epitomized in 
Nazism and Stalinism and in the repression of minorities and outsiders. But as Douglas 
herself was aware, the designation of something as ‘polluted’ – and thus disruptive of 
order - is not based on intrinsic properties of objects and experiences but on a culturally 
defined symbolic mapping which may become, as it happens in some domains of modern 
experience,  too  rigid.  As  a  result,  the  boundary  between  order  and  chaos  becomes 
impermeable  so  that  the  otherwise  meaningful  separation  turns  into  nonnegotiable 
dichotomy. In the process, the potentiality of disorder (Douglas 1980, p. 94) is negated 
and the view that the other of order can never be another order but only chaos (Bauman 
2004, p. 7) is propagated with dangerous effects.
Bauman recognizes a good alternative against modernity’s “all-devouring order” 
in  Simmel’s  thought.  Through  Simmel,  he  claims,  values  which  were  previously 
celebrated  as  absolute  and  timeless  are  removed  from  its  ‘ideological  pedestal’ and 
brought down to a more modest place: the search for gratification which is never fully 
realized but “… owes its attraction to the sacrifice it demands…” (Bauman 2004, p. 197).
What is seemingly overlooked in Bauman’s interpretation of Simmel is that, for 
the latter, lacking a form which convincingly asserts itself as ‘real’ (and we might say, 
sacred) – even though temporarily, that is, being operative only insofar as new ‘sacred 
ideas’ arise and reject them – the sense of meaningfulness is threatened.
In Brinkmann’s (2004) perspective, this would translate to the idea that individual 
desire has worth not merely in itself - by way of the impulse generated by the irreparable 
distance  between  desire  and  gratification.  Building  upon  Charles  Taylor,  Brinkmann 
claims that the worth of desire lies in its existence within a broader moral framework that 
determines the worth of things (a moral ecology) which is neither of the individual’s own 
making, nor a universal standard outside all social practices.  
From this perspective, we may reason that the delimitative standpoint between 
rigid  attachment  to  order  -  the  irrational  dichotomous  separation  between ‘pure’ and 
‘impure’ based on purportedly universal facts which potentialize oppression and violent 
assaults  against  difference  –  and  the  complete  overthrow  of  order  and  consequent 
desacralization of the world wherein all values are taken as merely an issue of personal 
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preference, is the conception of order (and values) as an artifact of sociality, of human 
interaction.
If  the  barbarism  of  Nazism,  Stalinism  and  all  kinds  of  modern  oppression 
contributed  to  the  historical  weariness  of  the  idea  of  ‘order’,  postmodernism’s 
dissemination of skeptical interpretations of culture, literature, art,  history,  philosophy, 
economics, architecture, fiction and literary criticism brought further destabilization.
Postmodernist philosophical perspectives undermine previous ideas of meaning 
originating  either  outside  or  inside  human  beings.  As  Kearney  analyzes,  through 
postmodernist lens, meaning travels from the pre-modern paradigm of ‘mirror’ (reflecting 
an existing light), to the modern paradigm of ‘lamp’ (projecting light from within rational 
human beings) to finally incarnate into the postmodern paradigm of the ‘looking glass’ or 
even  ‘multiple  looking  glasses’ which  reflect  each  other  interminably.  In  the  later 
approach, meaning is seen as the quite arbitrary result of the endless play of linguistic 
signs independent of any transcendental signified (Kearney 1988, p. 252).
Further,  Dufour  (2008)  notes,  some  strands  of  the  postmodern  thinking  (for 
instance, Foucault’s and Deleuze’s accounts, and the sociological accounts of Bourdier) 
also started to conceive culture, science, literature, art etc. – previously a means to the 
salvation of all – as a tool of power, alienation and oppression (Dufour 2008, p. 154). 
Postmodern philosophies which carried the banner of the denouncement of the hidden 
symbolic violence of culture fueled, thus, the contemporary aversion to culture and the 
generalized suspicion of the ‘sacredness’ of social order.
The consideration of how such processes – including historical forces such as the 
acceleration of individualization processes, the horrors of Nazism and Stalinism, the role 
of  postmodern  philosophy,  the  changes  in  capitalism,  among  others  -  led  to  the 
exhaustion of modern categories of meaning, underlies the discourses of scholars who 
claim that we have entered, in the last decades of the twentieth century, into a distinctly 
new postmodern world.
But  the  postmodern  novelties  are  not  so  discontinuous  to  what  was  already 
insinuating itself since the dawn of the century. Way before the disillusions of Auschwitz 
and other developments, Simmel had already identified several indications of what was to 
come. In his words:  “… we have been for some time now living without any shared 
ideal, even perhaps without any ideal at all” (Simmel 1971b, p. 380).
What Simmel had in mind – importantly in response to the influential  French 
vitalism (or ‘Bergsonism’) and the  German Lebensphilosophie movements of his time 
(Weinstein & Weinstein 1990) - was the emergence of a generalized suspicion towards 
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the  submission  of  life  to  any objective  form in  a  time  when “… cultural  forms  are 
conceived of as an exhausted soil  which has yielded all  that it  could grow” (Simmel 
1971b, p. 377) and life began to take itself as its own object of meaning.
If  previously,  he  explains,  the  struggle  against  forms  were  specific  –  i.e.,  a 
struggle  against  given  realities  felt  as  no  longer  apt  to  address  life’s  aspirations  and 
capacities, followed by its replacement by a new, life-imbued form - the twentieth century 
struggle becomes unspecific: all forms are to be supplanted for the sole reason that they 
are forms and thus, any sort of shared idea that could contain life within its limits should 
subsist (Simmel 1971b).
In contrast to the traditionalist / conservative sensitivity to the dying out of self-
evident  meanings  of  the  past,  Simmel  calls  attention  to  the  active  cultural  impulse 
towards dissolving forms for the sake of life as free/ unlimited intensification.
Connecting  the  idea  with  our  reflections  so  far,  after  the  individual  had 
progressively emerged  as  an  absolute  moral  imperative  in  modernity,  the  subsequent 
historical step was one in which life itself – as impulse, as pure immediacy - wanted to  
break free from every cultural form.  In other words, humanity historically moves from 
the sacralization of the idea of the individual as the sole maker of meaning in the world, 
to the cultural affirmation - going back to Eliade’s terminology - of the “… formless 
fluidity of a profane space” opposed to all order and authority.
Simmel analyzes several expressions of this cultural trend within the domains of 
art, philosophy, sexual ethics and religion, all of which comprising the common pattern of 
despising, doubting or negating the place of forms (radically questioning or subverting, 
the connection between artistic individuality & reality; knowledge & truth; erotic love & 
its institutionalized forms; spirituality & religion). The individual expression of life as a 
non-objectified flux (Simmel 1971b) is therefore emphasized, whereas everything that 
goes beyond it becomes increasingly senseless.
Historically,  it  seems  therefore  that  the  wane  of  cultural  forms  predates  the 
supposed  epochal  break  of  post-modernity,  being  sowed  in  modern  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth centuries and germinating its first ‘sprouts’ in the early twentieth century.
According to  Simmel,  it  is  fundamental  to  note,  the  sociological  germ of  the 
process of the decay of forms was the modern ‘money economy’. Money fully dovetails 
with  the  individualistic  trend  of  ‘breaking  free  from all  forms’ insofar  as,  being  the 
‘means par  excellence’ it  fully surrenders  to  the human will. More  than  this,  money 
actively fuels formlessness for it is intrinsic to it the undermining of all that may thwart  
its  requirements  of  continuous  circulation  (Poggi  1993).  In  other  words,  the  modern 
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money economy is not only compatible with, but also, a fundamental impulse for the 
contemporary desacralization of the collective order.
In contemporary times, the market-based societies of late capitalism radicalize the 
role of money as a God. As a result, the idea that life is a site for individual self-creation,  
in a kind of ‘glorification’ of a sovereign self purportedly independent from social limits 
and collective forms is powerfully disseminated. I shall pursue and develop the idea later.
7.3 - Are we living in limitless, meaningless times?
In  this  section,  my concern  is  to  bring  to  discussion  the  idea  of  a  totalizing 
collapse of meaning in contemporary times. This will be accomplished by elaborating on 
the ways by which some contemporary scholars,  departing from a common Lacanian 
theoretical basis, deal with virtually the same concerns that excited Simmel’s imagination 
in  the  beginning  of  the  century,  that  is,  the  decline  of  any  shared  agreement  on 
‘metaphysical categories of meaning’.
This idea, developed by scholars such as Dany-Robert Dufour, Slavoj Žižek and 
Jean-Pierre  Lebrun is  exactly what  underlies expressions such as “the end of the big 
Other as an efficient symbolic fiction” (Žižek 1997), “the decline of the symbolic Father” 
(Lebrun 2004) or,  in  Dufour  (2001,  2008),  “the decline  of  the Other/Subject”,  all  of 
which pointing somehow towards  a  relatively grim picture of  contemporary times as 
marked by meaning collapse.
The loss of the credence in the symbolic efficiency of the Other / Father/ Subject 
is seen as the effect of a historical circumstance wherein God is ‘no longer in the centre 
of  the  city’ (Lebrun 2004),  either  in  its  religious  or  modern,  secular  forms.  That  is, 
whereas in modern conditions many different ‘Subjects’ / ‘Others’ coexisted in a complex 
symbolic order, in contemporary times, any external foundation subsists intact when “… 
no figure of the Other and no Subject has any real validity…” (Dufour 2008, p. 42). As a 
result, everything rests in the economic, political, legal and symbolic autonomy of the 
democratic subject (Dufour 2001), or yet, in the discourse of science, with its multiple 
and equivalent “boutiques of knowledge” (Lebrun 2004, p. 54, my transl.).
The problem with this shift is, from this perspective,  that neither the ‘autonomous 
individual’ ultimately marked by the undecidability of  language,  nor  the  unavoidable 
transience of scientific statements can occupy the place of the Master as the One apt to 
say the ‘last word’ of meaning, determining the borders of what is right, wrong, possible, 
impossible and so on.
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The  modern  problem of  meaning  as  once  analyzed  by  Max  Weber  becomes 
therefore radicalized in contemporary times when, Dufour (2008) claims, the plurality of 
value-spheres that composed the complex symbolic order of modernity gives way to the 
decline of all Laws.
From the fading of collective agreements with sufficient symbolic efficiency to 
organize the social, so the argument goes, the individual suffers not only for lacking the 
support of the Law (or the Limit) to his jouissance (Žižek 1997) or, in Freudian terms, for 
the difficulty in the construction of the superego (Dufour 2008, p. 82). In addition to this, 
individuals  suffer  for  the  burden  of  self-reference  arising  from  the  absence  of  a 
foundation for their discourse (Dufour 2001).
In  a  time  wherein  no  foundations  subsist,  the  very  access  to  the  subjective 
condition is problematic and hence, different  attachments to forms of subjection (Žižek 
1997) such as paranoia,  panic attacks,  depression,  multiple personalities, toxicomania, 
perversion, etc. are potentialized (Dufour 2008; Lebrun 2004; Žižek 1997).  
According to  the psychoanalytic,  Lacanian rationale,  the proliferation of these 
pathologies are understood under the premise that the formation of the subject depends 
on the submission to the Other (the law of the ‘Father’ which can only work upon the 
support  of  socially  imposed  cultural  enunciators).  Through  submission,  the  subject 
organizes and structures himself before the inherent lack of every speaking being: for 
since  language  is  a  merely  a  representation,  subjects  are  always  far  from  the  real, 
depending thus on the submission / devotion to the Other in order to organize themselves 
before this primordial lack (Lebrun 2004, p. 30). That is, one can only become a subject 
if he first submits to the ‘Other’ whereby he finds foundation and legitimacy to lead life 
(Dufour 2008).
That  being  the  case,  when  myths,  God,  and  even  the  “modern  sagas  of 
legitimation” lose their previous social prestige and no other collective enunciator arises, 
postmodern subjects face therefore “an impossible formula of subjectivation” wherein the 
fundamental “initial support” that may enable one to become a subject, is now missing 
(Dufour 2008, p. 73).
This  leads,  in  Dufour,  to  the  claim that  before  the  waning of  the  prestige  of 
eminent symbolic “Subjects” to which individuals may submit (and against which they 
may struggle), the very formation of the subject is in check. As a result, the new subject-
form of postmodernity is psychosis, or a neurotic-psychotic borderline state marked by 
features such as precariousness, narcissism and openness to fluctuating identities. This is 
so because what the contemporary self-referential logic demands from human beings is a 
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“hysteriological formula” wherein “what should come after, comes before” (Dufour 2008, 
p. 71). That is, one has to become oneself (autonomously defining her fate) before she 
has submitted to an instance beyond her and thus, before she has become a self / subject.
In many passages of his The Art of Shrinking Heads: on the New Servitude of the  
Liberated in the Age of Total Capitalism (2008), Dufour denies that his argument implies 
the  idea  that  psychosis  (or  psychotic  tendencies)  is  an  empirical  inescapable  fact  of 
postmodern conditions. Instead, he argues, the fact that psychosis is the dominant subject-
form  of  contemporary  times  (as  ‘neurosis’ was  once  the  dominant  subject-form  of 
modernity)  does  not  mean  that  the  “… whole  of  postmodern  humanity is  becoming 
psychotic” (2008, p. 12). He even avoids a kind of apocalyptic view of the subject by 
declaring that human beings can certainly construct themselves when there is no longer 
an ‘Other’,  “… by using the numerous and effective resources that our societies provide 
for that purpose” (2008, p. 85).
Dufour’s attempt to rescue the contemporary subject out of psychosis as a nearly 
unavoidable destiny does not seem to fit, however, to his own descriptions of subjective 
formation within the Freudian-Lacanian analytical grid. In his words: “If I am to be here, 
the Other basically has to be there. Unless I make this detour through the Other, I cannot 
know who I am, cannot accede to the symbolic order and cannot construct any spatiality 
or  temporality”  (2008,  p.  26).  Now,  since  according  to  Dufour  himself,  “… 
postmodernity no longer has any presentable figures of the Subject to offer” (2008, p. 
53), the outlets outside the psychotic modalities of subjectification seem inexistent or at 
least too vague to be defended. The feeling of subjective catastrophe is yet reinforced in 
other moments of the book, for instance when he states: “… there is now a danger that 
there will be no more subjects” (2008, p.54).
Therefore,  and  despite  sparse  and  few  positive,  under-explained  observations 
about the possibility of being a subject in the current scenario, Dufour ends up depicting a 
relatively bleak view of the ‘subject’s possibilities’ outside pathological structures in a 
contemporary space  wherein meaning basically collapsed before the  decline of  every 
credible collective enunciator.
From such a perspective, meaninglessness could be understood as a determined, 
inescapable fate of an epoch in which the demands of self-foundation debunks limits in a 
totalizing  way  while  transcendental  principles  basically  collapse.  This  is  exactly  the 
situation that leads, almost fatally, to a meaningless, ‘near-psychotic’ existence, as Dufour 
sometimes seems to suggest. There are, I argue, some problems with formulations like 
that.
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First,  if  psychosis  is,  according  to  the  Lacanian  psychoanalytic  approach,  a 
condition in which ‘castration was not operative’ so that, in the Freudian formulation, 
psychotics have not “… agreed to give up something to be part of society” (Salecl 2005, 
p. 1151), we may argue, as Salecl (2005) does, that there’s still much that individuals give 
or resign for living in a society.
This is related, first and foremost, in my view, to the fact that our times are better 
defined  as  a  complex  interplay  between  modern,  contemporary  and  even  premodern 
social patterns than as a monolithic reality we sometimes want to didactically describe 
through terms such as postmodernity, late Modernity and so on.
Berger and Luckmann (1995), in a similar line of reasoning, claim that although 
biding systems of values no longer characterize modern societies – leading to forms of 
subjective and intersubjective crisis of meaning - a society without stocks of meaning 
doesn’t  exist  either.  Although  universality  dilutes,  there  are  still  commonalities  of 
meaning that can be developed in communities or drawn from historical reservoirs of 
meaning. Most contemporary people, they claim, “… don’t wander around like characters 
in a Kafka novel” (1995, p. 39) lost before a purely contingent existence.
But it is not only that. A person may wish not to speak the language spoken by 
others in the community he lives, not to work in order to survive, or not embody the traits 
of  what  is  considered  to  be  a  “great  person”  today  (Boltanski  &  Chiapello  2002), 
transgressing rules of behavior of how to conduct  one’s life as an expression of free 
personal  choices,  but  she  will  certainly  need  to  deal  with  the  consequences  of  his 
rebellion and in the limit, accept the fate of social exclusion.
Even  considering  the  wide  possibility  of  choice  that  modern  societies  accord 
individuals with, Durkheim notes, one who totally deny progress or at least,  the very 
principle of free examination would produce in modern times the effect of a sacrilege 
(Durkheim 1976, p. 214). Updating Durkheim to the present, the reformulated notion of 
well-being  as  a  normative  ideal  of  authenticity  is  considered  by some as  one  of  the 
avenues of a new cultural constellation11 (Ferrara 2002; Taylor 1991).
Contemporary constraints dwell therefore no longer, as Brinkmann (2013) puts it, 
in the regime implied by the previous formula “You may not!”. Presently,  constraints 
originate, rather, from today’s “You have to” formula, wherein “… not to do the possible, 
11 According to Ferrara, while the Enlightenment was the era of autonomy par excellence, 
ours is the age of authenticity. In the ethics of authenticity, he claims, the willingness to 
abide  to  formal  principles  (as  in  the  Kantian  formula)  is  no  longer  the  exclusive 
constituent of moral worth. Now, the urges which deflect us from our principles must be 
acknowledged  and  not  suppressed  “while  at  the  same  time  continuing  to  orient  our 
conduct to the moral point of view” (Ferrara 2002, p. 7).
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not to live up to our potentials, not to realize one’s true self” (Brinkmann 2013, p. 103) as 
the new ethics of authenticity commands, are the new forms of ‘contemporary sacrilege’.
Developing the idea, authors such as Kehl (2009a) and Salecl (2005) describe the 
contemporary experience as being marked by a new form of conflict. Opposing some 
views on the issue, the authors argue that conflict and guilty remain. Salecl (2005) claims 
that  unlike  psychotics,  contemporary  individuals  are  generally  doubtful  about  their 
choices, scared about personal failure, deeply concerned about how others view them, 
and often guilty when they are not able to comply with these expectations (Salecl 2005, 
2011).
Along similar lines, Kehl (2009a) argues that it is not only interdiction that may 
induce  guilt.  Rather,  the  impossibility  to  address  the  mandates  of  enjoyment  and 
performance also fuels it, which means that a severe superego (and hence conflict) is at 
the center of contemporary discontent. She writes: “… that this severity presents itself as 
a mandate of enjoyment, rather than as interdiction, by any chance weakens the sadism of 
the superego” (2009a, p. 217, my transl.).
Concerning, still, the vacuum of meanings and its psychological consequences, I 
agree with the line of thought submitted by contemporary sociologists such as Mikael 
Carleheden (2001, 2006) and Peter Wagner (1994) who call attention to the fact that (late) 
modern individuals, on the concrete level, develop their own means as to avoid the abyss 
of  excessive  openness.  This  means  that,  in  their  phenomenological  experience, 
individuals adjust so that they come to experience habits and values as self-evident and 
valid (Carleheden 2006, p. 61).
In this regard, Svend Brinkmann (2004) argues that despite the pervasive modern 
idea that values originate in subjectivity, the phenomenon of the human world involve 
values.  That  is,  in  everyday  life,  values  are  experienced  by  individuals  as  being 
objectively given,  not  something chosen by way of  preference and personal  decision 
within a value-neutral reality.  He writes: “… the disenchanted world is not the world of 
everyday, practical life. In practical life, people are moral realists” (2004, p. 63)
However,  as Carleheden notes (2006),  perhaps we moderns are not successful 
every time. Probably we are more vulnerable to be haunted by the ‘abyss of choice’ than 
our pre-modern predecessors. But this does not mean that we leave a purely formless life 
fully  and  continuously  dominated  by  the  sensation  of  this  abyss.  Since  the  task  of 
continuously  creating  normativity  out  of  freedom drains  our  psychological  energies, 
modern individuals find ways to forge at least a minimum level of stability so that they 
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can conduct their everyday lives without being continuously dominated by anguish and 
chaos.
For instance, the uncertainty of choices in conditions of value plurality can be 
partially offset by belonging to “circles of recognition” which lend stability to identity 
(Pizzorno 1986, p. 367). Within these circles, the person is recognized by the values she 
is using in her choices, enabling a sense of being a self-identical agent through time.
It is indeed expectable that when the ideal of an inwardly generated identity is 
promoted, while other forms of social recognition retract, recognition by others acquires a 
new and crucial importance and thus, the center of gravity of the ‘good life’ moves to the 
intimate sphere of the relationships with family and friends (Taylor 1991, p. 49).
Hence,  ‘circles  of  recognition’  to  which  individuals  are  exposed  become 
especially important, helping them to overcome uncertainty through a sense of personal 
continuity and social boundaries when decisions are no longer so firmly tied to collective, 
generalized assumptions (Pizzorno 1986).
These  considerations,  here,  do  not  cancel  the  fact  that  contemporary subjects 
continuously face the weight of ambivalence and contingency of today’s ‘liquid norms’ 
(Bauman 1999). But despite this fact, a purely chaotic, fragmented, ‘profane life’12 does 
not seem to be an empirical reality for the majority of us.
As Berger and Luckmann (1995) note, modern societies introduced new forms for 
the production and communication of meaning, such as psychotherapies, psychoanalysis, 
lectures, courses, self-help books and other forms of mass media such as television. The 
latter has, in modern conditions, the fundamental role of meaning dissemination (a role 
previously fulfilled only by parents, teachers, priests etc). According to the authors, “… 
they  mediate  between  collective  and  private  experiences  by  providing  a  typical 
interpretation for problems which are defined as typical” (Berger and Luckmann 1995, p. 
51).
12 As hinted above, both Douglas and Eliade claim that the symbolic quest for order / 
purity / sacredness is maintained, even if in transmuted and often vestigial / camouflaged 
religious forms, regardless of the degree to which the world may have been desacralized. 
As examples, Eliade cites  the permanence of sentiments of renewal in festivals such as 
New Year’s Eve; the mythological function of reading and cinema, which “… takes over 
and employs countless mythical motifs - the fight between hero and monster, initiatory 
combats  and  ordeals,  paradigmatic  figures  and  images  (the  maiden,  the  hero,  the 
paradisiacal landscape, hell, and so on)” (Eliade 1987, p. 205). One should question the 
degree in which mystical motifs lose their symbolic vitality as sources of meaning when 
they are framed – as often occurs today -  within a narrative of ‘individual exceptionality’ 
or when they seem to represent more a  ‘escape’ through a socially crippled kind of 
fantasy  than  a  realization  of  meaning  through  fantasy.  Even  so,  behind  the 
commoditization  of  these  forms,  we  can  find  vestiges  of  religious  behavior  and, 
simultaneously, nostalgia for it.
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In particular, Salecl (2011) claims, the fact that contemporary individuals have 
been  too  frequently  recurring  to  ‘specialist  advice’ also  suggests  that  the  idea  of  a 
‘limitless society’ should be brought into question (at least in its totalizing overtones). 
Salecl argues that even though there is today a “… push towards excessive jouissance” 
(2005, p. 1154), there is a difference between a society without limits and the capitalist, 
neoliberal “… ideology that  depicts that society as being without limits” (2011, p.12). 
This ideological depiction plays  over the limitless enjoyment  as a power fuel  for the 
legitimation of a consumer society based on perpetual dissatisfaction and endless choice. 
Thus, Salecl sounds correct when she writes:  “…it seems clear that the ideology that 
there are no authorities rests on new authorities, such as corporations” (2005, p. 1152). 
But this cannot be confused, she claims, with what happens in real life, with real people. 
In everyday life, fewer external prohibitions coexist with the creation of various forms of 
inner constraints as revealed by emerging self-management techniques aiming to control 
virtually all levels of life, from love and familial relationships, work, health, self-image, 
emotions and even death.
Salecl notes that contemporary subjects create “… ever new limits in order to 
keep their desire alive: they have invented new prohibitions of their own to curb their 
society’s push to enjoyment” (2011, p. 12).
However, since all these techniques of self-management are also part of market 
circuits (one is continuously seduced to pay for her health, self-image, emotional well-
being,  aging  and  so  on  and,  yet,  given  the  fact  that  ‘self-creation’ is  a  fundamental 
condition  for  deregulated  capitalism),  they  represent  not  only  individuals’  psychic 
adjustment to a limitless environment but also the effect created by a widely disseminated 
idea:  the  generalized  purported  neoliberal  ‘truth’ that  we  can  and  should  master  all 
aspects of life. The ‘tyranny of choice” is thereby, and importantly, a product of capitalist 
societies.
Now, I think Dufour does recognize, to a certain extent, all this. He is careful 
enough (as I hinted above) to explicitly state that even though psychotic tendencies are 
now the dominant subject-form, this is not to say that humanity as a whole is becoming 
psychotic in postmodern, Western civilizations. To justify this, he explains that “… not 
everything  in  the  world  has  become  postmodern  (…)  And  besides,  even  when  the 
postmodern offensive is at its height, there is still some resistance, for the time being at  
least”.  This  resistance remains  operative,  he continues,  “… wherever  there are  living 
institutions and wherever not everything has been deregulated” (2008: 12). In addition to 
this,  he  also  remarks  that  the  “near-psychotic  form”  he  is  talking  about  cannot  be 
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correctly understood by merely drawing on what is already known (in the psychoanalytic 
discourse) about psychosis (2008, p. 67). Rather, psychosis in Dufour rationale is directly 
associated with the emergence of a plethora of precarious subjects readily available to 
live in a world of images, consumption and artificial identities, who are to a certain extent 
the ‘products’ of a time when commodities tend to surpass, in prestige, other forms of 
social exchange.
This sounds less totalizing or catastrophic for sure, but Dufour does not elaborate 
on the issue of which ‘living institutions’ would protect contemporary individuals from 
inescapable meaninglessness, probably because it was not his focus.
From a Lacanian-inflected perspective, Dufour was worried with the effects of a 
self-referential rather than a hetero-referential manner of defining life in contemporary 
times.  That’s  a  condition,  he  writes,  wherein  there  is  no  Other  that  transcendentally 
legitimizes discourse and “… tolerates on our behalf, the things that we ourselves cannot 
tolerate” (Dufour 2008, p. 19). What Dufour has in mind here is the question of origins, 
ends and order, in a word, of meaning – which is possible only by way of reference to 
“presentable Others” (2008, p. 69).
The self-referential logic that dominates the contemporary condition, he reasons, 
ultimately point back towards the “torments of self-foundation” (Dufour 2008, p. 64), 
establishing,  at  most,  only  dual  relationships.  Thus,  “When  conflict  does  break  out 
between two actors, there can be no appeal to a law (a universal law laid down in the 
name of a Third), but only to a (local) procedure which gets the circuits working again” 
(Dufour 2008, p. 65).
Žižek elaborates on the issue by claiming that there is a fundamental gap between 
the  “proper”  authority  of  the  symbolic  law/prohibition  and  the  mere  "regulation  by 
rules/norms". Paradoxically, he notes, the domain of symbolic rules, to count as such, 
must be grounded in some (tautological) authority beyond rules, which commands "It is 
like this because I said it is like this!" (Žižek 997, p.1). The same idea is found in the 
accounts of the French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Jean-Pierre Lebrun, who explains 
that in order to exist a “symbolic Father” there must exist an enunciation which, for its 
incontestable character (and thus fundamentally distinct or even opposed to the discourse 
of the science) constitutes a Third (Lebrun 2001, p. 49).
Therefore, what is implied in the “paternal decline” in a contemporary context is 
the exhaustion of the symbolic (and not real) Law which tautologically asserts itself as an 
authority: “the One not there” which establishes societies as a homogeneous symbolic 
ensemble (Dufour 2008, p. 65).  The empty place left by the fading of this authority is, 
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according to this perspective, exactly the terrain where these proto-authorities - as  the 
totalitarian  power  of  political  leaders,  the  great  present  appeal  of  sensual  spectacles 
(Žižek  1997)  and  commercial  messages,  self-help  literature  and,  more  generally,  the 
‘tyranny of the market’ - can thrive.
Durkheim is, in many ways, ‘the silent partner’ of Dufour et al. Many of his ideas 
are consistent with the ideas of the cited scholars, although transfigured, in each case, 
through  the  lens  of  respectively,  sociological  thinking  and  psychoanalysis.  As  Lash 
(2005, p. 1), observes, “… the symbolic, taken from the work of Jacques Lacan, is to a 
certain extent Durkheim’s  conscience collective, as it were, grafted onto the Freudian 
Oedipus complex”.
First and foremost, the idea that in order to be constituted as a subject human 
beings have first (and necessarily) to submit to an instance greater and beyond them is, as 
we have explored to a significant length, very much in line with Durkheim’s thinking. I 
am not going to rehearse his arguments here. Sufficient is to add that, for Durkheim, the 
nature  of  commands  capable  to  submit  and  thus  found  human  beings  beyond  their 
instinctive impulses cannot be merely utilitarian in character so that consequences result 
from the act of violation (Durkheim 1974). Instead, commands hold their authoritative, 
foundational  force  upon the  fact  that  they are  collectively determined  laws  and thus 
sacred (which means that they are, also in Durkheim, symbolic and not merely real laws).
The tautological  and uncontestable  character  of the Law of  the Father  (which 
holds, in the psychoanalytic stance, a strict link with collectively imposed enunciators) is 
also consistent to Durkheim’s thinking. In his words: “This is why commands generally 
take a short, preemptory form leaving no place for hesitation; it is because, insofar as it is 
a command and goes by its own force, it excludes all idea of deliberation or calculation” 
(Durkheim 1976, p. 207).
Now, Durkheim is well known by his idea that the transcendental quality of the 
social  is  maintained by its  ‘collective representations’ -  the body of representations a 
society  uses  to  represent  to  itself  things  in  reality -  which  hold  a  linguistic  nature 
(Durkheim 2005).  Important  is  to note that,  in  Durkheim’s  accounts,  those collective 
representations  –  which  constitute  conceptual  though  and  language  -  are  not  mere 
reflections  of reality.  By the very act  of representation,  language infuses  reality with 
elements of a society’s collective experience, endowing it with order, meaning and value 
(Carls n.d.). As such, as long as individuals speak with each other, society persists and 
thus ‘meaning’ continues to circulate.
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In addition to language, any kind of domestic, civic or contractual duties; moral 
maxims; groundswells of public opinion; beliefs and practices/customs transmitted from 
the  past  by  education;  ‘articles  of  faith’  by  which  religious,  political,  economic, 
professional  organizations  condensate  their  beliefs;  collective  feelings  in  communal 
gatherings;  institutions  like  marriage,  the  specific  temporal  regimes  we  must  follow 
which organize our perceptions, conducts and our coexistence with others - or any social 
practice or idea that is repeated among individuals as a model of life imposed by the 
group - constitute, to go back to Dufour’s expression, ‘living institutions’ that serve to 
regulate society (Lukes 1977).
Yet,  inasmuch as  morality  begins  with group membership,  however  small  the 
group might be, or however small is the number of shared beliefs we have in common to 
our  fellow  human  beings  in  a  certain  community  (the  nation,  the  family,  the  city) 
(Durkheim  1974,  p.  52),  a  degree  of  social  cohesion  is  preserved.  From  such  a 
perspective, Durkheim would perhaps argue that the postmodern psychotic subject-form 
as  formulated  by  Dufour  is,  at  worst  (as  Dufour  himself  admits)  only  an  emergent 
tendency13.
There is still another critical aspect of the ideas of moral decline in conditions of 
weakening of collective agreements (shared, as we have just seen, by both Dufour and 
Durkheim)  that  deserves  analysis.  These  ideas,  drawing upon,  or  being  consonant  to 
Freudian  assumptions  that  subjective  formation  depends  on  masculine  relations  of 
separation, repression and authority, can be called into question.
The strict fidelity to this analytical grid, I think, may obstruct considerations for 
the  potentiality  of  new,  historically  emerging  possibilities  of  different  forms  of 
subjectification, based less on the repressive-style, masculine Law of the Father, to be 
premised instead on a more feminine ethos of care, subjectivity, listening and emotion.
The later ethos, it is necessary to stress, does not necessarily conflate with either 
self-centeredness, narcissism or the denial of humans’ intersubjective nature (Hookway 
2012) as it is often suggested.
For sure, the demands of authenticity can possibly be related to an empty urge to 
know  oneself  as  Sennett  (1978)  critically  described,  or  as  an  excessively  “intense 
13 Dufour and the other psychoanalysis-informed scholars cited earlier also recognize, in 
consonance  to  their  Lacanian  perspective,  that  the  discourse  is  the  ultimate  means 
through which the symbolic  function is  transmitted.  In this  regard,  Dufour  identifies, 
however, several ways by which the “gift of symbolic transmission” through discourse 
has been under attack in the contemporary period. For lacking Subjects to which it can 
appeal,  the “authority of the word” in contemporary societies is weakened, a process 
which has been reproduced and reinforced, he claims, by television and education (see 
Dufour 2008, pp. 101- 119).
128
preoccupation with the self” and “self-absorption” feeding a “culture of narcissism” as in 
Lasch’s (1991, p. 25) famous formulation.
But what these kinds of descriptions may overlook is the fact that the new “ethics 
of authenticity” can also, alternatively, be a means through which one knows oneself in 
the world and morally relates oneself to it (Ferrara 2002), or yet, with Charles Taylor "… 
a picture of what a better or higher mode of life would be, where better and higher are 
defined not in terms of what we happen to desire or need, but offer a standard of what we 
ought to desire” (Taylor 1991, p. 16). According to Taylor, this is so because whereas the 
ideal of authenticity leads the individual to pursue what is original and significant to him 
as a particular, unique being, the definition of what is authentic / more significant for 
oneself is necessarily “… enframed in a social understanding of great temporal depth, in 
fact, in a tradition” (Taylor 1989, p. 39).
Zygmunt  Bauman stands out  between those critical  of  perspectives  which,  he 
claims,  reproduce  the  modern  ideal  of  a  morality  fully  dependent  on  the  “… 
training/drilling job performed by society” and its shared Laws, while ignoring that this 
very ideal may be a source of immorality, recasting as inferior those forms of life which 
do not submit to Reason or to traditional agreements (Bauman 1993, p. 226).
Bauman explicitly contradicts Durkheim (and also Rousseau, Spencer and Freud) 
in their common consideration that individual freedom can only have morally positive 
consequences if it surrenders to heteronomously set standards, submitting to them (1993, 
p.  29).  For  Bauman,  as  he  defines  it  in  his  “Postmodern  ethics”,  morality  is 
fundamentally a  matter  of  moral  feelings  and emotions  commanded in  unconditional 
responsibility to the Other. Building upon Levinas, he claims that morality commands 
individuals to be responsible as the only way towards ethical proximity with the other 
(Bauman 1993, p. 86).
It is not the place here and it is not my intention to analyze all the philosophical  
issues embedded in the discussions on the moral worth of ‘authenticity’, nor to   untangle 
Bauman’s accounts on postmodern morality in its contrasts with Durkheim and others. 
What I think deserves consideration is the problematization of one-dimensional views 
according to which the so-called ‘Law of the Father’ and its ‘submission logics’ is the 
sole  existing  way  out  of  a  fully  immoral,  chaotic  and  psychotically  driven  social 
existence.
One of the valuable accomplishments of Bauman’s postmodern ethics, I think, is 
therefore to unveil both the lies and the darkness within prior forms of socially marshaled 
morality and, yet, to emphasize, with the sophistication needed to the work at hand, the 
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moral potential of facing up to ambivalence and linked individual responsibility (Bauman 
1993, p. 14).
This is not that Bauman does not recognize the dangers of celebrating the demise 
of the ethical, or of a one-sided promotion of the so-called unencumbered, autonomous 
self.  In  fact,  he  points  out  (and  rejects)  some common ‘easy solutions’ for  the  new 
contemporary  predicament  such  as  indifference  to  moral  concerns;  the  radical 
individualist stance which rejects all moral dictates; and the refusal to ‘choose between 
choices’ incarnated in ‘the anything goes’ of relativism.  He also acknowledges that the 
alternative out of, on one side, universality of socially imposed submission and, on the 
other, autonomy is needed: for each “drug” he states, “… turns into poison when taken 
regularly” (Bauman 1993, p. 239).
 Simmel’s analysis of the ‘life-form dialectics’ contributes to find a way out of, on 
the one hand, the totalizing prevalence of meaninglessness over the totality of the social 
body  after  the  metaphysical  orders  of  meaning  lose  prestige  and,  on  the  other,  the 
alternative  celebration  of  autonomous  life  as  the  sole  foundation  for  meaning 
independently of cultural forms.
Simmel’s life-form tension starts from the premise, visibly close to Dufour’s view, 
that  individuals  are  not  complete  and  self-sufficient  and  thus  that  the  life  of  each 
individual forms a unity with the ‘not yet’ (Noch-Nicht) of the future (Simmel 1999, cited 
in  Pyyhtinen  2012)  impelling  life  to  transcend  itself  into  cultural  forms14.  Further, 
Simmel shares Dufour’s concern with, in his terms, the “abyss of non-formed life” when, 
as of the beginning of the 20th century, individuals tend not to tolerate subservience to 
objectivized forms which they know to be their own product. 
But his concern does not lead him to assume a catastrophic view of the present 
civilization and of the vicissitudes of the subjective formation in a time when there are no 
longer prestigious Others or, in Simmel’s terms, when “all forms are denied” (Simmel 
1971b).
First, Simmel’s interactional view of society implies that if deinstitutionalization 
is  an  undeniable  important  change  in  modern  conditions,  bringing  consequences  for 
individuals (the upheaval of institutions such as the nation and the church) “… there 
exists an immeasurable number of less conspicuous forms of relationship and kinds of 
14 It is interesting to note that the conception of the incompleteness of human existence 
exist since “archaic stages of culture”. As Eliade points out, the primitive man did not  
consider himself “finished”. To become a man in the proper sense he must die to this first  
(natural) life and be reborn to a higher life, which is at once religious and cultural” (1987, 
p. 186,187). This anthropological fact, as we’ve seen, also informs Durkheim’s accounts 
on the dualism of human nature.
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interaction” which “alone produce society as we know it” linking individuals together. 
Any “fading of the Other” – to use Dufour’s terminology - cannot, in Simmel’s words, 
erase all “countless minor syntheses” (1950, p. 9) that also constitutes society.
These ‘minor syntheses’, for instance, the fact people look to one another and feel 
jealous,  that  they  exchange  letters,  dine  together,  adorn  themselves  to  be  seen,  feel 
grateful to one another etc. – even though not constituting ‘organizations proper’ (Simmel 
1950)  –  they  tie  individuals  together.  Hence,  any  totalizing  account  of  a  full 
fragmentation of meaning when those supra-individual organizations wane is mistaken.
Secondly, Simmel counters the  accounts of morality founded upon the imposition 
of a Law that binds and constrains individuals from the outside, either in the form of the 
categorical imperative (Kant), the collective fusion (Durkheim) or “the Father/ Other / 
Subject” (Dufour etc.) .15
Alternatively, closer to Bauman and joining the movement in moral thought that 
aimed to overcome the perceived antagonism between Kantian morality and individual 
life, Simmel grounds ethical existence in the creative accomplishment of what he sees as 
‘the authentic individual life’. The notion reveals Simmel’s theoretical move towards a 
conviction that moral life cannot be made intelligible without attention to the individual 
relationship between a person and herself (Lee & Silver 2012: 2, 7).
But even though Simmel asserts the moral vitality of personal life (in a typically 
vitalist  standpoint that contrasts  with Durkheim’s perspective),  he does not follow, as 
earlier discussed, the same path tread by most vitalists in its affirmation of the “flows and 
fluxes of life” against all structure. For instance, if for vitalists such as Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guatarri and more recently, Antonio Negri, the category of life is considered as 
desire,  a  ‘becoming’ pitted  against  dominant  social  structures,  that  is,  ‘the  symbolic’ 
(Lash 2005, p. 1), Simmel holds an alternative view. As we have hinted earlier, along 
with his vitalist views, he embraces the idea of life as a raw material (either natural life or  
social life) which is necessarily objectified in forms. For insofar as life implies, in itself, 
the call for “more-than-life” (Lee &Silver 2012), there can never be morality when there 
is only flow and flux.
15 I am referring here to Simmel’s ideas on morality after he had already moved away 
from  the  previous  approach  in  which  general  societal  forces  were  taken  as  the 
fundamental basis of morality. Scott Lash (2005) describes Simmel’s theoretical move as 
evolving from an early positivist to a mid-career neo-Kantian and a late-career vitalist. 
Yet, he adds, there is evidence of elements of Vitalism and positivism in all of Simmel’s 
work.
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Thereby,  Simmel  breaks  free  from the  confinements  of  both  ‘universal  Law’ 
(wherein  a  crystallization  of  external  ‘Oughts’  imposed  over  the  individual  are 
foundational to morality) and the opposite pole of “subjectivism” (wherein life as pure 
intensity and motion, deprived from any limits and objective engagements is asserted). 
The evasion is possible thanks to his perspective of the self-organizing processes of life 
into  cultural  forms,  as  well  as  due  to  his  view  of  society  as  ‘interaction  between 
individuals'.  For  Simmel,  the  social  is  seen  by him in  lying  half-way between  pure 
individualism and complete collectivism (Joan 2000, p. 71), so that when he thinks of an 
‘individualized moral  law’ he  does  not  imply a  merely subjective  decision,  based on 
arbitrary personal preferences. For Simmel what is ‘individual’ is, at one and the same 
time, subjective  and trans-individual. As such, to embrace the idea that each individual 
must  have  his  own  categorical  ‘ought’  means,  in  Simmel,  that  the  individual 
accomplishes it within the intrinsic, irremediable tension between life as pre-individual 
actuality and form as trans-individual objectivity. So, if the polarity of life as expanding 
and growing intensity and personal vitality composes Simmel’s own theory of morality, 
the ‘more-than-life’ need of reaching beyond itself toward forms (arts, politics, morality, 
religion, economics etc.) that may direct life from above is also part of the same formula 
(Lee, Silver & Moore 2007).  As Lee and Silver put it, Simmel’s “… law of the individual 
is individual without therefore being purely subjective” (2012, p. 11).
Despite  their  theoretical  divergences  and through distinct  paths,  Simmel  and 
Durkheim offer an outlet to the choice between the search for new totalities which may 
‘heal’  meaninglessness  and  the  alternative,  over-individualist  affirmation  of  life  as 
independent from forms/cultural  synthesis.  Yet,  the sociologists  also overcome radical 
views of the contemporary epoch as inescapably meaninglessness, leaving any healthy 
outlet  for  individuals  as  some  accounts  on  postmodernity  (as  those  by  the  scholars 
discussed above) seem sometimes to suggest.
Now,  both  Simmel  and  Durkheim  believed  that  the  anomic  state  of  form 
exhaustion  that  characterized  modernity  was  “…  too  paradoxical  to  be  permanent” 
(Simmel 2000c, p. 90) so that new cultural forms, appropriate to present energies, would 
emerge soon.  
But under the “new servitude of the liberated in the age of total  capitalism” - 
borrowing the words from the title of one of Dufour’s books - renewed attempts are made 
to deny all forms and ideals outside the ‘pure individual’ and to impose a set of trivial 
imperatives to a point wherein what prevails, for many of us, is life as a meaningless 
replication of human’s futility and/or conceit.
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Thereby,  the  analytic  exploration  of  the  present  socio-cultural  and  economic 
forces which are arguably challenging the pursuit of a more well-balanced integration 
between life/form, individual/society and thus, of meaningfulness, is needed.
I am referring to the challenge imposed by the new transcendent impulse of our 
contemporary era (which Simmel could not witness but anticipate in his analysis of the 
centrality of “money as a God” in modern culture) against the creation of a meaningful 
integration between form and life, fostering instead multiple processes of degradation of 
forms into commodities, which underlie today’s pathologies of meaninglessness and the 
linked epidemics of depression, as I shall discuss in some detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8: The money-God of the political-economic theology of neo-liberalism and 
contemporary crises of meaninglessness
8.1 – Does individualism fuel meaninglessness?
If once Lukács (1971), with a certain regret, described the modern hero as the one 
called to create his own version of meaning through the ventures of his individual soul 
whereas Nietzsche celebrated the novelty,  calling out ‘the brave’ for self-creation and 
active nihilism, contemporary individuals have, in a sense, relinquished the search for 
either a return to a golden age or a future that would overcome difficulties.
This  section  will  examine  the  quite  controversial  view  according  to  which 
contemporary individualism’ entails a ‘turn inward’ associated with cultural demise and a 
narcissistic  obsession  with  personal  fulfillment  leading  to  ‘collective  crises  of 
meaninglessness’.
Among scholars who elaborate on this idea, Christopher Lasch (1991)  remarks 
that  if  the catastrophes  of the twentieth century fed a sense of doom and impending 
disaster, people today nurse no hopes for a leader or an idea which will open the way 
towards the future or restore the past.
Rather, after the political upheaval of the sixties and the collective disillusion that 
follows it,  the sense of historical continuity and all great projects for the superation of 
collective difficulties suffer a strong blow, a condition expressed, in its crudest “… in 
disaster  movies  or  in  fantasies  of  space  travel,  which  allow vicarious  escape  from a 
doomed planet” (Lasch 1991, p. 49).
Less  dramatically,  the  survivalist  mentality  incarnates  in  everyday  experience 
wherein in conditions of ample commodification of existence, impulse gratification has 
been sanctioned as the good life. As a result, life becomes viewed as a kind of “obstacle 
course” whose aim is to get through “… with a minimum of trouble and pain” (Lasch 
1991, p. 49).
A context based on indifference to the past and disconnection from posterity is, in 
Lasch’s terms, a “therapeutic”, not a religious context. That is, when surviving in the 
present becomes the main drive to life, the hunger is to establish a personal identity, not 
to submerge identity in a larger cause (as in any religious mindset). Still, submission to 
higher loyalties, he writes, “… strike the therapeutic sensibility as intolerably oppressive, 
offensive to common sense and injurious to personal health and well-being” (1991, p. 
13).
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Lasch (1991) claims that, in this context, the typical pathology representing the 
underlying psychological structure of our age is narcissism. Thus, while in Freud’s time, 
he notes, hysteria and obsessional neurosis revealed the traits of an earlier capitalist stage 
associated  with  norms  such  as  acquisitiveness,  over  dedication  to  work  and  sexual 
repression, in the contemporary age,  narcissism prevails.  Lasch goes on to argue that 
narcissist types are not only likely to emerge but destined to succeed in “the age of the 
executive success game” (1991, p. 44). This is a time when previously valuable virtues 
such  as  loyalty,  capacity  for  deep  attachments  and  ‘individual  character’ based  on 
convictions  and  principles,  should  not  stand  in  the  way  of  a  flexible  individual 
continuously open to new ideas and multiple options.
Narcissists  seem to  be  crafted  for  a  time,  he  continues,  when  the  search  for 
‘personal  winning  records’ surpasses  worries  with  collective  aims  and even  with  the 
accumulation of wealth and goods, and when ‘individual achievements’ are no longer 
assessed against an abstract ideal of self-discipline and self-denial but, mainly, against 
comparison with the achievement of others.  Narcissist types will also easily adjust to a 
context  wherein reputation is  ultimately referred to  one’s talent to  operate  the ‘art  of 
seducing’ others, managing ‘personal impressions’ as to craft a ‘winning image’ which is 
not necessarily rooted in objective accomplishments.
Finally, a strong ‘culture of the image’ also triggers narcissist responses, either 
through the intensified role of ‘images of oneself’ recorded by cameras,  photographs, 
television  etc.,  or  through  the  emphasis  on  continuous  self-scrutiny  or  “eternal 
watchfulness” (Lasch 1991, p. 48) as a means to protect oneself from ‘threats’ against 
personal attractiveness.
The American urban sociologist Richard Sennett16 also identified the narcissist 
character of modern urban cultures marked by what he sees as the devolution of the 
public in the city and a hypertrophy of the private sphere.  In his thought provoking The 
Fall of the Public Man (1978) Sennett analyzes how in the urban, capitalist, secularized 
society, “… as gods are demystified, man mystified his own condition” (1978, p. 150). As 
a result, ‘personality’ has become a central social category in the public realm and  the 
meaning of everything tends to be narcissistically ‘filtered’: “… one ceases to believe 
one’s surroundings have any meaning save as a means towards the end of one’s own 
motion” (1978, p. 15).
16 Although the two scholars have several points of contact in their interpretation of the narcissist traits of  
modern / late modern culture, Lasch criticizes some aspects of Sennett’s perspective in “The Fall of the 
Public Man”, such as what he understands as the book’s political stance, and its devaluation of the personal  
realm (see Lasch, 1991, pp. 27-30).
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For  Sennett, a  culture  deprived  of  the  belief  in  the  public,  ruled  instead  by 
intimate  feeling  as  a  measure  of  meaning  (1978,  p.  326)  is,  ultimately,  a  culture  in 
distress. For behind all modern “obsession with persons” (1978, p. 4), we are in fact 
burdened and not liberated,  he understands,  by the historically engendered belief  that 
social meanings are to stem from individual feelings, as well as by the quite generalized 
avoidance to fit into any general pattern out of fear of inauthenticity.
The  essence  of  Sennett’s  argument  is  therefore  that  the  withering  of  public 
meaning and the alternative measurement of social reality in psychological terms, robs 
society of its civility, and individuals from a meaningful impersonal life. For people need 
social barriers in order to exercise their ability to act and to be really expressive beyond 
empty self-disclosure (1978, p. 264).
Philip Rieff, an author to which both Lasch and Sennett are indebted, depicts the 
contemporary state of affairs as one wherein all previous cultural consensus of “thou shalt 
nots” or taboos - which once put into work the classical understanding of culture as the 
symbolic order which inheres in its prohibitions and remissions - are replaced by the 
advent and triumph of the ‘therapeutic’ as the new dominant worldview (2006, p. 200).
Rieff  interprets  the  shift  as  a  cultural  revolution  in  which  the  “social  man” 
mobilized by the language of faith is replaced by the “psychological man” now impelled 
by a sort of “unreligion” of the “one feels” (2006, p.19). It is therefore, and paradoxically, 
also a form of “anti-culture” in which all settled convictions, normative institutions and 
vertical authorities fall under suspicion under the increasingly venerable idea that “… 
men must free themselves from binding attachments to communal purposes in order to 
express more freely their individualities” (2006, p. 59).
Like Sennett, Rieff thinks that behind the idea that “we can live freely at last” 
(2006, p. 4) an unprecedented problem is founded, a problem which he questions if it 
could ever be resolved. For a culture organized around the motivations of a psychological 
man is a “culture without cultus” which “in almost all historical cases” he writes, is “a 
contradiction in terms” (Rieff 2006, p. 11), lacking the sacred socializing agencies and a 
system of symbolic integration,  that is,  “salutary beliefs” which organize a life worth 
living  (Rieff  2006,  pp.  56-57).  Further,  being  against  doctrinal  traditions  which  urge 
identification  with the interests  of  the community,  the  therapeutic  mindset  serves  the 
purposes of anti-politics (Rieff 2006, p. 208).
The  accounts  of  these  scholars  have  been  interpreted  and  criticized  by  some 
scholars as pessimistic in its totalizing characterization of the contemporary epoch as 
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paving the way to social decline or even chaos, blind to anything other than ‘decadence’. 
Also, these works have often been labeled as ‘conservatives’, mourning past values.17
In my opinion, one of the strengths of Lasch’s, Rieff’s and Sennett’s accounts was 
to  highlight  the  possible  extremes  of  the  so-called  ‘therapy  culture’  leading  to 
psychologization  of  all  moral  and  social  issues  and  to  excessive  retraction  to  ‘the 
personal’.  However,  I  think that  a  more ambivalent  view of  both ‘religious  types’ of 
orientation  –  which  historically  entailed  ‘meaning’ but  also  oppression,  violence  and 
conformism - and of the so-called ‘therapeutic culture’ of contemporary times is needed.
In a similar line of argument, Katie Wright claims that the extremes of a ‘therapy 
culture’ fueling a mistaken replacement of social and political solutions by psychological 
ones should not discredit its emancipatory elements. The author remarks that concerns 
with  psychological  well-being  have  effects  beyond the  inner  lives  of  individuals.  By 
generating “… a language and legitimacy to claims of oppression, abuse and violence” 
(Wright 2006, p. 311), the “… therapeutic ethos has provided a vehicle for the exposure 
of abuse against some of the less powerful groups in society” (Wright 2006, p.  309) 
enabling social critique and political change.
Charles Taylor is also strongly critical of what he deems as the cultural pessimism 
of these accounts, arguing that the dark side of individualism, that is, the centering on the 
self – flattering and narrowing life, making them poor in meaning and less concerned 
with others or society – although being a verifiable contemporary reality, is not intrinsic 
to the modern ideal of authenticity, but an effect of its degradation into trivialized and 
self-indulgent forms (Taylor 1991, p. 15).
When  authenticity  loses  sight  of  concerns  that  transcend  the  self  –  be  they 
religious,  political,  historical  and aesthetical,  the  duties  of  solidarity,  or  the  needs  of 
natural environment (Taylor 1991, p. 22), amongst others – it indulges into forms that 
17 All the scholars mentioned, perhaps anticipating criticisms against their  ideas,  have 
something to say in this regard. Philip Rieff, despite his strong doubts about the possible 
validity  of  the  contemporary (anti)  culture  of  the  “psychological  man”,  is  willing  to 
entertain the idea that the foundation of civilization on ‘psychic well being’ might work. 
He explicitly states that his  ideas are not  meant  to be a  defense of the “unconscious 
conscience” based on “classical internalizations of authority”, but instead an indication 
that “… the initial  cost of modern cultural revolution has been a feeling of symbolic 
impoverishment” (Rieff 2006, p. 207). Richard Sennett, asserting the insightfulness of 
“… an empathy for the past”, warns that by describing the picture of the fall of the public 
culture,  he  does  not  want  to  evoke  a  feeling  of  regret  which  induces  paralyzing 
resignation  about  the  present  (Sennett  1978,  p.  259).  Christopher  Lasch,  similarly, 
remarks that “…current critical dogma equates every such reference to the past as itself 
an expression of nostalgia”. Countering this perspective, he argues: “the belief that in 
some ways the past was a happier time by no means rests on a sentimental illusion; nor  
does it  lead to a backward-looking, reactionary paralysis  of the political  will” (Lasch 
1991, xvii).
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compromise  the  justification  of  authenticity  as  an  ideal,  he  claims.  If  feelings  and 
subjectivity were supposed to determine the meaning of things outside any horizon of 
significance, there would be no reason why one should believe that authenticity itself is a 
valid ideal. This is so because in the subjectivist rationale it would depend on how one 
feels about authenticity, which can obviously vary (Taylor 1991, p. 39).
As  hinted  earlier,  the  intrinsic  problem of  the  ideal  of  authenticity  is,  Taylor 
admits, the idea of originality embedded in it, according to which we have to discover 
what is to be ourselves - by making or expressing it - outside the network of pre-existing 
models. The expressivism of modern individualism is at center stage here: “We discover 
what we have it in us to be by becoming that mode of life, by giving expression in our 
speech and action to what is original in us” (Taylor 1991, p. 61). However, he goes on to 
argue,  while  authenticity  involves  creation  and  frequently  opposition  to  the  rules  of 
society  and  even  potentially  to  what  is  collectively  recognized  as  ‘morality’,  it  also 
requires openness to horizons of significance and a self-definition in dialogue which is, 
ultimately,  social  (1991,  p.  66).  For  instance,  ‘self-choice’,  an  important  aspect  of 
authenticity,  cannot  have  any sense  whatsoever  if  it  lacks  reference  to  a  horizon  of 
significance beyond choice. Otherwise, he writes, “… what would be the value of self-
choosing instead of doing whatever one pleases? (1991, p. 39).
That is, we are not merely ‘liberated’ to choose. Rather, we are required to realize 
the virtues embedded within the ideal of authenticity, such as self-choice, self-respect, 
courage (rather than conformism), independence rather than heteronomy etc.: horizons 
are given.
In sum, and contrarily to the view of those labeled “cultural pessimists”, Taylor 
sees a strong moral ideal behind self-fulfillment, since ‘being true to oneself’ necessarily 
entails reference to a non-chosen framework of values and ideals.
Alain Ehrenberg will also criticize the line of thought of Lasch, Rieff and Sennett. 
Now, to be sure, Ehrenberg deals with many of the themes that occupied these writers. He 
opens discussion with these accounts in its emphasis on the decline of the public domain 
and the weakening / dissolution of social ties. For this constitutes a sociological thinking, 
he claims,  marked by nostalgia  for  the  past  and based on what  he considers  a  great 
misunderstanding:  that  contemporary individualism is  equivalent  to  social  dissolution 
(Ehrenberg 2013).
Conversely, Ehrenberg argues that lacking a pre-defined societal place to occupy 
as dictated by the Gods, Masters or Fathers, contemporary individualism emerges as a 
new social form which institutes itself over the wreckage of all tradition and foundation. 
138
Two historical “waves of emancipation” bring about the new societal model: first, around 
the sixties, the wave of the revolt of the private individual towards personal liberation, 
and more recently,  the second wave, that of personal initiative and submission to the 
norms of performance (2010b, p. 227).
The move – which he analyzes, specifically, in the French context- is therefore 
from a hierarchical model based on discipline to a model based on self-reference which 
fundamentally  changes  the  relationship  with  inequality.  The  change  refers  to  the 
replacement of the emphasis on social protection to the obligation of being autonomous 
as a new social exigency, that is, the democratization of the idea that anyone could be 
exceptional once they are given the means for acting by themselves (Ehrenberg 2007, 
2010a,  2010b).  A radicalism of  subjectivity  is  thus  evoked and individual  autonomy, 
psychic liberation and personal initiative, he states, become not merely private choices 
but the new laws projected as social demands (2010a, p. 74). For if the individual does 
not fulfill  the demands of autonomy and initiative,  “… a common rule valid for all” 
social exclusion is “… the threat for possible offenders” (Ehrenberg 2010b, p. 8).
The new supreme value of autonomy, the feeling that you have to be the author of 
your own choices in many levels of life and the linked retreat of political modes of social 
protection, he admits, feeds personal insecurity. But this, he goes on to say, constitutes a 
new social ideal, one which may weight over people that feel they can’t measure up to 
such a limitless responsibility.  As such,  people’s  insecurity is  not  a  signal  of lack of 
ideals.  In  other  words,  when autonomy dominates the concept of society, people  are  not 
asking “What should I do?” but rather, they start questioning themselves: “Am I able to 
do it?” (Ehrenberg 2007, pp. 130-131).
Contemporary  individualism,  therefore,  does  not  unleash  the  atomistic 
degradation of social ties but rather, it is socially embedded. To substantiate the argument, 
Ehrenberg builds on Tocqueville and Dumont to claim, firstly, that individualism does not 
exclude but encompasses its polar opposite, holism; secondly, that the struggle against the 
destructive side of individualism is an intrinsic feature of the social body in democratic 
times (Ehrenberg 2007;  2010c).   In his  words,  the “…slackening of  social  links  is  a 
natural  feature  of  democratic  society  and  not  an  evil  that  destroys  it  inexorably” 
(Ehrenberg 2013, p. 21).
Besides, whereas individualism implies that values of interdependency become 
hierarchically subordinated to independence, they are not absent; and could not be, he 
remarks, since life in common is part of the human condition (Ehrenberg 2010c, p. 9). 
Yet, if interdependency collapses, so would individualism: individuals can only be equal 
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and autonomous when the interaction between them is somehow subordinated (Ehrenberg 
2013, pp. 21-22).
Thereby, he claims, when advocates of ‘social decline’ associate the emphasis on 
the  personal  inherent  to  contemporary  individualism  with  the  privatization  and 
psychologization of reality they stage an “individualistic sociology” based on a mistaken 
dichotomization between individual and society. Leaving aside this artificial separation, 
the fact that the personal gains prominence over the public can be seen as a new social 
form and not  as  a condition that  leads  to the dissolution of society projected on the 
breakdown of communities, the collapse of politics and so on (Ehrenberg 2013).
Finally,  Ehrenberg also counters  the  idea that  this  new social  form condemns 
individuals  to  pathology  (and  that  narcissism  is  thus  the  price  to  pay  for  the 
disassembling of community as some accounts imply).  Even though a new collective 
psychology results from contemporary transformations, he states, “… the subject does 
not emerge from this process moribund, just changed” (2010b, p.192)
The  important  question  which  Ehrenberg  seems  thus  to  be  raising  is:  are  we 
pathologizing (as something against individual and society) what in reality is only the 
structurally inherent condition of individualist democracies?
The  question  reminds  me  of  Durkheim’s  refusal,18 as  we’ve  seen  earlier,  to 
conceive individualism as a form of antagonism between individual and society and thus, 
as something that would inescapably lead to social decline.
However, Durkheim had a very specific kind of individualism in mind when he 
submitted  his  idea  of  the  “religion  of  humanity”  as  a  social  institution.  And  this  is 
certainly not the same kind of contemporary individualism of “the pure individual” as 
Ehrenberg  himself  describes:  an  individual  which  has  to  govern  himself,  finding the 
orientations for his existence in himself alone (2010a, p. 11).
Before going into the details of this distinction, I would like to underline that in 
my opinion, Ehrenberg illuminates two important issues that should impact the way by 
which  the  theme  of  “meaninglessness”  is  to  be  understood  under  contemporary 
conditions.  First,  the  issue  –  as  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter  -  of  the  supposed 
dismantling of society after all absolute reference becomes contested. For him, this view 
is  profoundly  mistaken.  Rather,  social  norms  are  not  disappearing  but  shifting  as  a 
response to new emergent genres of social interaction. Secondly, his ideas go against the 
tide of “the mourning paradigm” calling attention to the obvious, but often neglected fact 
that, be as it may, the majority of us do not want to return to the previous disciplinary 
18 Ehrenberg seems to suggest the affinity of his argument with Durkheim’s perspective 
(see Ehrenberg 2013, p.  21).
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stranglehold wherein meanings were relatively given. In his words, “… instead of pitting 
ourselves  for  the  suffering that  surrounds us,  it  is  time to  face,  with some historical 
appreciation and good sense, the question of emancipation” (Ehrenberg 2010b, p. 7).
For this to become a reality,  he claims, contemporary individualism should be 
seen less as the triumph of egoism over civic spirit and more as a transformation in the 
way  we  experience  the  world.  Yet,  political  references,  modes  of  public  action  and 
institutions should not be seen as having collapsed, but rather, as having significantly 
changed.  Within  the  new  sociality  of  autonomy,  institutions  and  politics  are  now 
organized according to the ideal that “… each citizen has to be in an environment which 
leads him to be the principal agent of his action” (Ehrenberg 2007, p. 133).
Ehrenberg’s political stance of going beyond what he calls “… the endless game-
of-mirrors of liberal versus anti-liberal” (2010c, p. 7) also seems sensible and possibly 
fecund, although the idea needs further elaboration.
I do agree with Ehrenberg that social norms are nowadays changed rather than 
absent, and also that focusing on the present is a much more productive intellectual (and 
political) task than the critique of it in a spirit of more or less implicit yearning for an 
impossible return to the canons of disciplinary law.
What he seems to leave unfocused, however, is that the contemporary ideal of the 
“pure individual” obliged to be autonomous and independent of any conditions outside 
himself,  does  not  merely  constitutes  “… the  egalitarian  dream of  today”  (Ehrenberg 
2010a, p. 72) triggered by the historical loss of transcendental criteria to say ‘what we 
are’  and  ‘what  we  should  be’  (Ehrenberg  2010a,  p.  74).  Alternatively,  the  ‘pure 
individual’ he  describes  is,  in  many senses,  the  ideal  subject  of  the  present  stage  of 
deregulated capitalism.
I am not saying that Ehrenberg is not aware of this relationship. In his book The 
Cult  of  Performance (2010a)  he  insightfully  explores  the  historical  development  of 
notions of autonomy and self-management within the corporate environment, explaining 
how  these  notions  become  simultaneously  the  expression  of  collective  aspiration  of 
populations  and a  functional  exigency that  provides efficiency to  the management  of 
organizations (or even societies) in an unstable context (Ehrenberg 2010a, p. 43).
 However,  as Petersen notes,  “He is not interested in capitalism per se. He is 
rather,  as  Zygmunt  Bauman calls  him ‘… an indefatigable  explorer  of  contemporary 
mutations  of  modern  individualism’ ”  (Petersen  2009,  p.  64).  Hence,  the  economic 
capitalist context underlying the process by which values associated with autonomy have 
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been generalized  -  as  pseudo-autonomy and pseudo-responsibility  (Petersen  & Willig 
2004) - is left relatively unexplored, which shortens, I think, the breadth of his argument.
In other words, while I agree with him that the rise of individualism per se is not 
in itself the equivalent to the decline of society (and consequent meaninglessness), the 
new cult of the ‘pure individual’ is to be recognized as being deeply and problematically 
implicated  within  the  broader  transcendence  of  money  as  God  and  market 
fundamentalism as the political-economic theology of neo-liberalism. For “… a society 
that makes of interindividual concurrence a just competition” (Ehrenberg 2010a, p.13) is 
clearly working under the principles of this new theology. Likewise, if it is true, as he 
puts it, that the “… meritocratic virus … has become the ideal of everyone” (Ehrenberg 
2010a,  p.  69)  this  is  a  virus  that,  while  making  many  of  us  sick  from  excessive 
responsibility, is a remedy for keeping the system’s health.
The consequences of this implication over the fate of contemporary individualism 
are certainly wide. Under the rule of the money-God, the natural hierarchical balance 
between interdependency and independence of individualism has been disrupted to the 
benefit of the later. This is, in fact, a bland way of putting things; in the new theological 
neoliberal  rationale,  egoism is  to a large extent  erected as a rule  of life,  even in  the 
puritan guise of private or abstract interest: “… private vices, that is, private interests 
should have a free hand, because they lead to public happiness. Amor sui is the main road 
to glory” (Bergh 2013, p. 88). Still, in a context of the “divine market” (Dufour, 2009) 
independence itself is often just marketing bait for captivating consumers which ‘freely’ 
adopt massified behaviors while believing to be independent.
The question which therefore remains is: are we really acquiring skills to act on 
our own, as Ehrenberg (2007, p. 133) defines as being the fundamental ideal underlying 
contemporary institutions? Or are we, under the aegis of the rationality of commodities, 
exactly  shrinking  in  our  ability  to  reflect  and  act  whereas  a  new  transcendence  of 
performance  and,  paradoxically,  self-indulgence  and  limitless  enjoyment 
(institutionalized as entertainment) advances? Putting it differently: in what sense are we 
living in a social environment where all individuals can be the entrepreneur of their own 
lives when our purported “autonomous actions” become either an expectation of limitless 
efficacy or a camouflage of the new imperative of enjoyment?
In such a context, the Nietzschean ‘sovereign man’ is not (as Ehrenberg seems to 
suggest) the new social norm, unless in a totally perverted way – incarnated in the social 
promotion  of  the  Sadean  ‘isolist’ -  a  combination  of  hedonist  and  egoistic  forms  of 
existence  (Bergh  2013,  p.   88)  -  or  in  the  pseudo-autonomy  characteristic  of  the 
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meritocratic universe of the neoliberal ideal of the ‘pure individual’. Both forms, I risk to 
say, Nietzsche himself would label as fundamentalist and therefore nihilistic. After the 
decline of ‘metaphysical categories of meaning’, we still don’t live beyond transcendence 
as Nietzsche had imagined. Rather, a ‘sacralization of the profane’ has been imposing 
itself, a new fundamentalism manifested in the liberal ‘normative autonomy’ and, also, in 
the ‘hedonist creed’ of consumerist Western societies.
Still, even considering the plausibility of Ehrenberg’s warnings that contemporary 
individualism is not to be seen as leading to the decline of social ideals, the generalized 
contemporary  ‘religion  of  the  money-God’ –  which  I  shall  define  in  this  chapter  – 
incorporates ‘individualism’ as a tool for its reproduction, draining its worth as a social 
ideal. Further, I will argue, it also tends to dissolve those ends, ideals and societal values 
which ‘protect’ social ties but may clash with the rationality of money.
Ehrenberg himself,  quoting Tocqueville,  notes that American democracy fights 
individualism with institutions whose goal “… is to multiply,  to infinity,  for citizens, 
occasions to act in common, and to make them feel everyday they depend on each other” 
(Tocqueville,  cited  in  Ehrenberg  2007,  p.  132).  But  inasmuch  as  the  new  political-
economic theology has been condemning ‘as heresy’ everything which, being at odds 
with the neutral rationality of the divine-money threats to inhibit its logics, social ties 
seem  often  under  pressure.  In  addition,  we  are  constantly  invited  to  ‘egoism’ (not 
individualism or autonomy) as, purportedly, the best way to value our own interests.
Hence, the dismantling of social order seems to be less an implicit outcome of 
individualism than an effect of pragmatic principles inherent to the money rationality 
which, acquiring supreme value, has been increasingly converting social ideals and the 
intrinsic worth of things into cash value.
In  sum,  our  difficulties  do  not  seem  to  stem  from  the  acceleration  of 
individualization processes taken in isolation but from the dissemination of a new form of 
the  ‘Absolute’ which  has  to  be  described  and  analyzed  if  we  are  to  understand  the 
intricacies  of  contemporary  individualism  and  thus,  going  back  to  Ehrenberg’s 
terminology, “face the fact of emancipation”.
By saying this, I am leaving aside the philosophically complex discussion on the 
possibilities of emancipation and autonomy to be ever realized. Conversely, I am taking 
emancipation here - as I think Ehrenberg also implies in this passage - as the realized 
condition of contemporary individuals which are liberated/emancipated from the yoke of 
a  transcendent  meaning  (dictated  by  sovereigns  and  masters  to  which  they  obeyed) 
having now to be sovereign themselves.  But  emancipation cannot  be faced if  we are 
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merely  replacing  one  yoke  with  another:  from  a  religious,  traditional  or  political 
subjection to a new, but equally largely uncontested dominion of a new transcendent Law 
which  enslaves  and  commands  while  incorporating  individualism as  a  good  fuel  for 
keeping the commodities cycle running fast and well and thus, transfiguring it as “… the 
most radical repudiation of individuality” (Lasch 1991, p. 70).
In the following lines, I attempt to develop this issue, analyzing how autonomy as 
the  new neoliberal  ideal  interplays  with  the  collective  crisis  of  meaninglessness  in  a 
context wherein, far from being liberated and autonomous, people are now been invited 
to ‘serve’ under the auspices of the money-God.
8.2 - Autonomy in the new spirit of capitalism
Beyond the senseless nostalgia for an impossible and, for most of us, unwanted 
return  to  the  past,  and the  empirical  denial  of  an  excessively gloomy picture  of  our 
contemporary era as a time lacking any outlets for meaningfulness, the phenomenology 
of contemporary life suggests that autonomy has grown wide.
Thus, if one interprets autonomy either as predominantly a sign of an anti-culture 
motivated only by the anarchy of impulse release leading to social disintegration or, as 
Ehrenberg  says,  as  a  sign  of  a  new societal  model  which  now has  notions  such  as 
‘release’, ‘initiative’ and ‘action’ as the new basis for novel social forms of restriction and 
enthusiasm, the consensual fact seems to be that autonomy has acquired a very specific 
shape in contemporary conditions.
And if a more complete realization of individual’s rights and the refinement of his 
ability to reflect and act are (hopefully) part of this story, autonomy has also developed 
into  a  consecration  of  individuality  in  a  way that  is  certainly very distinct  from the 
Durkheimian notion of “the cult of the individual”.
Ehrenberg describes the shift as a process in which following the Enlightment, 
Romantic  aspirations,  Kierkegaard,  Nietzsche  and  others,  the  notion  of  a  sovereign 
individual becomes fulfilled, not in its critical design towards emancipation of humans 
from the webs of dependency and enforcement as in the early times of modernity, neither 
against the oppressing forces of progress and rationalization for the sake of singularity, as 
in romantic and existentialist projects, but as a norm. For the new ‘sacred individual’ has 
now lost all sense of critical demands and romantic utopias (Ehrenberg 2010a).
Hence,  whereas  Durkheim’s  (1976)  definition  of  ‘individual’  inheres  in  the 
submission  of  individuality  to  something  greater  (a  higher  social  ideal)  as  to  find 
meaning, the ideal individual of contemporary individualism – powerfully motivated by 
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neoliberal  ‘dogmas’ -  is,  rather,  the  embodiment  of  the  isolated  being  dependent  on 
neither  roots,  nor  past:  a  pure  individuality  which  refers  to  nothing  but  to  itself 
(Ehrenberg 2010a, p. 25, p. 54).
The Kantian and Rousseauian  moral  formula  based on the disregard  for  what 
concerns one personally for the sake of shared goals (underlying Durkheim’s notion of 
individualism  as  a  social  institution)  is  thereby  inverted.  Still,  even  the  Simmelian 
perspective of the life-form dialectics (which enlarges the role of individuality on the 
constitution of a moral life while maintaining the role of limits and cultural forms) does 
not find realization in such a model.  For the ‘ideal individual’ is pure exactly because he 
is independent of anything that goes beyond him, such as collective filiations, tradition, 
cultural forms, the heritages of name and any notion of ‘a general individual’. He is a 
“being of begginings” (Ehrenberg 2010a, p. 67) and thus, there where he is unique and 
supposedly  unbound  to  anything  existing  before  or  outside  himself,  the  ideal  ‘pure 
individual’ of neo-liberalism finds his fullness.
For  Dufour,  individualism has  suffered  an inversion:  whereas  formerly it  was 
realized within the symbolic order of society, now it develops upon indifference to the 
existence of principles which transcend individuals as pure expressions of their private 
selves.  This  bespeaks,  he  claims,  that  the  propagated  idea  that  we suffer  in  Western 
societies from the excesses of modern individualism is mistaken. Rather, societies are 
suffering  from  a  corrupted  “pos-individualist”  form  of  life  marked  by  the  chief 
fundament of the liberal ideology: “egoism” (Dufour 2009, p. 22, my tansl.).
In a way very consistent with Durkheim’s thesis (1973, pp. 54-56), Dufour claims 
that  ‘egoism’ does  not  originate  as a  result  of natural  developments  of individualism 
leading  to  social  dissolution.  It  arises  instead  from  the  collapse  of  a  “high-quality 
individualism”, which is not the enemy of rules and laws but instead is fundamentally 
dependent on them, being also based on a demanding critical ascetism.19
What is happening in the contemporary era, according to Dufour (2009), is that 
individualism has been degraded into a deinstitutionalized, liberalized, uncritical egoistic 
form,  based  on  contempt  for  everything  that  transcends  individuality  –  collective 
instances such as institutions and the state – and extending to ‘society’ as such.
According  to  Dufour  (2011),  this  shift  occurs  by  way  of  the  mutations  in 
capitalism in which all forms of exchange and institutions that have survived by reference 
to  some  transcendental  values  are  being  devalued  under  the  weight  of  the 
19 Dufour’s  ‘high-quality  individualism’  clearly  corresponds  to  Durkheim’s  ‘moral 
individualism’. An evident sign of this is the fact that both scholars refer to and elaborate 
on Rousseau’s and Kant’s definition of autonomy in order to argue for the legitimacy of 
an individualism which is the opposite of egoism.
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“antiauthoritarian totalitarianism” (Dufour 2011, p. 14) of the neutral monetary value of 
commodities.
In The Art of Shrinking Heads (2008), as discussed previously, Dufour’s focus lies 
mainly  on  a  psychoanalytic  inspired  interpretation  of  the  emerging  forms  of 
subjectification generated by the collapse of Subjects – that is,  of unifying, collective 
principles  which,  historically,  have  been losing  prestige and are further  disarticulated 
under the rule of the new laws of commodity exchange.
It is in his following works,  The Divine Market (2009) and  The Perverse City 
(2013) that the author explicitly argues and develops the idea that if the figures of the 
Other are now losing prestige, we are not living in a kind of ‘remission time’ wherein 
religion totally collapses. In other words, the present-day lack of symbolic subjection to 
grand enunciators holding a collective reach does not really bring about the ‘twilight of 
the idols’.
Conversely  –  diverging  from Rieff,  Lasch  and  even  ‘correcting’ his  previous 
perspective20 - a new religion has been installing itself and with it, a new idol emerges. 
Dufour (2009) calls that the “divine market”.
Hence,  if  something  is  collapsing  today,  he  claims,  it  is  not  religion  but  the 
modern  transcendental  project  in  its  various  philosophical  forms:  the  Kantian  ‘clear 
reason’, the Rousseauian idea of “the collective individual” as the guarantor of freedom, 
Hegel’s view of the state as “the reality of the concrete liberty” and so on. Meanwhile, 
religion returns through the widespread faith in the market’s providence (Dufour 2009, p. 
99, p. 132).
As we’ve seen above, Kehl (2009a) argues in similar lines. For her, the members 
of contemporary Western societies have faith in the symbolic coin that governs their lives 
– the capitalist mandate which has been continuously commanding us to enjoy, to self-
develop and to be sovereign of ourselves. Still, and very often, she adds, they despair 
when feeling unable to pay this symbolic debt.
As I have already hinted, I build upon this idea. Contemporary individuals are 
suffering less by the lack of imperatives and more by being under the yoke of a new form 
of  (political-economic)  transcendence  which,  paradoxically,  fuels  formlessness  and 
egoism.
20 In  his  book  The  Divine  Market (2009)  Dufour  explicitly  declares  that  his  earlier 
perspective on the “decline of the Other” is insufficient. However being a good way of 
describing  the  current  state  of  affairs  in  Western  civilizations,  he  writes,  it  does  not 
address the complexity of a contemporary situation in which - as I will also argue below - 
there is  simultaneously decline and change for a very new kind of  “Other” which is 
necessary to define (Dufour 2009, p. 85).
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Thus, contemporary emerging forms of individualization and the new “galaxy of 
autonomy” (Ehrenberg, 2010a) can only be adequately understood in its intricacies and 
effects, I think, by recognizing the fact that the historical development of individualism 
has been profoundly intertwined with economic developments.
This association can be understood, as Honneth (2004) submits, as the unintended 
result of a chain of various processes on material, social, intellectual and economic levels 
which, gathering in the manner of an elective affinity, were able to create, in conjunction, 
a new kind of individualism. Alternatively, rather than an unintended consequence and 
elective affinity, contemporary individualism and the forms of self-realization linked to it 
can be seen as the causal effect of processes of a relatively deliberate incorporation of 
individualist claims by the “new spirit of capitalism”, as in Boltanski’s and Chiapello’s 
(2002, 2005) accounts.
Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), following Max Weber, argue that since capitalism 
is in itself amoral, it needs to borrow a critical spirit from the outside in order to justify 
individual commitment to it. In their words:  “Unable to discover a moral basis in the 
logic  of  the  insatiable  accumulation  process  (which in  itself,  on  its  own,  is  amoral) 
capitalism must borrow the legitimating principles it lacks from orders of justification 
external to it” (2005, p. 487).
But these scholars also fundamentally diverge from Weber (2008) who, as has 
been discussed earlier  in this  thesis,  envisaged a  whole disenchantment  of capitalism 
before the  general  escalation  of  rationalization.  In  contrast,  Boltanski  and  Chiapello 
(2005) argue that capitalism proved itself to be robust enough to make use of critical 
elements external to itself in order to thrive as a system.
The “new spirit of capitalism” emerging in the 1970’s has thrived, they explain, 
upon a specific incorporation and metabolization of the emergent criticism of the sixties 
and  seventies  derived  from intellectual  and  artistic  circles,  which  they  term “artistic 
critique”. In Boltanski & Chiapello words, the artistic critique foregrounds “… the loss of 
meaning and, in particular, the loss of the sense of what is beautiful and valuable which 
derives  from  standardization  and  generalized  commodification,  affecting  not  only 
everyday objects but  also artworks (the cultural  mercantilism of the bourgeoisie)  and 
human  beings”  opposing this  with  “… the  freedom of  artists,  their  rejection  of  any 
contamination of aesthetics by ethics, their refusal of any form of subjection in time and 
space and, in its extreme forms, of any kind of work” (2005, p. 38).
Placing these demands within the wider historical process we’ve been analyzing 
in the thesis, it is worth noting that the artistic critique’s  intellectual foundations route 
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back to the Romantic Movement, but it was also an heir of Marx’s ideas on alienation and 
oppression (Boltanski & Chiapello 2005, p. 52). More recently, it incarnates in the 1960s 
and 1970s ‘counter culture’ through variegated cultural movements which, as we have 
discussed above, shared a ‘liberation discourse’ and proclaim values such as individual 
spontaneity, uniqueness and authenticity.
But  capitalism,  they  go  on  to  argue,  capitalized  on  the  normative  standards 
imbued in these criticisms, endogenizing them as part of its own legitimation and thus 
reinventing its otherwise outdated “spirit”. Doing so, capitalism fills the “… gap between 
the  actual  forms  of  accumulation  and  the  normative  conceptions  of  social  order” 
(Boltanski & Chiapello 2002, p. 3) and thus, justifies participation.
But while the economic system acquires a new legitimating morality, and more 
yet, an ideology - which functions as a hindrance towards thinking of alternative systems 
- by the same token, self-realization claims embedded in the ‘artistic critique’ become 
altered,  organized  and  finally  imposed  onto  individuals  as  institutionalized  norms 
(Honneth 2004, p. 467). That is, what once was an ideal (against capitalism) becomes 
institutionalized as a justification for the system itself, helping to disorientate all critical 
activity (Boltanski & Chiapello 2002) and somehow undoing the worth and strength of 
ideals. Thereafter, ‘critique’ is incorporated as the very fuel of capitalism.
The protagonists of the so-called artistic critique and all those who in the sixties 
dreamt to defeat capitalism through the rejection of all forms of authority, institutions and 
constraints  to freedom found out that they could only fulfil  demands of radical,  total 
liberation from all constraints  within  capitalism. In Boltanski and Chiapello words, “… 
the critique of oppression can gently lead… towards acceptance – at least tacitly – of 
liberalism” (2005, p. 39).
What it is notably clear is that the “norms of authentic self-realization” (Petersen 
2011) as they are today understood, corresponds to a new “regime of the self” (Rose 
1999)  which  successfully  addresses  the  needs  of  an  economic  system  based  on 
deregulation and deinstitutionalization.
That  is,  whereas  processes  such  as  de-nationalization  of  publicly  owned 
enterprises; minimization of rigidities in the labour market etc. are some of the structural 
conditions (Rose 1999, p.144) needed by the  neo-liberal system (Honneth & Hartmann 
2006), the corresponding subjective conditions for an effective neoliberal undertaking are 
reflected in a new ‘subjectivity-type’. The latter is structured, in Ehrenberg’s words, less 
around “… disciplinary obedience than to personal decision and initiative” (2010b, p. 8), 
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virtues  that  have  become  central  for  the  reproduction  of  the  economic  system  in 
contemporary conditions.
The process is particularly visible in the sphere of work. Since the 1980s - in a 
time when hierarchy and bureaucracy was being rejected and seen  as “…the eternal 
threats to freedom most recently incarnated in Nazism” (Rose 1999, p. 138) and, more 
concretely, due to technological mutations, economic instability and the globalization of 
markets (Ehrenberg 2010a, p. 91),  Fordist type arrangements of labour have fallen to 
more individualised types.
Whereas in a context of stable markets, bureaucracy allowed the obtainment of an 
internal  equilibrium,  contemporary instability  called  for  a  new discipline  of  personal 
engagement  and implication.  Previous  hierarchic  views based on the  “mystics  of  the 
boss”  leave  way  to  forms  of  management  based  on  participation.  The  responsible, 
autonomous  worker  arises  as  the  new  ideal:  no  longer  expected  to  passively  obey 
commands  and rules,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  be  able  to  act  as  if  there  was  no  one 
hierarchically superior to him to indicate the way forward (Ehrenberg 2010a, p. 89).
In such a context, new management conceptions and practices stressed the values 
of creativity, authenticity and self-realization in work, implementing thus the core ideas 
of the artistic critique (Petersen 2009, p. 60).
 Now,  if  prima  facie,  these  changes  seemingly  provide  the  opportunity  for 
individualisation and self-realization as had been previously demanded by workers, when 
individuals are required to be authentic human beings while being at the same time a 
productive, competitive employee, they have no choice but to instrumentalize their self-
realization  as  a  “competitive  trademark” (Petersen  2009,  p.  62).  Hence,  when  the 
investment  of  personal  values  and  emotions  becomes  one  of  the  prime  motors  of 
contemporary capitalism, the boundaries between, on one side, the sphere of authenticity 
and, on the other, employability, become blurred. In such a context, “…Authentic self-
realization is viewed as something that can be  moulded in order to enhance subjective 
performances and function as a company aid for constant economic progress” (Petersen 
2009, p. 62).
After  all,  one can be autonomous,  creative,  enterprising,  and motivated -  in  a 
word, authentic - in the highest degree possible, but these virtues won’t have any social 
value if the company’s targets are not met. In such a context, what is at stake is less to 
‘become oneself’ and more a pseudo-autonomy and pseudo-responsibility under which 
lies the need to follow the requirements of productivity and the exposure of individuals to 
constant efficiency tests (Petersen & Willig 2004, p. 342).
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Beyond the work sphere, media and advertisements also capitalize on individuals’ 
desires and emotions to a point at which the borders between the ‘authentic self’ and its 
spectacularization  through  artificial  personal-styles,  forms  of  expression  and thinking 
become blurred.
Far  from  self-determination,  choice,  uniqueness  and  ability  to  reflect 
independently, the conflation between the self and market goals entails the recruitment of 
individuals in massified groups. Again, this is done on the basis of the idea that products, 
services and images are tools to be used by free individuals in search of realizing their  
desires, actualize their choices and express their uniqueness. But the extremely deliberate 
strategies  of  market  and its  calculable  effects  on  the  behavior  of  purportedly unique 
individuals suggests another story.
Historically, the capitalization of individual desires and emotions also stemmed 
from capitalism’s capacity to reinvent itself. After the 1929 crisis of super-production, 
capitalism did  not  collapse.  Rather,  the  capitalist  moral  which once,  as  Weber  (2008 
[1904])  shows,  was  borrowed  from  the  Protestant  doctrine  of  work  and  production 
without fruition, was replaced by a new moral of the adoration of the capital as a means 
to fruition, to happiness and pleasure. This constitutes a move, in Dufour’s words, from 
the  “proletarianization  of  workers”  to  the  “proletarianization  of  consumers”  (Dufour 
2009,  p.  36).  In  such a  context  of  intense ‘reproduction of  the  same’ the  idea  of  an 
autonomous individual - who thinks and talks in his own name - sounds empty.
I agree therefore with Lasch when he claims that the devastation of personal life 
and not its promotion (which would include the social condition of human beings as a 
concern) that must be criticized and challenged. For not only moral individualism, as 
Durkheim once described, but even ‘authenticity’ gets transfigured as a sacred totem of 
the larger and more prominent cult of neo-liberalism. In this regard, I draw on Dufour’s 
wise warning about the danger to confuse “…escaping our symbolic subjection by rising 
above it with escaping it by debasing ourselves” (Dufour 2008, p. 44).
 For the ‘liberated’ contemporary individual, becoming a slave to his passions and 
compulsions,  to  objects,  self-image  (Dufour  2012)  and  yet,  to  new  social  ideals  of 
normative  action  and  autonomy  that  suits  to  the  system’s  reproduction,  has  been 
dissolving into a byproduct of the new theology of neo-liberalism.
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8.3 -The new religion of the money-God and crises of meaninglessness
If  significant  transformations  affected  the  ‘new  spirit  of  capitalism’,  the 
ascendency of money as a God is not a new historical trend. For sure, all the founding 
fathers of sociology were, in one way or another, intellectually concerned with the effects 
of the liberal economy on both individual and societal processes.
Durkheim himself, in his early  Suicide (1951) was already concerned with the 
phenomenon of the deregulation of industrial relations wherein government becomes “… 
the tool and servant” of economy.  Anticipating what,  presently,  is a pervasive reality, 
Durkheim states,  “… industry,  instead  of  being  still  regarded  as  a  means  to  an  end 
transcending  itself,  has  become  the  supreme  aim  of  individuals  and  societies  alike. 
Thereupon the appetites thus excited have become freed of any limiting authority… Their 
restraint seems like a sort of sacrilege” (1951, p. 255). Georg Simmel was also certainly 
aware of the sacredness of economic materialism in a modern era when all objects tended 
to be appreciated first and foremost to the extent to which they cost money while all 
qualitative references of value tended to decline (Simmel 2005)
Indeed, in parallel to Kant’s ideas on the transcendental universal duties, the new 
modern economy of money was being heralded in Adam Smith’s writings, promoting, 
Dufour  (2009)  notes,  the  opposite  idea:  the  possibility  of  evading  all  transcendental 
principles, aligning moral and human exchanges with the immanent rules of ‘science’ and 
promoting the pursuit of egoism (2009, p. 86) as the natural path to build the wealth of 
nations21.
In any case, the ‘natural movement’ from self-interest towards the realization of 
collective interests would be explained through recourse to the magical. In Adam Smith’s 
famous formulation, this natural movement is possible thanks to the “occult spirit” and 
the “invisible hand” of the market which favors public aims by drawing together the 
21 Some scholars  of  Adam Smith’s  work describe as  caricatured the  interpretation of 
Smith  as  an  advocate  of  egoism  and  greed  in  a  context  of  absolute  ‘laissez-faire’ 
(Chomsky 1995; Evensky 1993; Santos & Bianchi 2007; Wight 2005). Noam Chomsky 
(1995), for instance, argues that a minimally thorough reading of The Wealth of Nations 
shows that while Smith does argue for free markets as a means to the social order, for him 
– reveling his intellectual heritage as an Enlightenment thinker – equality of conditions 
(and not merely opportunity) is what should be aimed at. According to Chomsky, Smith 
even denounced a state whose “… the principal architects of policy are ‘the merchants 
and manufacturers’” who work for their own interests “… no matter of the effect on 
others”  (Chomsky 1995  n.p).  However,  Chomsky (1995)  himself  points  out  that  the 
proponents of the free market economics carefully crafted an ‘Adam Smith myth’ making 
him much more consistent with neo-liberalism than his ideas actually concede.
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desires and private interests of countless private individuals (Friedman & Friedman 1980, 
p. 14).
The  transcendent  flavor  of  Smith’s  ‘project’ seems  clear:  individuals  should 
dedicate themselves to their own conservation and prosperity, while the market’s natural 
forces - as those of an omnipotent and omniscient God more powerful and trustworthy 
than all mundane and fallible interventions - advances society’s interests and creates the 
maximum benefits for all. In this respect, Dufour (2009) claims that while Kant wanted to 
find a regulating principle (the categorical imperative), Smith advocated deregulation so 
that the ‘divine design’ could be fulfilled (2009, p. 115).
Smith’s religious worldview has been analyzed as essential to his ideas, especially 
his  conversion  to  “Deism”  (Denis  2005).  Deism is  a  religious  view  which,  gaining 
prominence during the Age of the Enlightenment, embodies the historical “… paradigm 
shift  from Religion  to  Science,  from a  divinely ordered  cosmos  to  a  Natural  order” 
(Keohane & Kuhling 2014). Classical deists of the time believed in God no longer as the 
transcendental Father that constrains human beings to follow his moral rules, but as a law 
of Nature, a transcendent reality which unfolds independently of human actions and can 
only be known via reason and the correct observation of nature (Keohane & Kuhling 
2014).
From  Smith  until  today,  all  the  ‘apostles  and  priests’22 of  the  market-God 
theology conceived the market as a strictly natural reality above and beyond the artificial, 
lower fictions of this world; a factual order to which all humanity should humbly and 
fearlessly  surrender,  never  trying  to  oppose  or  command  this  order  with  laws  and 
institutions, interfering with the ‘natural’ health of things.
The  supposedly  natural,  self-regulating  character  of  neo-liberalism  is,  for 
instance, explicitly declared by Milton Friedman, “the grand guru of the movement for 
unfettered  capitalism”  (Klein  2001,  p.  4).  In  his  words:  “Positive  economics  is  in 
principle  independent  of  any  particular  ethical  position  or  normative  judgment” 
(Friedman 1984, p. 211).
 Frank Knight, one of the founders of Chicago School economics, advocated the 
idea that each economic theory of the school is "… a sacred feature of the system not a 
debatable hypothesis”. For economic forces, he suggests, self-equilibrate like all natural 
22  The terms are not only metaphorical. For instance, the Chicago School’s economist 
Arnold Harberger described himself as a “seriously dedicated missionary” (Klein 2001, p. 
61) while Alan Greenspan, once chairman of the U.S Federal Reserve admitted, after the 
recent 2008 economic depression,  to be into “… a state of shocked disbelief”(Sandel 
2012, p. 12).
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forces: “… supply communicating with demand the way the moon pulls the tides” (Klein 
2001, p. 50).
The  new  Providence,  therefore,  does  not  rule  by  moral  commandments  but 
through purely immanent laws to be followed, natural laws not contingent on beliefs, 
customs or  traditions  but  established instead  by the understanding and application of 
‘things  as  they  are’.  That’s  a  Providence  of  the  ‘fundamental’,  ruled  by  ‘absolutely 
natural’, undisputable laws, purportedly independent of any ‘transcendentals’.
The  moment  in  which  German  transcendentalism  –  even  in  its  more  recent 
versions of Neokantianism or the Harbermasian perspectives - loses force and leaves way 
to English liberalism in its contemporary,  ultraliberal form, can be dated on the 1980 
decade. The ‘feat’ was historically epitomized in Reagan’s and Thatcher’s instauration of 
deregulated  economic  liberty,  firing  a  ‘great  shot’  over  the  social  pact  between 
individuals (Dufour 2012). Thatcher’s widely famous statement - “There is no such a 
thing as society” – epitomizes the shift.
As Rose notes, in this period, “… neo-liberalism took as its target not just an 
economy but society itself.  All kinds of practices - health, security, welfare and more 
were to be restructured according to a particular image of the economic - the market” 
(Rose 1999, p. 146).
Increasingly, market and market-like practices are thus extending their reach to 
almost every sphere of life. And while modernity created some resistance to it through 
coexistent,  concurrent  ideals  and  “the  effort  to  make  commodities  transcend  itself” 
(Jameson  1991,  x),  the  contemporary  epoch  witnesses  an  immense  dilatation  of  the 
commodity sphere wherein in Jameson’s words, “culture has become a product in its own 
right” (1991, x) so that the money-God can reign supreme.
The order of meaning has traced therefore a full cycle: those prior times when a 
transcendent realm was the sole and supreme sphere to which everything should return as 
to securely find meaning (far above all the mundane decisions of these ‘fallible’, ‘errand’ 
and ‘sinful’ human beings) are now, in new guises, back with us.
What  is  to  become  of  modern  society,  Weber  asks  at  the  conclusion  of  The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, “When the last ton of fossilized coal is 
burnt?” One possibility he suggests is a ‘great rebirth of religion’, so that, perhaps, “at the 
end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise” (2008, p. 124). So 
far, we find his prediction realized in the religion of money as God, proclaimed by the 
‘new prophets’ of market fundamentalism as political-economic theology.
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The  ‘religious  resurrection’  would  probably  not  surprise  Durkheim  either 
(Keohane  &  Kuhling  2014).  In  reality,  he  is  well  known  for  having  asserted  the 
anthropological nature of religion and its consequent perpetuation in different forms. The 
religious nature of man,  Durkheim says,  “… is an essential  and permanent aspect of 
humanity” (1976, p. 3).  Similarly, Carl Schmitt (1986) claims that if God can be done 
away with as “the ultimate, absolute authority”, his structural position remains embodied 
in new worldly factors, upon which order and meaning can be restored.  More recently, 
Dufour reinforces the idea. In his suggestive words: “God is, in effect, a phoenix that 
does not cease to reborn from its ashes under different avatars" (2009, p. 85, my transl.).
In present conditions, for sure, there is no longer space for the ‘religious God’ as 
the ‘city’s ruler’, nor to the modern ambition to eliminate all obscurity from the ‘natural’ 
and ‘human’ worlds. The ‘religion of the money-God’ is born exactly when the subject 
finds himself free from all submission to previous metaphysical authorities, collective 
enunciators, ‘Fathers’ that once legitimated history.  
Nevertheless, He acts not only by taking advantage of the historical upheaval of 
traditional values and ideals. Reinforcing the theological analogy, the new divinity is (to a 
certain extent at least) a Creator. Fundamentally, the Money-God’s creation is forged by 
actively repressing forms/values/ideals (even if it is accomplished through endogenising 
critical values as we have seen above) whilst also imposing a new set of imperatives.
Money’s psychological similarity to ‘divinity’ was long ago detected by Simmel. 
For  insofar  as  the  “…essence  of  the  notion  of  God  is  that  all  diversities  and 
contradictions of the world achieve a unity in him”, he argues, likewise, money is also the 
center in which the most opposed find their common denominator. In sum, having the 
peculiar strength of an abstract but concrete reality not able to dissolve into something 
relative, money provides “… an elevated position beyond the particular and a confidence 
in its omnipotence” which is perfectly suitable to the role of an “Absolute” (2005, pp. 
237-238).  In  addition  to  this,  money  lends  people  “…  such  a  measure  of  unified 
combination of interests, of abstract heights, of sovereignty over the details of life that it  
reduces the need to search for such satisfactions in religion” (2005, p. 238).
But the psychological affinity of money with God does not mean that when it 
becomes one, humanity lives in the same old ways as it did when ‘the transcendent’ was 
at the center of social life (either in its religious or secular forms). In reality, when it 
moves away from its role as a simple “bearer of values” to grow as an independent value 
and an end per se, money reveals a very specific kind of ‘potency’.
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If  the  religion  of  ‘monotheistic  theologies’ existed  by  way  of  a  number  of 
‘absolute ends’ – the ‘laws’ determined by God – money has no end of its own. Still, 
money  is  certainly  more  ‘absolute’  than  the  power  established  by  the  multiple 
‘transcendentals’ of  modernity,  Dufour  suggests  (2008).  In  modern  times,  he  notes, 
individuals  were  ‘invited’  to  submit  to  multiple  and  sometimes  contradictory 
‘transcendental laws’ and, simultaneously, encouraged to disobey these laws by virtue of 
their  own  individual  ‘critical  rationality  (Dufour  2009)’.  In  contrast,  the  logic  of 
commodities  (or  what  I  am calling  here  the  money-God),  admits  no  multiplicity  or 
critique: as an end, it liquidates all ends and reduces them to means.
The free market, a kind of ‘sanctuary’ for the money-God is, as Dufour remarks, 
“… more powerful than all the other Subjects, and they have to bow before it one after  
the  other.  Globalization  implies  the  disappearance  or  relativization  of  nation  states, 
republics and kingdoms and all their so-called universal laws, which suddenly look very 
specific to them” (Dufour 2008, p. 60).
In the Kantian “kingdom of ends”, wherein “everything has either a price or a 
dignity” (Kant 1964, p. 434) money, a means par excellence, has no dignity. Its kingdom 
is that of means, of quantities, of the interchangeability of things, a kingdom of objective 
and traceless connections, whereby nothing is specific and everything can be replaced for 
its numeric equivalent23.
In Simmel’s  words: if  money is  “… accepted as the only principle  of reality, 
reality  is  submitted  to  broadly  the  same  process  that  the  reduction  to  money  value 
exercises on the objects of our practical interest” (Simmel 2005, p. 274). That is, in a 
nutshell,  the destruction of all intrinsic specificity of objects and experiences. For the 
growing importance of money, he notes, depends exactly on “… it being cleansed of 
everything that is not merely a means, because its clash with the specific characteristics 
of objects is thereby eliminated” (Simmel 2005, p. 232).
The cleansing of everything that is not merely a means such as cultural forms, 
ends  and  ideals  so  that  everything  can  be  exchanged  and  replaced  by  a  calculated 
equivalent, is therefore a condition of the modern money economy - “the economy of 
23 Referring to the Kantian idea, Keohane remarks that some things have both price and 
dignity.  The  author  gives  the  example  of  houses,  “… whereby subjective  culture  is 
developed  and  institutionalized  …  as  the  end  in  an  otherwise  endless  sequence  of 
purposes  that  money can serve” (Keohane 2013,  p.  66).  In Simmelian terms,  objects 
acquired by money may sometimes represent resistance and meaningful limits to the flow 
of life, while it’s money per se that suffers from the predicament of being an intrinsically 
valueless means.
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means in the strictest sense” (Simmel 2005, p. 379). Hence, the weakening of ‘dignity’ is 
the natural implication of the deregulated ascendancy of money as an absolute.
Dufour is therefore touching on a fundamental aspect, theoretically anticipated by 
Simmel, and now fully realized, when he declares: “… commodities exchanges are, in a 
word, beginning to desymbolize the world” (2008, p. 4).
By that,  Dufour means that when the logic of commodities takes the lead,  all 
exchanges  that  have  survived  as  a  reference  to  traditional,  ethical,  transcendent  or 
transcendental  –  are  not  to  stand in  the way.  He writes:  “… neo-liberalism certainly 
targets  collective agencies (the family,  trade unions,  political  forms,  nation-states  and 
more generally, culture insofar as it is a site for generational transmission and collective 
representations) because they might hinder the free circulation of commodities” (Dufour 
2008, p. 92).
The values underpinning collective agencies,  usually tied to specific  ends and 
existing within determined symbolic  boundaries  may possibly constitute an unwanted 
resistance, either critical or political, to the free flow of money.
Etymologically,  the  word  ‘symbol’  comes  from  Greek  symbolon “token, 
watchword, sign by which one infers; ticket, a permit, license” (Harper n.d), embedded in 
the  general  understanding  of  symbol  as  ‘something  that  represents  or  stands  for 
something else’.
Money is  a  symbolic phenomenon, possessing no value of its  own beyond its 
worth as means, a thing that is able to ‘stand for’ concrete and varied purposes which are 
external  to  itself  (Simmel  2005,  p.  260).  However,  by  becoming  forcibly  an  end,  it 
reveals itself as it is: nothing but a pure immanence, formless and fully emptied of all  
symbolic contents - money is the symbol that is, so to speak, ‘only money’.
In contemporary social practices, we are not short of concrete situations wherein 
moral,  civic,  aesthetical,  political,  scientific,  religious  forms,  as  well  as  the  intrinsic, 
concrete quality of people, things and thoughts are, in an increasingly naturalized way, 
either negated or ‘sold’ for the advantage of asymbolic money principles.
Indeed, it is not hard to find contemporary examples of the increasing capacity of 
the  money-God to  drain  the  worth  of  symbolic  goods.  Michael  Sandel,  in  his  What 
Money  Can’t  Buy:  the  Moral  Limits  of  Markets (2003),  provides  us  with  some.  For 
instance, he describes the extension of the marketing device of ‘rebranding’ to what was 
once the ‘sacred domain’ of national identity when Tony Blair’s government decided to 
“rebrand Britain as one of the world’s pioneers rather than one of its museums”; the same 
principle incarnates, he notes, on the British Travel Authority’s choice of a new slogan to 
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represent the country,  which shifts  from “Rule Britannia” (alluding to the historically 
recognizable British identity) to “Cool Britannia” (Sandel 1998, p. 92), erasing all group-
specificity and celebrating instead the generalized, ‘rational’ marketing motifs working 
upon individuals’ desires.
In the United States, Sandel points out the strategy adopted by various districts 
across the country of paying students a certain amount of money as a means to improve 
test scores, attendance and behavior (Sandel 2013, p. 51), which means that the logic of 
incentives, characteristic of ‘business discourses’, is imposed over and above Pedagogy 
and the meaning of knowledge.
Also in  America,  one  finds  the introduction  of  ‘pop culture  stamps’ replacing 
historically  relevant  national  figures  usually  honored  in  stamps  by  cartoons/films 
characters or other (commercially advantageous) pop culture images (Sandel 1998, p. 
92). There is also the increasingly common practice (even outside the U.S) of imposing 
an economic approach to gift giving when shops sell ‘gift cards’ worth a certain amount 
of money in order to avoid the [economic] ‘value-destroying loss” of a gift one may not 
like, surpassing concerns with values such as thoughtfulness and attentiveness inherent to 
traditional gift giving practices (Sandel 2013, p. 104).
In  the  realm of  academy,  the  logic  of  the  money-God  incarnates  in  the  new 
‘managerial  paradigm’ devoted  to  the  pursuit  of  a  very specific  form of  ‘excellence’ 
(Readings 1996). The new paradigm has been replacing ideals of culture,  particularly 
national culture and also the intrinsic worth of knowledge. However, Readings (1996) 
points out that what is at stake is not the replacement of the previous grand narrative of  
nation-state (or ‘reason’) by the ‘grand narrative of excellence’, but the end of all grand 
traditions whilst universities tend to turn into transnational corporations.
Thus, the discourse of excellence has, according to the author, any meaningful 
reference to the quality of intellectual work / thought, being more akin to the quantifiable 
technical and bureaucratic standards of the cost-accountant. Standards based on ideas of 
efficacy and success in the application of means to achieve determined ends, measured by 
criteria such as margins of profit, number of prizes, quantity of publications and general 
performativity.  Within  this  context,  professionals  are  being  assessed  by  volume  of 
productivity and social visibility, all converted into marketing and cash value.
To this list,  I would add what I think to be perhaps one of the most everyday 
instances through which a symbolic impoverishment pervades our lives: television and 
advertisements in its widely known subservience to numbers through the law of either 
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‘audience’ or ‘marketing research indicators’ surpassing, if needed, any aesthetical and 
moral concerns.
Since everything can be sold and bought – values, justice, beauty, knowledge – 
the  absolute  character  of  the  money-God seems clear:  it  works  by undoing all  other 
‘competing authorities’ on the way, even the most meaningful ones.
In  addition  to  ‘draining’ the  dignity  of  objects  and  experiences,  the  value  of 
objects  has  been increasingly decided  solely by its  price.  This  happens  in  a  cultural 
context in which the intrinsic worth of objects to which money is indifferent to - in its 
cultural, aesthetical, moral worth – becomes blurred. In this regard, Dufour mentions the 
common mindset between contemporary artists according to which it is impossible to 
distinguish art from “shit” provided that the “deject” is sold for a good price (Dufour 
2013, p. 31).
The ability to distinguish between one and another work of art depends on the 
existence of certain symbolic markers – what is good, what is bad; what is real, what is  
false; what is art, what is not– and also, Dufour notes, it depends on a hierarchy of value 
(Dufour 2010). But in a context wherein, as discussed earlier, hierarchies and any kind of 
order are seen – against Mary Douglas’ sensitivity - as excesses of power and in its limits, 
a  harbinger  of  totalitarianism, qualitative distinctions  are  seriously challenged.  In the 
empty space of meaning – when, as Jameson (1991) pointed out, there is no hermeneutic 
relationship to be possibly established with typical cultural products of the ‘postmodern 
era’ supported solely in their ‘actual image’ -  personal visibility (the capacity of each 
artist to sell himself as a brand) and “price” advance as the Supreme allocators of worth.24
In the “comedy of subversion” (Dufour 2009, p.  244,  my transl.)  that became 
contemporary art (in which things like the artist’s shit and recently used preservatives are 
24 An eminent example of this phenomenon is Damian Hirst’s “For the Love of God” - a 
platinum skull  covered  with  8,601 diamonds.  The piece  animated  the  public for  any 
reason more significant than its price tag: 50 million pounds, the most expensive piece of 
contemporary art  ever created.  The idea of ‘money’ and ‘the creation of oneself  as a 
brand’ as the assigners of worth seems to be further revealed by speculations that the 
artist fabricated the news that the skull was sold by such a high price as an elaborate 
strategy to attract publicity and increase the value of all his works.  Eugenio Merino’s 
controversial  Damien  Hirst  sculpture  called  “4  the  love  of  Go(l)d”  reinforces  this 
interpretation. The sculpture shows a figure of Hirst (wearing a t-shirt emblazoned with 
the sparkling skull sculpture) shooting himself in the head ‘in the name of money’. This 
interpretation is given by Merino himself (a self-declared admirer of Hirst). He speaks to 
The Guardian newspaper:  "I thought that, given that he thinks so much about money, his 
next work could be that he shot himself. Like that the value of his work would increase 
dramatically… obviously, though, he would not be around to enjoy it."
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to be considered as art  as long as the artist  declares it  to be an oeuvre of art),25 the 
shocking, the trivial, the amusing, don’t destroy previous structures of meaning in order 
to  invite  individuals  to  occupy  another,  more  sensitive,  inspired  or  critical  place. 
Subversion  becomes,  rather,  a  banal  ‘comedy’ when there  is  neither  any meaning to 
subvert, nor any meaning to be ‘found’.
The downfall of all transcendental values (cultural forms) entails the decline of 
meaning  and,  in  its  place,  the  ascent  of  ‘the  egos’.  This  typically  incarnates  in 
contemporary art  wherein all  that  stands is  the artist’s  (and the audience’s)  ‘right’ to 
express or see whatever they want, whilst the oeuvre vanishes as something that ‘hides’ a 
meaning  which  “looks  at  /  speaks  to  the  individual”,  summoning  him to  go  beyond 
himself (Dufour 2009, p. 243). In Simmel’s words: "Life, anxious only to express itself, 
has, as it were, jealously withheld ... meaning from its product" (Simmel 1971b, p. 230).
In  a  world  wherein  transcendental  principles,  beliefs  and  forms  are  under 
suspicion, money has the advantage of not asking people for any kind of ‘leap of faith’.  
The new God is purportedly here to be seen and capable of being verified by anyone 
without further sacrifice or irrational devotion. For instance: why the national identity of 
Britain should be preserved in campaigns disseminating its image if the  fact is that the 
nation would prosper through a more attractive market-based image of itself? Against 
facts, the worth of memories, collective identity and roots, already weak in the social 
imaginary,  are  nothing  but  irrational  devotions  and  conditionings  to  be  overcome. 
Likewise, to argue that paying money for students may pervert (even further) the intrinsic 
worth of learning and behaving well, has no force at all if calculus and statistics indicate 
simply that ‘it works’!”.  
Henceforth, the biblical exhortation ‘those who have eyes to see and ears to hear’ 
still applies to the new market-oriented doctrine, but it is no longer a metaphor for the 
capacity to see and hear the invisible, undetermined reality of spiritual truths. It applies 
instead as the crude affirmation of ‘facts’ - divorced from either religious beliefs or the 
Kantian  lucidity  and,  also,  from  societal  ideals  that  generate  moral,  aesthetic  and 
ideological sacred boundaries.
Yet, the money-rationality expands not only to objects that can be sold for money 
in the market. The discipline of economics is turning more abstract and its projects more 
ambitious, being described by some economists as a science of human behavior.
One of the forerunners of this changing discourse of economics is the economist 
Gary  Becker  who,  in  his  book  The  Economic  Approach  to  Human Behavior (1976) 
25 The egotistic definition of art  in a formless world is, of course, epitomized by the 
famous declaration attributed to Duchamp “If I say it’s a work of art, it’s a work of art”.
159
advocates  a  rational  determinant  for  behaviors  against  any  “… reluctance  to  submit 
certain kinds of human behavior to the ‘frigid’ calculus of economics” (Becker 1976, 
cited in Sandel 2013, pp. 48-49).
Clearly, ‘rationality’ as described by ‘rational choice theory’ of which Becker was 
one of the earliest proponents, means that a rational action is one in which the individual 
act as if  balancing costs against benefits to arrive at an action that maximizes personal 
advantage. That being so, those who resist the economic approach to behavior, writes 
Becker, understands behavior as “… ignorance and irrationality, values and their frequent 
unexplained shifts,  custom and tradition,  the  compliance somehow induced by social 
norms” (Becker 1976, cited in in Sandel 2013, p. 51).
In  a  culture  wherein  money  is  at  the  center  of  societies’ organization,  the 
generalization of this economic approach to behavior is, in Simmel’s rationale, expected. 
For money is associated with  the intellectualization of experience, a tendency to orient 
action on the basis of cognitive rather than normative or social expectations (Poggi 1993).
As discussed earlier, in the contemporary calculative world, customs, traditions, 
social ideals and norms - in a word, culture – tend to be seen not only as irrationalities 
but, even further, as synonyms of barbarism.
Isaiah  Berlin  (1988,  2002)  elaborates  on  the  issue.  Berlin  was  worried  with 
conditions in which the universalizing status of an ideal may justify all kinds of actions, 
including violence, in order to fulfil it. Now, this is not the same as negating the worth of  
ideals and values  per se. Berlin’s point was, rather, to inquire on the  nature of human 
values and ideals, which, he argues, does not afford exclusive, final solutions which deny 
moral  conflict,  disagreement  and  dilemma  (Hardy  2000).  His  essential  (and,  in  my 
opinion, rightful) claim was, thus, that ‘monist utopianisms’ – based on the notion of a 
‘perfect  state’ or  ultimate  harmony’ as  the  proper  goal  of  our  endeavors  –  is  both 
mistaken (since it denies the ‘unfinished character’ of human life) and dangerous (for if 
an idea is taken as a ‘universal truth’ or a ‘ultimate end’, any sacrifices for the sake of its 
realization may be felt as justified).
The  problem with  this  kind  of  criticism is,  of  course,  the  potential  it  has  to 
degrade into an equally totalizing rejection of social  order (with its ideals,  limits and 
constraints), inducing neo-liberal deregulation.
Indeed, the idea widely promoted by economists after the end of the Cold War – 
in a kind of over-simplification of Berlin’s ideas - was that ideals are dangerous things 
always leading to disaster. After so many historical examples of the potential blindness of 
ideals – the corruption of Marxist ideals and its degradation into the Stalinist terror being 
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usually in the neo-liberal spotlight – concerns with the ‘common good’ should leave way, 
so the argument goes, to the sole reason to be pursued: the removal of constraints for 
individual liberty.  Individuals would thus be the sole Gods of their  own private lives 
determined by “negative freedom”, that is, a freedom of absences: of laws, constraints or 
interference from others (Curtis 2007).
A kind of consecration of absences is thus defended by the adherents of ‘negative 
freedom’ under the premises that when the ‘freedom from’ is replaced by ‘the freedom to’ 
live a determined form of life (prescribed by ideals) brutal tyranny will follow.
But if this liberty of absences, of constraints, of ideals and ends leaves us closer to 
God-like powers, it also makes us less distinct from animals. God-like powers are the 
clear effect of negative freedom in which in the absence of any resistance, infinite options 
are available. But if we are to stay under a state of negative liberty for too long, we may 
end up, as animals, ‘liberated’ from endowing life with meaning and purpose (Marques 
2011, p. 76), liberated, in Simmel’s words, from “… that life-content, that inner bond, 
amalgamation and devotion” which ‘though it restricts the personality, none the less gives 
support and content to it” (Simmel 2005, p. 406).
Marquis de Sade – according to Dufour, the intellectual who most perfectly (in a 
shockingly  plainspoken  manner)  deducted  all  the  logical  consequences  of  the  liberal 
standpoint (Dufour 2013, p. 173) – paints the picture of a world based on the principle of 
men and animals’ equalization. In his novels, the pleasure principle exults in its excesses 
unrestrained by ethics, religion or any idea of a social pact.
 It is not a lawless world, however. Now it is Nature that subordinates individuals 
as  “the  blind  instruments  of  her  inspirations”.  In  the  meanwhile,  individuals  are  not 
merely licensed but summoned (or even obliged) to transgress all limits: “… were she to 
order us to set fire to the universe, the only crime possible would be in resisting her” (de 
Sade 1990, p. 138).
But  by delivering themselves to  all  impulses  – and to  the unlimited,  negative 
freedom that money as a God implies, which is a freedom without an end – individuals  
may find themselves not simply enjoying the liberty to choose. Rather, if by overcoming 
collective  binding  rules  and  fully  yielding  to  our  animality  we  may  feel  free  and 
unfettered, it  also evokes the suffering brought about the contingency of an existence 
wherein everything is possible and everything could be different (Szakolczai 2009).
Kehl  (2009a)  analyzes  the impacts  of  the  current  imperatives  of  pleasure and 
enjoyment  over  the  individual's  psyche,  proposing  an  inversion  of  the  typical 
understanding of the relationship between depression and inhibition. She argues that the 
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idea  that  depression  is  the  single  explanation  of  inhibition  (and social  isolation)  that 
marks depressive experiences is inaccurate or, at least, incomplete. In her view, first the 
individual  detaches  himself  (from the  world)  and then  he/she  gets  depressed (2009a, 
p.194). The world from which the individual retracts, she notes, is one in which pleasure 
becomes as accessible as obligatory, more on the terms of compulsion than on the terms 
of desire. Thus, the inhibition and social isolation that underpins depressive experiences 
are,  often,  healing  attempts  (even  if  ill-succeeded)  from the  part  of  subjects.  Kehl’s 
argument, in short, is that when the depressed retracts from the world to isolate himself in 
his own confined subjective terror, he is somehow questioning (without knowing that) the 
mandates of continuous (but hollow) enjoyment, performance, and consumerism.
The argument is not intuitive. To say that pleasure is what underpins depression 
(by definition marked by absence of pleasure) is against common sense, especially in a 
world wherein we learn that all one needs to be ‘happy’ is freedom to do those things that 
give him/her pleasure. In that line of reasoning, if you are free to enjoy and to do what 
you want, you have no reasons whatsoever to be depressed. Depressives, themselves - at 
conscious  levels  at  least  -  also buy the  idea.  That's  why they frequently reveal  their 
puzzlement and sometimes their guilty for being so deeply sad when (purportedly) they 
could enjoy all the pleasures of life.
Andrew Solomon, for instance, in the pinnacle of his depressive pain - when he 
could barely eat, walk, take a bath or sleep - tells his father: “I used to work twelve hours  
and then go to four parties in an evening some days. What happened?”.
In a world where the supreme law is to self-develop, succeed and to enjoy, the 
idea  that  a  highly  performing  individual   may suffer  from depression  sounds  like  a 
contradiction,  opening  the  way  for  views  of  the  problem  as  a  purely  chemical 
phenomenon that steals the individual from a otherwise wonderful life.
What this view fails to consider is that the liberty to choose everything and the 
intensities of limitless enjoyment without any boundaries / limits on sight can turn itself 
into a heavy load of which one may attempt to be relieved.
In  Simmel’s  words:  “… this  freedom may be  compared  with  the  fate  of  the 
insecure person who has forsworn his Gods and whose newly acquired ‘freedom’ only 
provides the opportunity for making an idol out of any fleeting value” (Simmel 2005, p. 
405).
The  problem  gains  empirical  substance  through  the  story  of  one  of  Kehl’s 
patients. D. is a young man divided between the hyperactivity of the raves – when he 
would switch from anti-depressive medication to ecstasy – and the reclusiveness of his 
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room. Kehl  (2009a)  points  out  that  even  though  the  only  form of  leisure  that  was 
appealing for D. was the excitement of the raves, it wouldn’t produce any experience to 
be later reported (and made public) in the analytical sessions. Rather,  what he would 
report was a sensation of emptiness that followed each explosion of pleasure, she writes, 
the “… very opposite of the pure intensity without fantasy experienced during a night or 
two” (Kehl 2009a, p. 105). Thus, putting aside these moments of extreme excitement, 
depression would incarnate in the questions that D. frequently posed to his analyst: “ I 
can do this or that… but for what?” (Kehl 2009a, p. 105).
These questions suggest that despite his ‘marathons of pleasure’ something was 
missing in D’s life: reasons for action. In itself, pleasure and excitement do not generate 
experience (in the Benjamin’s sense) things to be said, to be made public, transmitted to 
others, nor it provide reasons to act. Even desire is not an implicit of pleasure, since – as 
Brinkmann (2004)  claims  –  we desire  things  not  merely because  we like  it  (or  find 
pleasure in it), but because they are desirable, which may only be determined in reference 
to values and qualified discrimination of ‘things that matter’.  
Now, an action or project can only be experienced as ‘desirable’, still according to 
Brinkmann (2004), within a ‘moral ecology’ that determines the worth of things.
The  problem  is  that,  as  Khel  (2009a)  notes,  in  a  social  imaginary  wherein 
individuals should be sovereign of themselves and wherein enjoyment is supreme, D. 
could find few references upon which to create fantasies able to represent a future to be 
desired and a life to be constructed. That’s exactly the point wherein all the excitement 
seemed to shift, in his experience, into inhibition and then, depression.
Interesting  is  to  see  that  the  purported  sovereignty  of  a  “pure  individual” 
independent from any reasons for life outside pleasure and satisfaction, that is, outside 
himself, tends to boil down to new dependence because of the fact – long ago illuminated 
by Durkheim - that this entity ‘without historical antecedents, without a social milieu’ 
does  not  exist,  unless  as  an  abstraction:  the  ideal  individual  of  neo-liberalism.  As 
Durkheim puts it:
The actual man has nothing in common with this abstract entity. He partakes of an 
age and a country; he has ideas and feelings which come not from himself but 
from those around him; he has prejudices and beliefs; he is subject to rules of 
action  which  he  did  not  make  but  which  he  nevertheless  respects.  He  has 
aspirations  of  all  sorts  and  many  concerns  other  than  keeping  his  budget 
economically (1973, p. 38)
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Indeed,  despite  of  this  abstract,  discursive  autonomy,  obligations  and  ‘idols’ 
abound in real life, in the guise of both ‘normative autonomy’ - the obligation to choose 
and master all aspects of one’s life - and in the ‘feast’ of enjoyment and consumption 
(with brands becoming the new symbolic markers).
Thus,  whereas  the  ‘cosmic  axis’ of  the  Australian  Alchipa  tribe  – founding a 
world centered on the divine – is now disenchanted, the Money-god becomes in many 
senses the new ‘sacred pole’ of contemporary societies. But the direction to which the 
‘sacred  pole  of  money’ continuously  bends  does  not  lead,  going  back  to  Eliade’s 
definition, to “… the passage from the virtual and the amorphous to that which has form” 
(Eliade 1987, p. 55). Rather, as we’ve seen, it opens the way to homogeneity (where there 
is no qualitative but only numeric discrimination between things) and relativity (where 
everything and anything can be, provided that the calculus is correct and consequences 
realized in a pragmatic way).
In other words, in a world where the money-God rules, the profanation of the 
sacred increases - for money transforms into means all sacred ideals that would clash 
with  its  fundamental  requirements  of  impersonality,  transience,  instrumentality, 
abstractness  and  potentiality  -  while  the  profane  plane  of  numbers,  calculus  and 
pragmatic rationality is sacralized.
That’s a tremendous appeal, and one with a clear religious character: to abandon 
or  surpass  the  inherent  ambiguity  of  human  reason  and  commands,  in  order  to  live 
instead in the ‘heavens of certainty’ provided we follow the Law (of economics).  As 
Latour (2014, p. 10) puts it: “How to resist the transcendence of capitalism parading as 
immanence?”.
However, despite the illusions of liberation that this ‘immanence parade’ might 
induce, the new political-economic theology of money subtly but powerfully exerts the 
same determining role over our fate: ‘the direction towards which it bends’ commands - 
without space for human critique or doubt, since it’s a neutral Law who’s ‘commanding’ - 
the route which societies should take. The new Law commands unconstrained economic 
growth as the supreme uncontestable rule, whilst any critical force which throws doubt or 
attempts to hamper it from the vantage point of a different set of values is treated as 
heretical.
Hence, if once we suffered, on the cultural realm, under the oppressive force of 
traditional  prejudices  and by the modern affirmation of ‘hyper-absolutes’ and,  on the 
organizational plane, under the chains of bureaucratic systems, we now suffer not only 
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from  the  “tyranny  of  choice”  (Salecl  2011)  but  from  an  excessive  sacralization  of 
immanence.
As  faithful  devotees  of  the  political-economic  theology  of  market 
fundamentalism, Western contemporary people increasingly incorporate the instrumental 
rationality  of  the  market  as  their  own.  But  instrumental  rationality  traps  individuals 
within the narrowness of its pragmatic mindset and thus, ‘reason’ is  converted into a 
disengaged,  acritical  and desymbolized  tool,  disregarding the  fundamental  domain  of 
human satisfactions arising from bonds with things ‘greater than ourselves’ as Durkheim 
so many times stressed.
In the ‘new faith’ all that should stand is the “I” – it is not coincidental that there  
is rarely a single advert that does not repeat the chorus: “I can”; “I deserve”; “I choose”; 
“I do”; “I achieve”. For sure, this may sound as good news, but only as long as we do not  
look closer to what is behind the cheerful façade of the all-powerful individual. If we do, 
a much more confuse and ambiguous universe is revealed. One in which individuals are 
continuously invited / seduced to forge a sovereign existence which, in reality, is belied 
by strongly gregarious behavior obedient to the commodities’ flows. In the meanwhile, 
the  human  gifts  of  critical  thinking  and  of  cultural  rootedness  become  increasingly 
deficient.
In  a  world losing faith  in  ideals  other  than  the utilitarian  and ‘egoistic’ ones, 
individuals may end up as ‘released’ as emptied of the ‘devotion to something’ which is 
what gives meaning to a purely individual action without properties. As we’ve seen in the 
experience  of  D.  analyzed  above,  that’s  a  societal  universe  wherein,  despite  all  the 
potentiality  of  the  ‘I’,  actions  may  lose  meaning,  calling  forth  the  expansion  of 
depression.
In sum, when the calculative, mathematical rationality of money reaches spheres 
of  life  traditionally  governed  by  nonmarket  norms,  divorcing  them  from  symbolic 
meanings  they  formerly  held  (supposedly  “irrational”  values  and  ideals  which 
nonetheless make life feel richer and purposeful); when we are “released” but have no 
symbolic pointers to guide us for what we want to do with this liberation; when egoism, 
self-interest  and  ‘self-expression’ are  erected  as  rules  as  if  individual  action  were 
unconcerned  with  social  ties  and  objective  values,  we  may  fundamentally  lack,  as 
Stiegler puts it, “…the goals and motives without which the human being is little more 
than  an  algorithmic  machine,  that  is,  a  system  of  comparisons  reduced  to  a  set  of 
calculations without a point (sans object)” (2013, p. 5). Meaninglessness ensues.
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8.4 - Concluding remarks
To conclude the section, I would like to untangle an apparent contradiction that 
these reflections might imply. To bring it into the form of a question: how is it possible,  
without falling into an irreconcilable paradox, to say that there is still a collective order of 
meaning (a transcendence, under the form of the new religion of money as a God, its laws 
and commandments, exhortations and sanctions) and yet, maintain that this new order 
fosters meaninglessness?
This could sound as the same as to defend the somewhat awkward claim that the 
money-God is a new form of symbolization which, in turn, fosters desymbolization. But 
as much paradoxical and awkward as it might seem, that’s exactly the case: the political-
economic theology of money keeps a “close watch on authorized meanings” (Dufour 
2008, p. 156) defining norms which become collectively shared. However, these norms 
are of a type that fosters desymbolization / meaninglessness. This is so because when 
‘means’ are divinized, any values or cultural references which may can come between 
individuals and commodities are unwelcome (Dufour 2008). As a result, what is chiefly 
promoted is a self-referential individual living for nothing other than himself, a situation 
which, as claimed above, does not sustain meaning.
Thus, the new ‘symbolization’ of money brings about a new set of ‘values’, all of 
which  consistent  to  its  logics  and  detrimental  to  symbolization  and  meaningfulness. 
Among  them,  we  mentioned:  the  instrumentalization  of  life;  the  prevalence  of  a 
pragmatic  rationality  concerned  with  consequences  but  not  with  ‘reasons’;  the 
sacralization of formlessness (and limitlessness) and the promotion of ‘egoism’.
For the sake of clarity, I will finish by reiterating here, in a more schematic form, 
the ideas presented throughout the chapter, that allows the conclusion that it is not simply 
the historical absence of meanings per se, but the presence of a new transcendent order of 
meaning that we must define if  we want to understand and, hopefully,  deal with this 
widespread feeling of meaninglessness and the associated epidemic of depression.
First,  for the very fact  that ‘money’ is  a pure means (establishing no ends by 
itself), when societies sanctify it, what becomes sacred is ‘immanence’ while all ‘things 
that matter’ - embodied in principles, collectively shared values - are profaned and tend to 
be ‘sold’ by money.
Second, it does not create, keeping with Durkheim’s definition, sacred ideas with 
the capacity to grant meaning to life, that is, “…a sort of moral supremacy which raises it  
far above private aims” (1973, p. 51). On the contrary,  the new transcendence of the 
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money-God is founded exactly, as we have seen above, on the private individual, the one 
independent from all collective forms and public regulations unless those which protect 
his (negative) freedom.
Third,  an  ideology  of  pleasure  or  ‘the  obligation  to  enjoy’ (Dufour  2009)  is 
consecrated as the primary dogma of the neo-liberal theology. But while pleasure without 
self-restraint leaves individuals liberated from limits, it also leaves them lacking limits, 
suffering from freedom without structure, ends and purposes. Linked to it, since humans 
are, in reality, always constituted within a social milieu, the liberated pleasure-seeking 
individuals end up as “… free soldiers of forces they are unaware of” (Dufour 2009, p. 15 
my transl.).  
Fourth,  contradictory  as  it  might  seem at  first,  the  reign  of  pleasure  and  the 
flattering of human passions are joined, as we have mentioned, by the equally widespread 
belief and strict submission to the norms of performance and the associated imperative of 
action, according to which individual initiative is continuously required. The paradox is 
quickly unveiled if  one thinks of the ‘two arms’ of market  reasons:  productivity and 
consumption – both depending on different arrangements of initiative and the liberation 
of passions. But here, again, even though the contemporary ‘demand of self-realization’ 
becomes institutionalized in the form of laws constraining individuals from without, it is 
still founded upon egoistic aims (competitiveness, individual performance of the ‘pure 
individual’ etc.)  and thus  also leave individuals  disconnected from reasons for action 
beyond personal interests. In the context of the theology of the money-God, ‘authentic 
self-realization’ favors de-regulation and ‘negative freedom’.
Finally, if the new religion incorporates both Reason and Individualism as its new 
sacred totems, it is however in any way the case that either knowledge (as related to the 
capacity of reflection and the spirit of critique), or individuality (in the form of individual 
dignity and autonomy which don’t preclude membership to society) are today realized. 
Contrarily, the impersonal and unstoppable powers of the new tyrannical God provoke 
the constant decadence of both, feeding the cultivation of a vain individual life. That’s a 
life marked by a type of knowledge which is too narrow to become wisdom, and by the 
precarious individuality of a self-referential individual whose personal power ‘without 
object’ risks dissipating into meaninglessness.
In sum, the contemporary collective order of meaning - under the effects of the 
transcendence of the money-God – has been imposing a pragmatic, calculative, egoistic 
rationality which is spreading to the whole of society as a new social demand. However, 
such rationality and the norms it implies: e.g. the devotion to a pragmatic reason that 
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establishes what is ‘useful’ in each circumstance at hand rather than the devotion to any 
sacred principles of ethics, morality, beauty, criticism and so on; the values of limitless 
enjoyment and self-idolatry inherent to the ideal subject in market-based societies; and, 
finally,  the  ethics  of  authentic  self-realization  (capitalized  by market  reasons)  do not 
constitute narratives capable to signify life. That is, the human search for addressing the 
‘useless’ question of the meaning and purpose of existence – ‘What is it all for?’ - cannot 
find,  in  the  useful  pragmatics  of  the  ‘money  rationality’ any  meaningful  narratives 
beyond those based on instrumental reasons and the fundamentally deceptive affirmation 
of the ‘sovereign I’.
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Chapter  9:  Depression  and  meaninglessness  in  the  contemporary  culture  of  the 
money-God
More and more people in contemporary Western societies tend to feel, sometimes 
without knowing why and how to describe it,  that we are losing something; a vague 
sensation  (although  mostly illusory)  that  the  past  was  better  after  all,  and  life  more 
meaningful.  This  vague sensation of  the meaninglessness of life  may often lead to a 
degree of nostalgia for the past, or it can emerge in a continuous (and usually frustrated) 
search  for  communities  to  join  in  order  to  awaken  our  feelings  of  belonging  and 
sacredness. Still, it can incarnate in the individual body (in its psychological and physical 
levels)  through the painful, asymbolic suffering of depression in which ‘everything is 
bad, but nothing is wrong in particular’.
When desymbolization grows under the auspices of money as a God, it is small 
wonder that depression -  a mental suffering that cannot be symbolized (depression is 
sometimes experienced as standing for anything else, a suffering that just ‘is’, without 
any ‘point’) - emerges epidemically.
In this regard, I cannot fail to mention the work of the philosopher, sociologist and 
psychoanalyst  Julia  Kristeva.  In  her  Black  Sun,  Depression  and  Melancholia (1989) 
Kristeva elaborates on the Freudian theorization of melancholia, reconceptualizing what 
she terms the composite “melancholia-depression” as a linguistic malady whose primary 
symptom is chronic asymbolia or loss of speech and meaning (Kristeva 1989, p. 10).
Kristeva  acknowledges  but  yet  goes  beyond  the  Freudian  understanding  of 
depression as the concealed hatred of a lost love object, theorizing about a specific form 
of depression which she terms “narcissistic depression”. In the latter, individuals mourn 
not  the lost  object  but  an unnameable pre-object.  That  is  to  say,  the unsymbolizable 
sadness of narcissistic depression has, in Kristeva’s interpretation, old roots: an archaic, 
precocious  narcissistic  wound  leading  to  inadequate  integration  into  the  symbolic. 
Asymbolia, in Kristeva’s accounts, results from the individual’s failure to deal – at the 
first stages of her/his psychic development - with “…the sine qua non condition of our 
individuation: the matricide” (1989, p. 28).
Individuation relies on the negation of the symbiotic relation with the mother (the 
semiotic) – a domain of imaginary completeness where there is no experienced separation 
between individual and reality – as to ingress into the world of society, language and 
signs  (the symbolic).  But  this  is  exactly what  depressives  cannot  realize,  she claims. 
Instead, they “…disavow the negation: they cancel it out, suspend it, and nostalgically 
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fall  back on the real  object  (the Thing)  of their  loss,  which is  just  what they do not 
manage to lose, to which they remain painfully riveted” (Kristeva 1989, pp. 43-44).
On her experiences with depression, Elizabeth Wurtzel (1997, p. 7) writes: “… 
when I  am off drugs,  when my head is  clean and clear of this  clutter  of reason and 
rationality, what I am mostly thinking is: Why? Why take it like a man? Why be mature? 
Why accept adversity?”. After saying that, Elizabeth rationalizes her assertion and adds: 
“I don’t like to sound as a spoiled brat. I know that into every sunny life a little rain must 
fall and all that, but in my case, the crisis-level hysteria is an all-too-recurring theme.” 
(1997, p.7).  The passage is in great consonance with Kristeva’s argument. Despite being 
rationally aware that human life is inherently incomplete, Elizabeth faces difficulty or 
even refusal to abandon the delusive (and impossible) state of imagined completeness and 
to deal with the inescapable lack at the heart of human life.
The problem is  that the brightness of imagined completeness,  or in Kristeva’s 
terms, “the supreme good” of intense, archaic, unnameable affects is also, and at the same 
time, the darkness of silence and lack of representation. The Nervalian metaphor of the 
“black sun” is thus borrowed by Kristeva to designate depression as an intense affect 
which painfully escapes  conscious  articulation:  “… an insistence  without  presence,  a 
light without representation” (1989, p. 13) or yet, "… an abyssal suffering that does not 
succeed in signifying itself and, having lost meaning, loses life" (1989, p. 189).
Kristeva’s  ideas  are,  for  sure,  relatively  consistent  to  the  Lacanian  informed 
accounts of Dufour,  Lebrun and Žižek earlier  discussed: it’s the imposition of a Law 
(arising from the Name-of-the-Father, the Other, the Subject) that positively dissolves the 
child’s imaginary idea that he is one with his Mother and with the world and introduces 
him to the domain of language, culture and society.
As earlier discussed, from this point of view, the Law of the symbolic father can 
only be operative insofar as it finds room in the social realm: the Father’s discourse has to 
be rooted within the broader symbolic order of language and its collective enunciators in 
order to be effective.
Going back to Elizabeth’s Wurtzel’s experiences, we may think that in order to 
escape from the symbolic emptiness of delusive completeness, she needed the Law of the 
Father (even if it was to be found in the discourse of the Mother, as the representative of 
the symbolic order). However, her ‘real father’ was mostly absent, whereas social ideals 
and values - to which the ‘paternal function’ should refer – were (as Elizabeth herself 
describes) in a state of fragmentation and confusion.
170
Elizabeth was born a single child of a marriage that ended when she was only two 
years old. As a child, Elizabeth was a precocious and smart little girl who excelled at 
school and sports, who was stubborn and domineering, and who believed, as she states, 
that she could do anything that she wanted to (1997, p.34). But such a life impulse and 
self-assurance, she reports, would not last long.
On that, she writes: “It is hard for me to remember a life that was so cocksure, so 
free of self-doubt,  so pure in  its  certainty.  How did all  that life-force energy turn so 
completely into a death wish? How quickly it seemed that my well-developed superego 
managed to dissolve into buckets of free-flowing, messy id?” (1997, p, 36).
Elizabeth’s own reflections point towards insightful answers.
About the relationship she had with her mother, Elizabeth describes it as close and 
intense. She tells how she would, as a child, frequently switch roles with her mother, 
helping the latter to pick out boyfriends after the divorce, trying to control the mother’s 
smoking habits or encouraging her in moments of financial difficulties. Her father was 
mostly  absent,  even  when  he  was  with  the  daughter.  She  writes:  “In  all  my  early 
memories of him, he is sleeping, or just waking up, or about to go to sleep” (1997, p. 26). 
When he was awake and would talk with her, Elizabeth says, “… almost nothing my 
father told me ever really stuck because I was convinced that he was nuts himself” (1997, 
p. 28). In an interesting passage, Elizabeth reports that, when she was little, one of her 
favorite activities was to stand on her father’s feet as he held her for balance,  “quite 
literally walking in his footsteps” (1997, p . 32), she writes. She would also make her 
father leave his shoes outside her bedroom door so that she could be sure that the father 
was still there: “It was like I knew he was planning to disappear on me sometime” (p. 
32). In addition to this marginally involved ‘father figure’ represented by her ‘real father’, 
Elizabeth inherited from both of her parents what she herself describes as a fragmented 
symbolic heritage. In her words:
When I try to understand where I made a bad turn, how I stupidly meandered 
down the wrong road in the fork of life, I can’t shake the sense that being 
born smack in the middle of the Summer of Love (July 31, 1967), with the 
confluence of social revolutions from no-fault divorce to feminism to free 
love  to  Vietnam  –  and  their  eventual  displacement  by  punk  rock  and 
Reaganomics – all had something to do with it. I hate to think that personal 
development,  with  its  template  of  idiosyncrasies,  can  be  reduced  to 
explanations as simple as 'it was the times', but the sixties counterculture – 
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along with its alter ego, eighties greed – has imprinted itself all over me (p. 
20).
Following,  she  describes  how  her  parents  found  themselves  struck  between 
traditional beliefs and new sense that anything was possible, living marriages that they 
once deemed a necessity “…in a world that was suddenly saying: No necessities! No 
accidents! Drop everything!” (1997, p.  21).  Rather than taking advantage of the new 
(potential) freedom, she explains, a lot of frustration emerged, while she became, in her 
words, “… the battlefield on which all their ideological differences were fought” (1997, 
p. 23). For instance, she writes that her mother sent her “ … to the synagogue nursery 
school,  thinking this  would provide me with some sense of community and stability, 
while my dad, who turned up to see me about once a week, would talk to me about 
atheism, insisting I eat lobster, and ham, and other nonkosher foods that I thought were 
not allowed… This went on, back and forth, for years, until it was clear that all three of 
us  were  caught  mostly in  the  confusing  crossfire  of  changing  times,  and what  little 
foundation my parents could possibly give me was shattered and scattered by conflict” 
(1997, pp. 23-24).
What makes Elizabeth’s report so useful to the aim of finding empirical substance 
to the theoretical argument developed in this study is her capacity to understand how her 
personal drama - evolving up to the point wherein she became this ‘unhappy, nihilistic 
girl’ –  was  lived  within  collective  grounds marked by blurred  symbolic  foundations. 
Elizabeth could hardly be more specific when she writes: “I really believe that had either 
of them had any strong convictions or values to pass on to me, my worldview might have 
emerged as more sanguine than sanguinary” (1997, p. 24).
That’s  an insightful  metaphor.   Indeed,  the  fragility of  a  symbolic  heritage  in 
terms of  values  means that  individuals  are  thrown to their  own individual  intensities 
whereas the life-force drifts without those regulating symbolic mediators that would limit 
and  provide  it  with  content,  form  and  direction.   Individuals  living  a  formless, 
meaningless  life  are  not  sanguine  –  purposeful,  optimistic,  socially  involved.  Rather, 
lacking  meaning,  individual  life  can  be  as  sanguinary  as  death  (the  unrepresentable 
experience par excellence), a mere process towards dissolution.
In Elizabeth’s words: “… process, process, process – all for naught. Everything is 
plastic, we’re all going to die sooner or later, so what does it matter. That was my motto” 
(1997, p. 11).
Kristeva is exactly analyzing how periods of ‘meaning crisis’ impact individuals’ 
subjectivity and rebound in the experience of life as a meaningless process.  She writes: 
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“The periods that witness the downfall of political and religious idols, periods of crisis, 
are particularly favorable to black moods” (1989, p. 8) or still, “…  both religious and 
political, the crisis finds its radical rendering in the crisis of signification” (1989, p. 222).
The author is particularly concerned with how crises of signification emerge from 
the “…political and military Cataclysms” which “… are dreadful and challenge the mind 
through the monstrosity of their violence (that of a concentration camp or of an atomic 
bomb)” (1989, p. 223). For her, the monstrosity of the twentieth century’s destructive 
forces, especially in the Second World War, hollowed out the symbolic means through 
which any meaning could be attached to a conflict of such a magnitude. Having their 
systems of representation and perception incapacitated by the unnameable of tragedy, the 
only adequate answer to such an unnameable horror that blinds is silence.
The argument of this study is, alternatively, that beyond lived catastrophe and its 
perduring effects ruining vehicles of signification, the new faith of the Money-god has 
been  projecting  asymbolia  from  horror  to  banality.  That  is,  the  silence  before  the 
impossibility to  represent  tragedy – of  which  Kristeva  talks  – turns,  in  the  political-
economic  theology  of  neo-liberalism,  into  the  tragedy  of  the  ‘everyday  silence’ or 
‘disarticulation’  about  the  symbolic  worth  of  things  beyond  instrumentality,  ego-
glorification and pleasure gratification.
In the everyday silence of ultraliberal societies – which, I insist,  can never be 
complete, and that’s why it is still possible to have a meaningful life - signification is 
emptied by more subtle and apparently softer means. Its ‘emptying methodologies’ work 
incessantly and independently of crisis, not through shock, but through the naturalization 
of social asymbolia under the imposition of a new faith: the fundamentalism of money as 
God and its side effects: the promotion of continuous enjoyment and performance of the 
sovereign individual.
In other words,  if meaningless in the wake of catastrophe is the expectable but 
tragic  collective  condition  favorable  to  black  moods, the  subtle,  but  incessant 
disarticulation of the symbolic order as a sort of sine qua non principle of the circulation 
of  commodities,  constitutes,  beyond  catastrophes,  an  insidious,  day  to  day  fuel  for 
meaninglessness.  For  some,  it  may  pathologically  evolve  to  the  hurtful  experienced 
superficiality and fragility of  purpose  or,  in  the limit,  to  absence of  signification for 
anything in life: that’s what we will very often hear behind the faint discourse of many 
depressed individuals.
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As we’ve seen in chapter 4, humans’ unique task to lead life beyond instincts and 
the linked need to  signify existence,  impel  them to constitute  the symbolic  forms of 
culture as an accumulated and shared transcendence in which meaning can be found.
Since  culture  –  the  time-space  wherein  individuals  share  collective 
representations and thus, the domain of ideals, values and objective forms – is explicitly a 
target of a sacralized market that wants no borders to its neutral exchanges, the collective 
means to handle the human task of signifying experiences is continuously under attack. 
As a result, individuals’ actions can miss the sense of purpose fundamentally linked to 
things which are dear to them beyond the simply useful and the short-term satisfactions 
of pleasure, compulsive action and narcissistic glorification of oneself.
Thereby,  whereas  for  the majority,  the  impoverishment  of  meaning leads  to  a 
sense  of  (manageable)  dissatisfaction,  individuals  suffering  from  depression  may 
experience  a  hyper-lucidity  about  the  arbitrary  nature  of  meaning  in  signs  (Eiselein 
1991). But this is in no way a signal of his/her geniality or philosophical sensitivity; at 
least it does not seem to be the single motor of his / her depression. Rather, this is a 
painful lucidity of someone who suffers under the weight of social asymbolia and became 
a sort of, in Kristeva’s terms, “… radical, sullen atheist” (1989, p. 5) living an existence 
in which “…signifiers cannot find a compensating way out of the states of withdrawal in 
which the subject takes refuge to the point of inaction or even suicide” (1989, p. 10).
What  blinds  today is  thus,  less  the  historical  trauma  of  an  non-representable 
violence, but the apparently radiant, cheerful glorification of the free sovereign individual 
invited to  marvel  himself  with  his  self-image and personal  performances  purportedly 
forged by himself alone. But depression, as Kristeva sensitively states, is the hidden face 
of Narcissus, “…that countenance which - although it will  carry him off into death - 
remains unperceived by him as, marveling, he contemplates himself in a mirage” (1987, 
p. 5).
As in Narcissus’ myth, individuals stroke by depression are often unperceived of 
the gradual process underlying their apparently sudden and often inexplicable dive into 
suffering.
This is so, perhaps because for most people, it also remains unperceived that the 
collective silence about the symbolic worth of things is not a signal that we have elevated 
ourselves above symbolic subjection (Dufour 2008), so that we are now free to be happy 
and to enjoy life,  but a much  more desperate  kind of silence.  After  being relatively 
released from or deprived of meaningful principles, normative borders, forms and values 
outside  the  purportedly  independent  self,  individuals  risk  losing  touch  with  the 
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meaningfulness of linguistic signs. We should note that depressives do not abandon - as 
psychotics  to  a  certain  extent  do  -  the  world  of  signs;  they  just  cannot  ‘see’ the 
meaningfulness in language, so that it often sounds to them as an absurd, ambiguous, and 
powerless task (Eiselein 1991, p. 137).
And  when  the  situation  progresses  (in  response  to  a  cluster  of  different 
biographical  and biological  reasons  within  a  ‘reinforcing’ sociological  background of 
social deregulation) to a condition in which, for those gravely depressed “…it’s a fierce 
trial  attempting  to  speak  a  few  words”  (Styron  1990,  p.  63)  actions  will  soon  feel 
indifferent and in its most hurting extremes, barely possible.
The sense of identity – who am I – is also affected by social deregulation (and 
meaninglessness) implicit in the advance of market as a God. Svend Brinkmann’s ideas 
on ‘identity’ can illuminate the issue. The author argues that identity refers not only to 
one’s  acts  and  attributes  (as  psychological  theories  often  articulates)  but  to  one’s 
deliberations about what matters, which is a function of the social imaginary to which 
one belongs, a framework of values that exist independently of the subject.  He writes: 
“Our identities are framed by our relations to values, and the crux of our biographies is  
how we move and develop in relation to these values” (Brinkmann 2008, p. 411).
The challenging, potentially pathological aspect of societies when money ascends 
as a God is that the societal framework wherein individuals come to live is pervasively 
marked by a logic in which values, traditions and collective beliefs are either a barely 
irrelevant question of choice and preference, or irrationalities, obstacles on the way of a 
‘free’ and ‘rational’ action.
Now, according to Brinkmann’s (2008) perspective, this formula may address the 
existence of causal links for behavior (when things  happens as a consequence of some 
mechanism, in this case, a function of individual desires and ‘rational choices’), but not 
reasons  for  action  (intentions  expressing  meaning,  referring  to moral  frameworks). 
Drawing on Charles  Taylor,  Brinkmann calls  these causal  ‘explanations’ for behavior 
“weak evaluations” (things are good because we desire them), adding that:
…  if the model of weak evaluation were the only model a person had recourse 
to in deliberating and explaining herself, we would find that this person led an 
extremely impoverished and inhuman life.  All  she could do was act  on her 
strongest desire at any given moment. Such a person could never articulate a 
genuine reason for her actions, for she could not refer to any moral frameworks; 
all she could say was that she did something because her strongest desire made 
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her. In that sense, she could only refer to causes and not to reasons. If acting 
means acting for a reason, such an individual could not act at all (2008, p. 409).
In a context wherein exactly this model for explaining behaviors should subsist, it 
can be challenging for some people to find reasons for one’s actions beyond desire. That 
is,  while  the person can still  refer  to  causes  (related to desires,  wants  and pragmatic 
needs), the space of reasons (rooted in values and beliefs) may become fragile.
Indeed,  as  Simmel insightfully argued,  in  a  context  wherein money levels  the 
worth of all things through its “…capacity to reduce the highest as well as the lowest 
values equally to one value form and thereby to place them on the same level” (2005, p.  
256), a “blasé attitude” towards life tends to be the typical response.  Intrinsic to this 
attitude is the development of insensitivity for any value differences. The indiscriminate 
value of everything may lead to a feeling of the valuelessness of all things so that, in the 
next  step,  Simmel  claims,  the  “blasé person” cannot  experience great  enthusiasm for 
anything.
Simmel  could  not  be more  accurate  (and even prophetical  about  what  can be 
deemed a hyper-developed tendency nowadays) in his interpretation of the immediate 
reaction to  the evolving blasé experience of  the world:  a craving for excitement  and 
extreme impressions (Simmel 2005, p. 258). These days, this craving is addressed and 
even  stimulated  by  the  ‘fun  morality’ at  the  heart  of  ‘deregulated  capitalism’,  also 
attempting to find realization through the expanded “drive for activity” wherein “life is 
conceived  as  a  series  of  projects;  the  more  they  differ  from one  another,  the  more 
valuable they are” (Chiapello & Fairclough 2002, cited in Petersen 2011, p. 16).
Nevertheless, the defensive strategy against the lack of substance of everyday life 
doesn’t seem to work, writes Simmel,  unless as “… temporary relief, but soon the former 
condition will be re-established, though now made worse by the increased quantity of its 
elements” (2005, p. 258).
Satiated  by  excitement  and  pleasure  but  with  a  weakened  sense  of  value-
discrimination from which “… the whole liveliness of feeling and volition originates” 
(Simmel 2005, p. 257), the attraction of all things in life may decrease. This situation is 
radicalized,  we  may argue,  in  a  time  when  the  calculative,  egoistic  logic  of  money 
becomes generalized and imposed as a supreme Law by the political-economic theology 
of  neo-liberalism.  As  a  result,  the  “grey  hues”  (Simmel  2005,  p.  257)  of  the  blasé 
experience may evolve, epidemically, to the dark hues of depression.
Thereby, the experienced shattering of identity (frequently embodied in feelings 
of worthlessness and also in the impossibility to name ‘what matters’ in life that marks 
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depressive experiences) and the linked ‘difficulty to act’ is in any way an incongruous 
‘response’.
Rather, it can be (for some people and in some level) a symptom of the fragility of 
meaning  in  a  world  wherein  “… all  things  float  with  equal  specific  gravity  in  the 
constantly moving stream of money” (2000, p. 178).
An interesting question that could be raised here is:  how these issues become 
manifested  in  the  discourse  of  people  experiencing  depression?  As  discussed  earlier, 
depressives are suffering a pain that has no clear addressees, which is well expressed, as 
stated  above,  by the  formula  ‘everything is  bad,  but  nothing is  wrong in particular’.  
Hence, if it is exactly a process of symbolic impoverishment generated and fueled by the 
‘money  religion’ that,  as  we  are  arguing  here,  underlies  the  increase  of  depression, 
depressive  discourse  will  often  be  characterized  by  symbolic  disarticulation, 
diminishment or lack of memories, and an impoverished use of language and thinking.
I refer here to an example of my own experience as a clinical supervisor. In her 
first  psychotherapy session,  Mary introduces  herself  and states  that  she is  depressed. 
Before the psychotherapist  could speak, Mary interrupts him and says; “Sorry,  which 
tools  do you have for  helping me to get  rid  of  depression?”.  Without  answering  the 
question, the psychotherapist invites Mary to talk about herself. However, throughout the 
session,  Mary’s  discourse  is  basically  descriptive:  descriptions  of  symptoms,  of 
interactions  with  different  doctors,  of  trials  with  different  medications,  its  collateral 
effects etc.
Her discourse is marked therefore by an emphasis on the life in its factuality, that 
is,  a  life  that  does  not  generate  meaningful  narratives,  having  virtually  no  space  for 
qualitative reflections about existence.  The latter  would entail  memories – and hence 
'things to be said' according to Walter Benjamin - and interrogations about the existential 
vicissitudes  of  her  individual  (both  private  and  public)  life.  Now,  it  is  exactly  this 
impoverished  symbolic  language  that,  in  Mary’s  case,  suggests  the  shadows  of 
meaninglessness behind her symptoms. Thus, even though Mary doesn’t say that her life 
is meaningless (rather, as most depressed individuals, she just depicts how everything 
became meaningless after depression)  the form of her discourse – trapped in this kind of 
factual, merely descriptive terms, lacking reference to memories or representations for 
the future – suggest that.
I  think  therefore  that  any empirical  examination  of  issues  of  meaninglessness 
behind the discourse of people experiencing depression should pay close attention not 
only to  what  the  individual  says,  but  also  to  what  he/she  does  not,  or  cannot  say – 
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everything that concerns the ultimate questions of Being: ‘Who am I? How should I live? 
What do I have to say about life? What are the reasons for my life projects?'. For it is  
perhaps in silence, and not in discourse that the traces of meaninglessness will be found.
Mary didn’t go on with the sessions (perhaps because she couldn’t get from the 
therapist any objective solutions for her problem as she expected). This, of course, limits 
the range of any potential conclusions about this case.
However,  her  discourse  in  this  single  session  is  typical  of  the  general 
contemporary  condition  wherein  money  is  Supreme,  in  which  the  domain  of  the 
empirical,  merely biological  or factual life  dominates,  whereas the qualified,  political 
character of existence shrinks.
Increasing desymbolization in the auspices of money as God also impacts the way 
contemporary individuals have been experiencing time. This is, I think, another important 
aspect  in  other  to  understand,  or  at  least  to  throw  some  light  over  sentiments  of 
meaninglessness which underpin depression.
Time-wise,  the calculative  reason  of  the  money-God  is  always  present  and 
transitory,  merely  circumstantial  and  without  further  consequences  beyond  each 
particular  act  -  “…  a  perfectly  postmodern  God…reduced  to  a  pure  Providence  of 
circumstances” (Dufour 2009, p. 92, my transl.).
 That is, money transactions are exhausted as soon as the costs and benefits of 
options are weighted, and the greatest utility realized.
Since  each  new  financial  exchange  will  have  to  be  once  again  weighted  in 
accordance  to  all  the  circumstantial,  fluctuating  variables,  they  have  no  past  and 
permanence.  Under the rule of the money-God, exchanges are inherently present and 
temporary, leaving no traces behind (no memories) and limited by any specific ends (that 
is, linked with no particular future).  
Thereby, when money becomes a God ruling the social body and impregnating 
individual  life  with  its  principles,  time  will  tend  to  be  experienced  as  lacking  the 
meaningfulness coming from memories and ends. In regard to the consequences for the 
individual subjectivity which concern us here, it can only produce in Stiegler’s words “… 
herds of beings with difficulty to being and to become something, that is, beings without 
a future” (Stiegler 2004, n.p., my transl.)
‘Beings without a future’ sounds like an accurate description of depressed people: 
without any hopeful representation of tomorrow and without meaningful memories that 
press life to go on, depressives cannot act.
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In contemporary times, a certain disconnection from both the past and the future 
and a hyper attachment to ‘the present moment’ is not a privilege of depressed people,  
though.  In  contemporary  social  practices,  it  is  commonly  disseminated  -  by  the 
apparently  optimistic  discourse  of  ‘well-being  specialists’,  ‘life  coaches’,  ‘self-help 
books’ and  also  in  ‘advertising  messages’ -  that  ‘to  live  in  the  present’ is  the  most 
valuable  formula  for  a  good life.  These  discourses  will  sometimes  refer  to  ‘bits  and 
pieces’ of Eastern philosophy as an attempt to substantiate and disseminate a supposedly 
spiritualized view of the good life as one liberated from useless attachments with the past 
and pre-occupations with the future.
But bits and pieces of Eastern wisdom, carelessly transplanted without the needed 
sophistication  of  thinking  to  our  secular,  market-based  and  relatively  desymbolized 
societies in the West, ends up reproducing, frequently, nothing more than an attachment 
with the empty, trivial instant.
The rising depression rates (and other mental pathologies) in children and young 
people - which would seem a scary and even unconceivable reality if it wasn’t already a 
disseminated fact – is one of the signals that something must be challenged about the way 
we have been relating with time and memories in contemporary conditions.
This later statement can only have sense if we concede that difficulties behind 
children’s depression belong not only – as the media so often portrays – to the realm of 
purely private traumas and abuse (as if the private could be dissected from the social). 
Neither should it be exclusively associated to the ‘devouring potentialities’ of our brains 
(as if there was a brain outside the ‘individual in the world’). There is, I think, much more 
to be said in regard to this disturbing phenomenon. For sure, this is a task that certainly 
demands a specific focus, which is not the one I have here.
I  would  like,  though,  to  briefly  consider  the  contemporary  phenomenon  of 
children / adolescent depression as an analytical device in order to examine the interplays 
between the contemporary experience of time, meaninglessness and depression.
The inconceivability of a depressed child lies in the fact that children are normally 
represented as the ultimate bearers of the thirst for life, of cheerfulness and hopes for the 
future: the very opposite, thereby, of the ‘being without a future’ of depression.
In addition to these common representations of childhood, we are living in a time 
when  children  have  been  commonly  regarded  as  smarter  than  children  of  the  past, 
somehow even  wiser  than  adults26.  This  is,  of  course,  a  huge  inversion  of  the  way 
26 The new social representation of children gets expression in the social phenomenon of 
the so-called “indigo children”. The phenomenon is rooted in the publication of the book 
"The Indigo Children:  The New Kids  Have Arrived"  (1999)  by Lee  Carroll  and Jan 
Tober. According to a New York Times’ article with the suggestive title: Are they here to  
179
children used to be seen: someone who was to be taught, raised and guided by adults 
(bearers and representatives of the forms, values and meanings of the world, and thus 
those who ought to legate the signification of things to children).  
If we look closer, we detect that children appear in the social imaginary as smarter 
than adults chiefly because they are more conversant on the novelties of the present - just 
consider how many times we hear people saying, amazed, how their children can handle 
technological  gadgets  much  better  than  them.  Now,  putting  aside  the  fact  that  these 
gadgets didn’t exist in the past, things have always been and will always be like that. The 
younger necessarily has more knowledge of and familiarity with what is specific to her 
generation. Parents (and adults in general) are by principle, representatives of the past, 
the ones who are expected to know what came before children appeared in the world and 
to guide “… the newcomers by birth through a pre-established world into which they are 
born as strangers” (Arendt 1956, p. 403).
Thus,  the  novelties  of  any  new  generation  have  always  been  something  that 
belongs,  mainly,  to  the  ‘newcomers’.  What  changed  thereby,  were  not  children 
themselves but  mostly,  the amount  of novelties that we have to assimilate  in today’s 
accelerating societies and also, our relationship with the present and the past.
If it is the present, with its transitory and merely circumstantial, instrumental and 
always  immediate  pragmatic  goals  that  mostly  matters  in  the  money  culture  of 
contemporary societies; if the past becomes virtually useless in an accelerating society 
when you always have to be ready for the new and the unforeseen (Rosa 2010a, p. 94); if 
experience, as Benjamin (1973) anticipated, tends to collapse, being reduced to a series of 
impressions  we live  behind in  a  succession  of  successive  but  ephemeral  shocks  that 
cannot become memories;  and if  we learn that even the memories that we may have 
formed have no value (for what matters for the ideal ‘pure individual’ of neo-liberalism is 
exactly what he does in the present despite the past, and also to ‘enjoy in the present’) we 
will increasingly tend to feel that we possess anything meaningful to pass on to children 
and youths. Rather, we will think that we must learn from them. We will sometimes try to 
imitate them and idealize them as examples to be sought. After all, they are prejudice 
free, spontaneous, flexible, creative, active, quick and ‘liberated’ from all the unwanted 
weight from past knowledge, social rules and conditionings, that is, they are more or less 
save the world? (Leland 2006), the book has sold 250,000 copies since 1999 and has 
spawned a cottage industry of books about indigo children. The ‘indigos’ are described as 
sharing traits like high I.Q., acute intuition, self-confidence, resistance to authority and 
disruptive tendencies. Still, these children are expected, according to a commentator and 
writer on the subject, to be "…the answers to the prayers we all have for peace".
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what we learn – from the gospels of the neoliberal theology – that we should aim to 
become.
Thereby, living under the rules of the contemporary credo of ‘realism’ and hyper 
valorization of the present,  adults  can feel  either  impotent  (because cultural  referents 
seem lacking or obscure) or ambivalent about their task to bequeath cultural meanings 
and  memories  to  the  young.  The  dependence  of  the  juveniles  on  parents  -  still 
acknowledged - is often conceived more on the level of ‘what to do not to disrupt the 
development  of  children’  than  on  the  level  of  the  transmission  of  memories  and 
meanings.
This leads to a condition in which the adults’ role as “agents of socialization” is 
fundamentally  challenged.  The  religious  obedience  to  the  new  ‘credo  of  money’ is 
complete  when  parents,  rather  than  operating  as  the  mediators  of  meaning  to  their 
children,  “…tend  simply  to  supply  whatever  the  media  and  advertising  prescribe” 
(Dufour 2008, p 164).
What  the  horror  of  depression  in  children  (and  also  anxiety,  attention  deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, alcohol / drug abuse and other pathologies) seems to be silently 
saying is that children themselves are probably not gaining much from their high social 
status. Rather, they are in many ways suffering (perhaps even more than adults) from 
having to handle their natural aptitude to live life in its intensity and spontaneity without 
the protections coming from meaningful forms, values and sacred limits that are passed 
on to  them by the  community in  which  they live,  in  particular,  by their  parents  and 
significant others, such as professors27.
Further, if  the past has been losing worth, the contemporary experience of the 
future – which underlies our sense of direction - has also been changing.
Historically,  as  we’ve  seen,  direction  and  purpose  were  once  perceived  as  a 
projection of obligatory, traditional conducts. Later, in modern fashion, people’s sense of 
purpose and direction was exactly to release oneself from traditional obligations aspiring 
rather towards autonomy, self-determination,  progress, growth and promises of political 
transformations.
This  makes  the  modern  project,  as  Hartmut  Rosa  (2010a,  2010b)  insightfully 
claims, dependent on and supported by social acceleration. Amongst the most ‘sacred 
27 It is worth noting - as it is also the case with adults – that a significant number of  
‘depression  cases’  affecting  children  and  adolescents  may  constitute,  in  fact,  a 
medicalization  of  moral  problems  (see  Brinkman  2013).  This,  however,  does  not 
contradict but reinforce my argument: it is exactly because we are lacking meaning - that 
is, because our values, memories and ideals are losing worth - that we are inclined to 
project ‘problems of living’ to the hands of specialists and experts.
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principles’ of the dominant cultural logic of Western modernity, he continues, the aim to 
overcome slowness and inertia stands out, incarnating into the speeding up of processes 
of  transport,  communication,  and  production.  Indeed,  Modernity  is  fundamentally 
defined as a time when dominant expectations are no longer rooted in the experiences of 
the past. For sure, the very notion of progress - upon which Modernity defines itself - 
involves the idea of the superiority of the present (and the future) in relation to the past.  
More generally, being modern refers, to a large extent, to the search for the means and 
strategies through which one can autonomously steer one’s motion (Rosa 2010b): the 
very contrary of inertia.
Hartmut Rosa remarks that in late modern times, however, acceleration loses its 
attractive appeal as the force of liberation and autonomy. The “turning wheel” as the core 
symbol of modernity’s love for speed and directed progress can no longer stand for the 
contemporary cadences of time. Nowadays, he argues, our relationship with speed finds a 
better metaphor in the image of the relentless motion of the treadmill (Rosa 2010b).  
What Rosa seems to be implying - although he does not put it in this way - is that 
the dominant temporal regime in contemporary times is becoming desymbolized: it does 
not stand for progress, nor does it find solid legitimation within the symbolic order of 
society (as collectively established means for the good life). Even though contemporary 
acceleration is still inescapably rooted in the dominant cultural ideals of modernity, more 
recently - in the manners of the ‘natural laws of economics’ of the neoliberal political-
economic theology -  acceleration,  in Rosa’s  terms,  is  becoming “… a self-propelling 
system”. As such, acceleration does not depend on anything external to itself, being “… 
non-articulated and completely de-politized, such as they appear to be natural givens”, 
something that ‘just is’, outside the borders of any moral or political debate (2010a, p. 42)
Rosa draws attention to ‘symptoms’ of desymbolization both in the public and in 
the subjective domain of life. In the public domain, he claims, the principles of speed are 
frequently put forward by economists and politicians. Nevertheless, they no longer appeal 
to  the  principles  of  the  good  life  or  social  progress  as  the  legitimating  motives  for 
acceleration, referring to the “…images of a bleak future and decay instead” (2010b). 
And if this kind of “frantic motion” appears in the collective cultural perception of time 
as “… the end of (directed) history”, he argues, in the subjective plane, individuals tend 
to live life as series of changes and adaptations, but not as a process of development. In 
his words, “… in this perception, things change, but they do not develop, they do not ‘go 
anywhere’” (2010a, p. 41) which might lead, in his interpretation, to various forms of 
alienation and depression.
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 Rosa also notes that in late modern societies, the old modern promise of shaping 
society  beyond  economic  necessity  is  waning.  As  a  result,  individual  and  political 
energies are sacrificed “…to the acceleration machine symbolized in the hamster-wheel 
of socioeconomic competition” (2010a, p. 82).
The  submission  of  time  to  economic  competitiveness  is  emblematically 
symbolized  by Benjamin  Franklin’s  famous  equation  of  time  and  money.   However, 
whereas Franklin’s statement “Remember, that time is money” (Franklin 1736, cited in 
Weber 2008, p. 12) is certainly accurate as an expression of the capitalist idea of saving 
time  as  a  tool  for  gaining  competitive  advantage,  the  implicit  consequences  of  this 
equalization must be analyzed and challenged. For the equation of time and money leads 
to the hollowing out of any worth of time beyond the indeterminate, merely calculative 
cash  nexus.  As  Weber  points  out,  the  peculiar  ethic  underlying  Franklin’s  ideas  is 
coloured with utilitarianism, that is, virtues are good because they are “… useful, because 
it assures credit” (2008, p. 17).
Indeed, when time is money, it is virtually disconnected from any specific ends 
beyond those of usefulness and credit. As such, it becomes a means to all circumstantial 
and  utilitarian  exchanges,  without  ethical  worth  and  social  significance  towards  the 
realization of a meaningful life.
However, there is no literal truth in Franklin’s statement beyond the strategic logic 
of capitalist accumulation. In the human universe, time is not (and cannot be) money. 
Rather, “… time is the fabric of our lives, it’s everything we have” (Kehl 2009b,  my 
transl.).
The more this equation is artificially imposed and time follows the indeterminate 
paths of money, the more it lacks reference to the significance which can endow objective 
time with the fundamental sense of a meaningful connection between past, present and 
future. That is to say, if time is experienced as being as indeterminate and objective as 
money, it artificially and inhumanly becomes the time of the empty instant. A time that 
lacks  social  determination  (coming  from values  and  ends)  has  virtually  no  sense  of 
duration  and  development,  lacking  meaningful  connections  between  happenings  and 
instants; a meaningless time which can only pass in a self-propelling way.
Thus,  Rosa’s  interpretation  of  depression  as  “…  individual  (deceleratory) 
reactions to overstretched pressures of acceleration” (2010a, p. 35) is certainly insightful. 
But how “dysfunctional deceleratory reactions” of some forms of pathological depression 
are to be understood? Rosa’s response is that the experience of inertia (that sometimes 
motivates the pathology of depression) originates when the dynamics of one’s individual 
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and collective history “… are no longer experienced as elements in a meaningful and 
directed chain of developments” (2010a, p. 40).
Building upon Rosa, we could summarize the issue by saying that when time runs 
in  the  rhythm  of  the  speed  and  indeterminateness  of  money  without  any  ‘hopeful 
representation’ of where ‘speed’ can lead us to; when time is consequently experienced as 
having  insufficient  connections  with  what  came  before  and,  also,  seems  rather 
directionless; or to put it differently, if the objective time of the clock cannot sufficiently 
‘borrow’ the meaningfulness it lacks from memories of the past and from a ‘projected 
future’,  one’s sense of purpose and direction is disrupted to a point in which actions 
might  acquire  the  sentiment  of  randomness,  and  for  some  depressives,  of  hurtful 
meaninglessness.
In  the  next  and  final  section  of  the  thesis,  I  will  analyze  how  issues  of 
meaninglessness pervade not only depression as an experience, being also at the core of 
contemporary representations of depression as a concept.
9.1 - Some words on conceptualizing and coping with depression in the age of the 
money-God: the shadows of meaninglessness
In a context wherein collective narratives of meaning lose generality, giving way 
to  a  cultural  emphasis  on  the  purported  sovereignty  of  the  individual,  an  increasing 
number of human experiences have tended to be interpreted by way of the pathologised 
language of ‘psychological problems’, in relative neglect of its social, moral, political and 
spiritual nexus.
More recently,  another  stage follows. The psychologization of the malaises  of 
subjectivity and of the social  is  leaving way to (or being paralleled by)  a propensity 
towards  understanding  virtually  all  experiences  in  terms  of  the  brain.  Analyzing  this 
emergent tendency, Nikolas Rose coined the term “neurochemical selves” which stands 
for the inclination of contemporary Western people to contemplate “…our minds and 
selves in terms of our brains and bodies” (Rose 2003, p. 46). The author develops the 
idea: “… while discontents might previously have been mapped onto a psychological 
space  -  the  space  of  neurosis,  repression,  and  psychological  trauma  -  they  are  now 
mapped upon the body itself or one particular organ of the body - the brain” (Rose 2003, 
p. 54).
The two ‘ideal  types’ are not unrelated.  If  contemporary western societies are 
inclined to project all problems to the jurisdiction of individuals, both psychological and 
cerebral explanations tread different paths to accomplish the same thing: the projection of 
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human discontents to the interiority of our minds and later, bodies.  In its political and 
social  unspoken  foundations,  ‘brain-centrism’  and  ‘psychologization’  converge.  As 
Ehrenberg  puts  it,  “…  the  brain  is  the  materialist  version  of  the  personality’s 
totemization” (2009, p. 207).
However, the emergence of a “contemporary neuroculture” (Ortega 2009) has a 
genealogy  of  its  own.  As  discussed  in  the  first  chapter,  it  is  related  to  historical 
vicissitudes of the evolution of psychiatry in its quest to become a legitimized science 
within  the  medical  field,  being  also  a  function  of  the  recent  unification  between 
psychiatry and neurology (through which neurological and mental disturbances tend to be 
envisaged as a single type of problem). Finally, Rose (2012) notes, neurosciences gain 
intensified power by its convergence with the digital technologies and its dissemination 
to specialized and lay communities via the internet.
More  broadly,  ‘neuroculture’  is  consistent  with  historical  mutations  in  the 
contemporary understanding of individual and life and, I claim, it also reveals significant 
traits of the contemporary epoch in regard to issues of meaninglessness fostered by the 
money-God religion.
Concerning the earlier aspect, in societies wherein the individual is required to be 
a kind of entrepreneur of his own existence, achieving prominence in an increasingly 
competitive  market,  tools  that  hint  at  securing  individuals’  selves  through  firmly 
supported ‘realities’ based on objective aspects of life, sounds like a blessing (Ortega 
2009), an appealing alternative to a fairly large audience (Gardner 2003, p. 126).
But neurosciences’ increasing popularity can also be understood noting the fact 
that it comes up with a theory, a method and an underlying perspective of individual and 
of  the  world  which,  in  significant  ways,  matches  the  principles  of  the  contemporary 
religion of the money-God.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) – the so-
called ‘bible’ of the ‘neuroculture adepts’ – is exemplary of the latter argument. First, it 
depicts  an  ideal  individual  nearly  extracted  from  the  symbolic  order:  the  manual 
presupposes that mental disorders are derived from a dysfunction in the individual and it 
is not an expectable response to any external stressor (Horwitz & Wakefield 2007, p. 
viii).  Second, there is a clear prominence of the quantitative (number and duration of 
symptoms) over the qualitative aspects of discontents. For instance, the diagnostic criteria 
for major depression in the DSM-V require 5 out of 9 symptoms listed for the illness,  
lasting for at least two weeks.
185
It  is  therefore no longer  the individual’s  singular,  subjective experience which 
dominates the understanding (which in less reductionist psychological approaches could 
include  the  world  in  which  this  subjectivity  is  constituted).  Rather,  in  line  with  the 
calculative logic of money rationality, pure objectivity is proclaimed as the very basis of 
reality. As Simmel once declared, referring to the money rationality, here, “…only the 
objective measurable achievement is of interest” (2000b, p. 176). Similarly, discontents 
are  seen,  ultimately,  as  real,  calculable  and  purportedly  manageable  facts  relatively 
disconnected from psychological or moral reasons.
  The social popularity of the ‘cerebral discourse’ about our minds in general and 
depression in particular is therefore understandable in a world in which the calculative 
rationality of money prevails over the qualitative worth of things and experiences. In such 
a context, ‘science’ is one of the few societal domains wherein truth still  holds some 
stability. Hence, individuals will tend to resort to the competent, specialized narrative of 
experts,  the  remaining  authorities  entitled  to  voice  the  truth  about  our  lives  in 
quantitative, technical terms.
As Dufour (2008) analyzes, if we want to secure reterritorialization in a world 
wherein the old collective enunciators go into decline, the ‘mother nature’ looks like an 
optimum solution. In his words: “This would mean that the myth would no longer be 
celebrating a cultural referent, it would be celebrating the real referent (…) it would be 
celebrating our origins: Nature. Now that the great totems of history have pretty well 
collapsed, geography [and biology28] is [are] making a comeback” (2008, p. 52).
Returning, very briefly, to the historical overview developed earlier, we find that 
melancholia has been represented in distinct ways according to specific features of the 
order of meaning of each particular era: a proof or onus of geniality; the acedia of those 
unwilling to dedicate to the needed moral sacrifices of religious life; sensitivity before the 
emptiness  triggered  by the  collapse  of  previous forms  of  communitarian  coexistence 
which  modernity  has  destroyed; a  dysfunction  of  rational  thought;  a  result  of 
psychological trauma.
Nowadays, the mainstream views on depression are being proposed as scientific 
and thus purportedly unrelated to any societal representations of existence. Ironically, for 
this  very  reason,  these  views  completely  match  the  state  of  affairs  of  contemporary 
societies. For if it is true that existence is being desymbolized by the force of the new 
theology of money,  the fact  that  the dominant  views about depression represent it  as 
something basically extraneous to any horizon of signification beyond its  reality as  a 
‘neutral, objectively measurable phenomenon’ is telling.
28 My observation.
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Time-wise,  depression simply  is,  something glued to the present reality of our 
bodies, with barely any past or any meaningful future, a real, asymbolic fact relatively 
alien from past memories and future prospects.
Clearly,  the  same  paradigm  is  also  at  work  in  the  striking  growing  of 
antidepressants consumption. When health practitioners, patients and society in general 
promote / accept antidepressants as the main (and certainly the more prestigious) form of 
treatment for depression, it means that the latter is being represented as a ‘mental state’ 
that  does  not  refer,  in  the  manners  of  money,  to  anyone in  particular  but  to  what  is 
common among us (irrespective of any existential  or cultural  specificity),  that is,  the 
body.
Furthermore,  the  logic  of  the  medical  discourse  is  one  in  which  individuals’ 
discontents are addressed by way of causes (mechanisms, either biological or, more rarely 
today, psychological, leading to effects - depression) whilst reasons (the existential and 
moral  circumstances  and  issues  underlying  depressive  experiences)  are  dismissed 
(Brinkmann 2004).
Indeed,  if  environmental  causal  factors  can  be  overlooked,  leading  to  the 
medicalization of problems stemming from social and existential grounds, concerns with 
values  are  even more distant  from the neutral  questions  (and answers) of  hegemonic 
medical  /  psychological  theory  and  practice.  This  is  so,  Brinkmann  (2004)  argues, 
because both psychiatry and psychology are based on the historically rooted idea that 
their  theories  and practices  should understand and treat  “… how things  are  with the 
human being, not how they ought  to be” (Brinkmann 2004, p. 60). As a result,  critical 
matters  of  value  are  totally  alien  to  both  understanding  and  intervention;  more 
specifically, the question of  whether  peoples’ discontents may stem from “… a lack of 
moral resources” (Brinkmann 2013, p. 113) are and should be out of discussion.
The immediate consequence of the dismissal of reasons and issues of meaning 
underpinning  depression  is  also  analyzed,  in  a  distinct  way,  by  Tort  (2001  cited  in 
Martins, 2008). The author claims that when signification demands are translated as mere 
technical demands, it may lead to a kind of “somatization of the symptom” wherein “… 
the  access  to  the  real  of  the  body  reduces  what  the  symptom  is  ‘saying’  –  the 
meaningfulness of the symptom – to what is merely empirically observable ... whereas 
the illness occupies the place of the patient’s identity (Tort 2001, cited in Martins 2008, p. 
333, my transl.).
When the observable implodes language, a number of  meaningful questions are 
muted: questions about our life in common, about what matters in the world in which we 
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live and about what should matter; questions about beauty, purpose, wisdom, in short, all 
those transcendental questions that concern ‘the meaning of life’ and cannot be addressed 
by the empirical aspect of life.
On the same theme, Andre Green’s critical accounts are somewhat prophetic. As 
early as in 1960, Green warned his professional colleagues that psychopathology should 
be aware of the risk that psychopharmacology may strip away the meaningfulness which 
is  the  human  prerogative.  Green  highlighted  that  if  psychiatry  does  not  account  for 
medication in a way that avoids the reduction of human to a simple projection of the 
nervous  system,  they  would  constitute  a  kind  of  “veterinary  psychiatry”  (Ehrenberg 
2010b, p. 86).
Andre Green’s worries became, to a certain extent, realized in our ‘brave new 
brain’s’ era. Within today’s medical and general discourse about depression, issues related 
to our existence as “living creatures” (Rose 2012, p. 1) greatly surpasses concerns with 
issues of meaning underpinning suffering; more than this, the latter are not even part of 
the equation. As a result, the fundamental human need to find reasons to mental pain and 
meaning to life is left unattended.
In Brinkmann’s words:
… it  is doubly tragic that moral and existential forms of suffering, stemming 
from a lack of meaning and value, are routinely pathologised, thus stripped of 
whatever meaning that was left. People who are looking for meaning meet a 
system of treatment that tells them that their suffering is meaningless and should 
be  understood  causally,  thus  possibly  reinforcing  the  very  ground  of  their 
suffering (2013, p. 114).
Indeed, if there is sense in thinking that today’s fragility of meaning fuelled by the 
money-God  religion  is  one  factor  underlying  the  flourishing  of  depression  rates, 
meaninglessness finds ratification in contemporary neuroculture.
If  depression’s  rampant  rates  can  be  seen  as  one  of  the  signs  of  a  broader 
meaninglessness crisis - wherein life is relatively desymbolized under the influence of the 
‘money-God’ - the current ‘neuroculture’ reproduces and, at the same time, aggravates the 
crisis. This is done in the exact same manner of the money-God, that is, by addressing the 
factual, empirical aspects of life and dismissing the symbolic levels of existence of a 
social  being,  that is,  a concrete person in search for meaning, living in an extremely 
complex world.
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Conclusion
The conclusion is structured in four parts. First, the main analytical findings of the 
thesis will be tied together, composing a unified and synthetic overview of the study. 
Second, I explore some ways by which the experience of meaningfulness can incarnate in 
the contemporary epoch. The issue gains concrete grounds through a brief analysis of 
Andrew Solomon’s biographical trajectory - especially in the last stages of his experience 
with depression and after his recovery - which reveals his path out of depression and 
towards meaning. In the third step, the limitations of the study are identified, pointing 
towards some worthwhile  aspects of the project  to  be investigated in the future.  The 
section ends with  some considerations on the  thesis’ contributions with respect to the 
research  question,  analyzing,  in  a  succinct  manner,  how  they  contradict  or  amplify 
existing theories on the theme.
The present research intended to analyse how a context marked by contemporary 
‘crises of meaninglessness’ generated and fostered by the political-economic theology of 
the money-God can have, as one of its effects, the dilatation of depression rates.
One of the thesis’ significant findings is that the ‘animal side’ of human life has 
been gaining relevance in our epoch. This is true, as we have just seen, within dominating 
representations of depression in the medical field and general public discourse, which 
conceptualize and treat the problem as something pertaining more to our existence as 
animals, than to our existence as humans. It is also intrinsic to the paradigm of calculative 
thinking and pragmatism inherent to the rationality of money as a God - and the linked 
view of the individual as a maximizing animal with no reasons for action beyond his own 
interests - which, to a large extent, has been ruling over contemporary societies in the 
West.
The ‘animality ideology’ at the heart of ultraliberal societies reached the movies. 
In  the  1987  Oliver  Stone’s  film  Wall  Street,  Bud,  a  young  stockbroker  desperate  to 
succeed, becomes involved and seduced by a ruthless corporate raider who memorably 
declares:  “Greed is  all  we have left,  but  greed is  also what  made America great.  It's 
normal. It's healthy and it's what keeps the system going. Greed is good”. But this is a 
story wherein the ‘Law of the Father’ still makes its mark and, eventually, prevails: bad 
conscience, guilt and existential emptiness disrupts the protagonist’s millionaire lifestyle 
(un)ruled  by  the  anti-ethics  of  money.  The  stockbroker  finally  chooses  the  moral, 
idealistic reasons of his father over the egoistic reasons of his mentor.
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The 2013 film The Wolf of Wall Street, by Martin Scorsese, on the same theme, 
tells a very different story. Based on Jordan Belfort’s memoirs, the film presents the life 
of the stockbroker in three hours of excess, perversion,  limitlessness,  corruption,  sex, 
drugs and decadent hedonism, epitomizing the outright disregard for rules, values, limits 
and  other  people  when  everything  and  everyone  are  means  for  continuous  money 
accumulation.
The role of the Law in the film is, at most, timid. Subjectively, no anguish, shame 
or remorse disturbs Belfort’s humorously portrayed narcissism. Objectively, after serving 
a sentence of 22 months (in what is clearly a white collar prison where he is shown 
playing tennis), Belfort remains somewhat in control and literally, center stage.
The contrary is true for the FBI agent who built the case against Belfort. In one of 
the last scenes of the movie, Patrick Denham is shown riding the subway home after  
bringing Belfort down. His face shows no airs of victory, but a melancholic, uncertain 
expression (indicative, perhaps, of his own doubts about whether playing by the rules was 
really worth it).  In any case,  in Scorsese’s film, the Law is  doubtful,  colorless, lacks 
glamour and prestige: things which, seemingly, only money can buy.
After all, wolves still run the show, in fiction and in real life. In the last shot of the 
film, ‘the show’ is commanded by the real Jordan Belfort (now a motivational speaker) 
and the fictional Jordan Belfort is the applauded guest speaker. He is the one expected to 
teach an audience about how to succeed in a world wherein ‘everything is for sale’.
Indeed,  ‘wolves’  are  proliferating.  Sometimes  in  the  skin  of  money-mad 
psychopaths à la Jordan Belfort, subjugating all social values to the purposes of wealth 
accumulation and transgressing all limits. Other times, they incarnate in the skins of more 
ordinary  people,  including  a  number  of  egotists,  of  ‘fun  morality’ adepts,  and those 
whose life lack meaningful resources beyond the everyday quest for financial security, 
personal performance and consumption - forms of life which may, sometimes, coincide to 
either  a  cynical  disparagement  of  values,  or  a  blasé-like  incapacity  of  value-
discrimination (Simmel 2005).
Nevertheless,  against  totalizing  views  of  contemporary  society  as  a  fully 
fragmented and meaningless epoch, the thesis concedes that most people are still engaged 
with the world and with others, having values, principles and behaving in ways that don’t 
fit in the so-called ‘me-ism’ stereotype.
Those not at ease with the model of the Sadean, ‘isolist ego’ so frequently sold to 
us by the new economic-political theology of money as a God, are  struggling - as our 
condition  of  ‘animals  of  transcendence’  has  always  impelled  us  to  do  -  to  find 
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completeness, and to address the questions of meaning: What is life about? What is the 
best way to live? How can I find purpose, meaning in life?
But in the culture of the money God, questions of meaning tend to be diluted 
either in the fluidity of inner validation (wherein, developing the modern perspective on 
morality,  values  are  supposedly  matters  of  individual  choice  and  preference)  or 
senselessness  (since values  are,  according to  the rationality of money,  useless  in  any 
pragmatic sense).
Still,  the  worth  of  the  impossible,  of  uselessness,  of  the  intrinsic  and  non-
pragmatic worth of things - the nourishment granted by ideals, social forms, historical 
and cultural heritage, in a word, by meaning – which money knows nothing about, is far  
from useless from the human point of view. Meaning is not only a basic human necessity, 
but it does not exist if not through the participation in something beyond our actions as 
isolated, calculative, maximizing animals.
One of the most compelling findings of this thesis is thus that  after the social 
order of meaning in the West has seen its center of gravity to move from the cosmic 
immanence of reality, to the transcendence of God as a ‘governor’ of life and death, and 
finally, to the interior space of human reason or sensibility, a new kind of transcendence 
emerged in our epoch: the new theology of the money-God. Thus, behind the ‘liberation 
feast’, the profane has been sacralized and incarnates within the fundamental dogmas of 
societies ruled by the new political-economic theology of money: the purported power of 
individuals  as  sovereigns  of  their  own  self-crafted  performance  in  life;  the  cult  of 
pleasure,  entertainment  and  self-image;  the  emphasis  on  instrumental  and  pragmatic 
rationality over  the  qualitative,  idealistic  worth  of  things;  and the  Supreme worth of 
things and experiences that Money can buy. These are kinds of guidance, for sure, but 
which can hardly help us to live and die meaningfully. Rather, it fuels a profound lack of 
wisdom on how to lead our private existences and our life in common. The result, with 
increasing frequency, is depression.
Thereby,  despite  the whole cultural  climate of  suspicion on everything which, 
from the exterior, would guide human life and the linked postmodern idea that morality 
should  be  a  private  matter  not  to  slide  into  over-authority,  the  study suggested  that 
‘autonomy’ remains a still-to-be-seen Nietzschean aurora.
Presently, the purported ‘sovereignty’ of individuals has not been an undisturbed 
good  dream.  Rather,  the  feeling  of  ‘transcendental  homelessness’ once  detected  by 
Lukács, still haunts today’s ‘liberated’ subjects. The ‘nostalgia for totality’ – embodied in 
a myriad of forms such as fundamentalist cults; addictions; co-dependency; the idealized 
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and utopian representations of the past in some strands of New Age movements (Kuhling 
2004);  the  exodus  to  the  Suburbia  wherein  many  attempt  to  reawake  the  sense  of 
“primordial  perfection” (Eliade 1998, p. 186);  and, more generally,  in the widespread 
devotion to the dogmas of the political-economic theology of Money – suggests that the 
idea of a human being founded upon itself is an unstable condition upon which new gods 
(with its dogmas, symbols, altars and feasts) are thriving.
Outlets for a meaningful life
However, and on a more positive note, if depression’s elevated rates is one of the 
contemporary social symptoms of the asymbolia and meaninglessness crisis fostered and 
reinforced by the theology of Money, there are still plenty of surviving, resisting sources 
of meaningfulness in life, potentially ‘healing forces’ against depression.
Contrarily to the ‘there’s no alternative’ spirit of the neoliberal political-economic 
credo, a whole spectrum of possibilities for a meaningful life beyond the rationality of the 
money-God can still be found in the contemporary era.
 In  other  words,  the  reign  of  money and  its  dry realities  of  competitiveness, 
numeric  formulas,  pragmatic  thinking,  compulsive  action,  circumstantial  and  empty 
experience of time, and all forms of ‘ego-idolatry’ are myths, human constructions like 
any other. They are not the whole “Real” as the new theology wants us to believe.
Resisting spaces of culture and of life that can still breath outside the ‘fire’ of the 
money rationality  are  fertile  soils  upon  which  contemporary  individuals  in  the  West 
reinvent/redefine  order  and  sacred  spaces  for  life  without  the  onus  of  repressive, 
exclusionary, monolithic, eschatological ideals.
Those who have crossed the dark psychic pit of depression – their memoirs often 
tell us – will re-encounter ‘light’ in the meaningfulness of non-quantifiable aspects of life: 
in beauty, in the bonds with others, in values, in love.
Among those, Andrew Solomon’s biographical trajectory - especially in the last 
stages of depression and after his recovery - reveals a graceful path out of depression and 
towards  meaningfulness.  In  the  very last  pages  of  his  Noonday  Demon:  an  Atlas  of  
Depression (2001), Solomon declares that even though he would certainly prefer not to 
have experienced depression “… there are values to be found in it” (2001, p. 439). In the 
last paragraph of the book, he completes: “I hate those feelings, but I know that they have 
driven me to look deeper at life, to find and cling to reasons for living. I cannot find it in 
me to regret entirely the course my life has taken. Every day, I choose, sometimes gamely 
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and sometimes against the moment’s reason, to be alive. Is that not a rare joy?” (2001, p. 
443).
Throughout the thesis I have elaborated on the problematic dilution of the critical 
spirit  of  contemporary  individuals.  Under  the  auspices  of  the  ‘ideal  subject’ of  the 
money-God theology,  individuals are being invited to incorporate forms of rationality 
marked by a lack of discrimination over the qualitative differences between things. This 
leads to a condition in which, as Dufour (2008) claims, individuals liberate themselves 
from  all  ties  with  values  and  critical  stands  (and  often  without  realizing)  become 
subjectively open to all fleeting impulses, a subjective state that has been systematically 
exploited by commodities.
What Solomon suggests in this passage, I think, is that the way out of depression 
involved, in his experience, exactly the opposite, critical work of ‘finding and clinging’ 
for reasons to live.  Not the fluid, lawless, homogeneous and chaotic flow of life, but 
rather a life of continuous and conscious ‘choices to be alive’.
His move makes a lot of sense. ‘Death as the internal possibility of life’ is, for 
people who experience depression, a close, intimate reality. And as we’ve seen earlier 
with Simmel,  death is also the limit  of life impelling it  to transcend itself  as a mere 
deregulated, chaotic flow in order to incarnate as engagement with the objective world, as 
meaning.
Solomon’s auto-biographical details in his memoir on depression paint a picture 
of a reasonably happy, regular life, lacking psychological traumas and familial problems. 
This  kind  of  narrative  usually  leads  to  a  somewhat  superficial  but,  still,  common 
interpretation:  this  is  a  ‘good  life’ wherein  depression  (purportedly,  according  with 
dominating views on the problem) could only be understood as an extraneous, biological 
phenomenon. However, Solomon is a proto-typical case of the contemporary subject – 
seemingly  ‘successful’,  well-off,  professional,  cosmopolitan,  secular,  liberal,  living 
within  ‘liminal’,  ‘limitless’ conditions  marked  by the  social  forces  of   narcissism & 
‘isolism’ and thereby vulnerable to depression associated with loss of meaningfulness. 
For instance, about life in his twenties, Solomon states:
I decided, almost on a whim, to become an adventurer and took to ignoring my 
anxiety even when it was connected to frightening situations. Eighteen months 
after I  finished my graduate work, I  started traveling back and forth to Soviet 
Moscow and lived part-time in an illegal squat with some artists I got to know 
there… I allowed myself to consider every kind of sexuality; I left most of my 
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repressions  and  erotic  fears  behind.  I  left  my  hair  get  long.  I  cut  it  short.  I 
performed with a rock band a few times; I went to the opera. I had developed a 
lust for experience, and I had as many experiences as I could in as many places as 
I could afford to visit (Solomon 2001).
Of course,  the  very brief  summary of  Solomon’s  biography presented  in  The 
Noonday Demon  (2001) does not  allow any thorough interpretation of the social  and 
subjective factors behind his depression,  nor it  provides sufficient information on the 
intricacies implied in the long process of his hardly won ‘reasons for living’. But they 
are, in the least, suggestive of some of the ways through which he could transcend death 
towards the quest for a meaningful life.
Some years after his third depressive breakdown and the publishing of his book 
on depression, Solomon (who since 2003 was in a relationship with John Habich) decided 
to have a child together with his longtime friend Blaine Smith via in vitro fertilization. 
The child was finally born in 2007. She lives with her mom, now in a relationship with a 
male partner in Texas.
In  the  same  year,  Andrew  Solomon  celebrated  a  civil  partnership  with  John 
Habich, followed by Christian and Jewish ceremonies.
In 2009, on the eighth anniversary of their meeting, the couple married again, so 
that their marriage would be legally recognized in the state of New York. Soon after, 
Solomon’s  second biological  child,  to  be raised by him and John Habich,  was born. 
George (the name was chosen after John’s grandfather) was conceived with donor eggs 
via a surrogate mother, Laura, Habich's friend and one half of a lesbian couple whose 
own two-child family Habich enabled by donating sperm to them.
Solomon’s trajectory is punctuated by bonds which are very much contemporary 
in its anti-traditional form (incarnated in a nearly difficult-to-conceive type of composite 
family involving a heterosexual couple, two lesbians, two gays and 4 children in three 
states). At the same time, forms - incarnated in social ties, the worth of memories and of 
values - are strongly, and intentionally, Solomon declares, part of this story.
A  non-traditional,  gay  couple  gets  married  in  a  traditional  civil  ceremony, 
providing them not only with civilian rights but with social roots. Christian and Jewish 
religious  ceremonies  of  a  gay  marriage:  again,  traditional  forms  are  fundamentally 
disrupted in its dogmas, all the while being acknowledged as a way to make them feel 
symbolically  included  into  a  collective  space  of  memories,  values  and commitments 
beyond their private, self-choosing existences. In Solomon’s words:
194
I was amazed at how emotional both weddings were - the first because it was a 
public declaration of our love in the company of everyone we cherished most in 
the world, and the second because married, which had applied to my parents and 
grandparents  and back a  hundred generations,  was  ours,  too.  The use  of  that 
expression drenched us in dignity. Since then, I’ve read stories to our children in 
which princes marry princesses, and though John and I are both men, I can say, 
“Just like when Daddy and Papa got married” (Solomon 2012).
By being  married,  Solomon  and  Habich  have  now  their  own,  non-traditional 
particular narratives (Rev. Peter J. Gomes, a minister of the Memorial Church at Harvard 
who  celebrated  their  marriage urged  the  couple  to  remain  “outré”  letting  their  “…
imaginations  run wild”) contained within a  greater,  collective narrative which applies 
back ‘to hundreds of generations’. They are thus, ‘outré’ inside society, not only in civil  
terms, but in the symbolic sense, by associating memories and substantive values to their 
own ‘acts of imagination’, endowing it with form, content and purpose.
He  also  seems  to  have  bypassed  the  subjective  desertification  of  an  empty, 
transitory present moment – the ‘pure present’ was seemingly, in Solomon’s experience 
with depression, a paralyzed time which left him ‘split and racked’ at the ‘tightest corner 
of his bed’ -. He did that by forging a continuity of subjective life from the past to the 
present and towards the future, combining, still, individual and collective time.
Finally, Solomon’s ‘choices to be alive’ were possibly favored by the basic human 
gift of love and its associated gifts of long-term bonds, solidarity, care and gratitude. On 
the one hand, meaning here is rooted, as Durkheim would put it, in the fulfillment of his 
obligations as a father, husband and relative which are defined externally to himself ‘in 
law  and  custom’ (Durkheim  1982,  cited  in  Hookway  2013). On  the  other, love  is 
unconstrained,  beyond  or  even  opposed  to  duty.  As  the  philosopher  André  Comte-
Sponville beautifully puts it: “duty obliges you to do that we would do simply out of 
love, if in fact we loved” (2001, p. 224). Love is a gift that has thereby a dignity of its 
own, and although not ‘sacred’ in the Durkheimian sense of a social constraint imposed 
upon individuals from without,  it  is  still,  and fundamentally,  something sacred in the 
sense that it grants meaning to life, something which money can never buy.
In this regard, in reference to Simmel’s ideas, Keohane (2013) analyzes the ways 
through  which,  in  the  hyper-individualized  contemporary  condition, love  relations 
constitute “more than life” experiences, forms of sociation which potentially generates 
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super-personal values which are sacred in themselves “… an end in an otherwise endless 
sequence of purposes” (2013, p. 70).
In 2012, Solomon wrote another book Far from the tree: Parents, Children and 
the Search for Identity. This book, a long work project of ten years, enabled Solomon to 
talk  with  more  than  three  hundred  families,  collecting  oral  stories  and  memories  of 
parents who have a child with conditions such as deafness, dwarfism, Down syndrome, 
autism, schizophrenia, multiple severe disability, early genius, conceived through rape, 
with criminal behavior, and transgender. Being for so long involved in narratives of love, 
care, sacrifice and responsibility – and deciding in the meantime to have his own child (in 
a clear suggestion of his developed awareness about the meaningfulness one can find 
through the beauty and the sacrifices of unconditional love) is perhaps another indication 
that  the  gift  of  love,  but  also  of  meaningful  work  (and  a  meaningful  relation  with 
knowledge) were significant means in Solomon’s trajectory towards the crafting of his 
own individual freedom as meaningful engagement with life.
Someone may counter this argument by saying that some people are married, have 
children, professional projects, and are still depressed. Indeed, this is not a formula, a 
definitive shield against depression,  especially if  we consider that these forms endure 
weakened  social  prestige  as  sources  of  meaning  (endangered,  as  they  are,  by  the 
commodification  of  all  cultural  forms).  So,  I  am certainly  not  saying  that  marriage, 
parenthood, work, memories and other cultural forms such as art, religion, knowledge 
etc. are contemporary ‘safe paths’ to meaningfulness. Even though in their intrinsic worth 
they can represent significant resources where one may find meaning, they can also turn 
into  meaningless,  empty  accomplishments,  a  collection  of  actions  without  purpose. 
Nowadays,  these  forms  are  sometimes  founded  upon  egoistic  or  merely  pragmatic 
reasons29 in the valueless manners of the money rationality. In this case, ‘forms’ may be 
there, but they are not animated. They don’t impress a character to existence, don’t carry 
principles  and  reasons  for  action;  by  being,  in  Simmelian  (2000b)  terms,  overly 
objectified, they don’t come back over its creators to enrich their lives, don’t enhance 
individual subjectivity; they mean nothing.
29 Keohane  remarks,  for  instance,  how  home  ownership  (and  familial  life)  can, 
ambiguously, be both a potential surplus of added value to life and a societal terrain for 
the flourishing of “…sedentary pleasure and the liberties of private life on the one hand, 
and, no less, with petty bourgeois conservatism, aggressive narcissistic defensiveness and 
a terrible entrapment in banal routine” (2013, p. 68).
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Limitations
One of the limitations of this study is the lack of empirical data associated to it.  
The  possibility  to  investigate  whether  the  issues  of  meaninglessness  theoretically 
analyzed here are empirically confirmed in the experience of individuals suffering from 
depression would enrich and provide greater consistency to the argument.
In addition to this, the issue of how to cope with depression in a context of ‘crises  
of  meaninglessness’  is  another  unexplored,  but relevant,  correlated  aspect  to  be 
investigated  in  the  future.  As  a  psychotherapist  writing  about  depression  as  a  social 
pathology  of  meaninglessness,  I  should  say  that  even  though  I  fully  agree  that  the 
psychologization of existence is a problematic element of the very meaninglessness crisis 
I  depict  here,  the  condemnation  of  psychotherapy  per  se  is  based  on  a  mistaken 
opposition between individual and society, personal and social issues. With this is mind, 
the investigation of how clinical work with individuals experiencing depression could be 
re-interpreted  and enriched by the  understanding  of  this  experience  within  a  societal 
context of ‘meaninglessness crises’ is a relevant and timely issue.
How the research locates itself within the framework of sociological theories on the 
contemporary ‘depression epidemic’?
First, I would like to stress that the present thesis – as noted at the very outset of 
the text – did not intend to explicate depression. Depression is, and perhaps will always 
remain, a mysterious, fugacious and multi-layered phenomenon just as anything human. 
Indeed,  one  of  the  challenging aspects  of  depression is  that  its  causes  will  probably 
remain vaguely defined, especially if we want to artificially tease biology, psychology 
and culture apart in any definitive way.
Even within the sociological domain of analysis, the issue of meaninglessness in 
today’s culture of the money-God is one amongst others that can open up different, but 
often  complementary modes  of  understanding  the  phenomenon of  the  rising  rates  of 
depression in contemporary times. That is, if the disarticulation of the symbolic order in a 
society  wherein  the  rationality  of  money  prevails  can  lead  to  the  weakening  of  a 
meaningful relation to life and to oneself which may fuel depression, other conditions 
which are not directly related to the issue of meaning can also factor in.
This position may sound ‘scientifically’ inaccurate or vague, but this, again, is 
exactly the real, uncomfortable state that we find ourselves in when we try to inquire – 
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without unjustified intellectual pretention - on mental illnesses in general and depression 
in particular.
The theme of societal meaninglessness as an explanatory basis for the so-called 
depression epidemic is not new. Authors such as David Karp (1996) and Dan G. Blazer 
(2005)  have,  although  from  different  perspectives,  explored  the  links  between 
depression’s  massive proliferation in  our  era  and societal  issues  of  the contemporary 
epoch that surrounds the theme of meaninglessness, such as the weakening of social ties 
(Karp)  and  the  fragmentation  of  societies  in  the  West  leading  to  feelings  of  radical 
meaning loss (Blazer).
.  The latter,  in his  book  The Age of Melancholy (2005),  claims that  when the 
“sacred canopy” of modern progress has blown away, a gravest sort of anxiety emerges,  
connected to the very disturbing sense that “… we have lost our foundations and chaos 
reigns”  (2005,  p.  136).  As  a  result,  not  only  any fixed  meaning  stands,  but  even  a 
minimum  basis  for  the  discourse  about  values  is,  according  to  his  view,  lacking. 
Depression, which he describes as a signal to withdraw, should be understood thus as a 
kind  of  adaptation  to  a  grave  anxiety emerging in  a  context  wherein  all  authority is 
abolished, whereas all  beliefs and explanations are brought into doubt, fracturing and 
fragmenting meaning.
The  particular  contribution  of  the  present  study to  the  theories  exploring  the 
interplaying  between  societal  meaninglessness  and  depression  lies  in  the  distinct 
definition of meaninglessness advanced here.
Meaninglessness, in the context of this study, is neither a totalizing condition of 
fully  fragmented  societies  (as  we’ve  claimed  throughout  the  thesis,  there  are  social 
reservoirs  of  meaning  that  offer  resistance  to  de-symbolization),  nor  an  intrinsic 
consequence of the collapse, per se, of master narratives of the past as implied in Blazer’s 
interpretation. The weakening of our ties with values, principles, forms and ideals is not 
the passive result of a historical lack of the Other and of wider frameworks of meaning, 
but the active effect of a new kind of Law which weakens the strength of values and 
ideals by opposing all sources of signification (even if by incorporation, as it happens 
with the so-called ‘authenticity ethics’) beyond the fundamentals of money.  
The argument can be further clarified through a critical dialogue with two existing 
sociological  analyses  on  depression’s  expansion  in  contemporary  times:  Alain 
Ehrenberg’s and Anders Petersen’s accounts30.
30 As I did with Blazer’s argument, my intention is not to provide an exhaustive 
analysis of the authors’ accounts on the theme, but rather to delineate the basic lines of a 
critical dialogue between such theories and the present study.
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Alain Ehrenberg examines the expansion of depression by way of an historical 
analysis of the processes by which psychic suffering and psychological problems become 
a significant issue in societies wherein autonomy becomes a norm (2010c).  
He is thus especially interested in  “… depression’s medical and social success” 
(2010b,  p.  xxix)  which  he  envisages  as  being  a  function  of  the  “…  complex 
recomposition of relations between illness, health, and life and their relation to individual 
autonomy” (2010b, p. xxviii).
Thus, in a time when collective references for guiding human conduct are blurred 
and autonomy becomes the new social ideal, the ways by which people experience affect 
fundamentally changes (Ehrenberg 2010c).  In this  regard,  Ehrenberg (2010b, pp. 8-9) 
claims that when western individuals move from a collective to an individual experience 
of  themselves,  guilty  and  conflict  symptoms  rooted  into  the  dichotomy between  the 
allowed and the forbidden (at the core of neurosis) tend to be supplanted by feelings of 
inadequacy and symptoms of action inhibition, fueled by questions about the possible and 
the impossible (the basis of depression).
To be very brief, here lies the fundamental explanation for the expansion of the 
diagnosis of depression given by Ehrenberg: through inversion /opposition, depression 
reveals  the  mutations  of  individuality  when,  as  of  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth 
century, values associated with autonomy, action and initiative have been generalized.
The present study certainly concurs with these arguments. In a society wherein 
religious and secular authorities subside, whereas the individual is enjoined to be his own 
sovereign,  discontent will  tend to be experienced as failure,  something fundamentally 
referred to individuality,  not to the Law. In relation to this,  Ehrenberg will  rightfully 
argue,  the modes of  thinking about  depression  will  tend to  focus  on the  individuals’ 
‘functioning defects’ (etiology being more akin to the Janetian model of mental illness as 
exhaustion, than to the Freudian model of mental  suffering motivated by unconscious 
reasons; hence, diagnosis becomes, fundamentally, a function of signs such as passivity, 
lack of motivation, inability to function and fatigue). In parallel, the prevailing modes of 
treating  depression  will  center  not  on  reasons  or  memories,  but  on  the  recovery  of 
individual action, ultimately, through antidepressants (Ehrenberg 2010b).
What shortens the breadth of his analysis on depression as ‘the fatigue of having 
to become oneself’ is, I think (as I mentioned in chapter 7) that the capitalist economic 
context underlying the process by which values associated with autonomy are imposed, is 
left relatively unexplored. To be very brief, depression is understood primarily as mental 
rigidity,  fatigue  and  action  deficiency  within a  neo-liberal  context  wherein  the  very 
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opposite  of  these  traits  are  required  for  constant  economic  progress.  The  gap  in 
Ehrenberg’s analysis is thus, in my opinion, the fact that he is not sufficiently precise 
about how the contemporary modes of experiencing affect, and of reasoning about affect 
under  the  rule  of  action  emerge  via  the  spreading  neoliberal  idea  of  self-realization 
underpinned  by  market  principles  of  meritocracy,  self-sufficiency,  efficiency  and 
productivity.
Anders Petersen fills this theoretical gap. Building upon Ehrenberg, he maintains 
that depression’s increasing rates in contemporary society should be socially understood 
as the dark side of today’s social demands for authentic self-realization associated with 
the  emergence  of  the  new  spirit  of  capitalism  (Petersen  2009,  2011). That  is,  the 
continuing struggle of the individual to live up to norms - to be active, to explore one’s 
potentials, to be innovative, creative, always ‘on the move’, motivated, a sovereign of his 
own life (which Petersen recognizes as decisive virtues of the productive, efficient and 
profitable ideal individual of neo-liberalism) - may exhaust individuals to depression.
The argument sounds true and certainly consistent with the thesis’ views about the 
contemporary epoch. And I do think that the flourishing of depression can, to a certain 
extent, be seen exactly in this light: the lasting and continuous pressure to realize oneself 
as an authentic, flexible, creative, social, innovative, in a word, a powerful individual, 
constitutes an extreme social pressure over the individual psyche; a “… chronic stress 
factor which risks rebounding in the form of depression” (Petersen 2011, p.  7). Still, 
being the sole agent responsible by his achievements and failures, when the individual 
cannot live up to demands of “lasting and authentic self-realization” (Petersen 2011, p.7), 
personal  discontent  can  only  reflect  back  on  him.  Alone  in  its  “… inner  normative 
tribunal” (Petersen & Willig 2004, p. 348) the self may become exhausted; sentiments of 
worthlessness may follow, preparing grounds for depression.
The present study draws upon, but complements this perspective by changing the 
analytical focus from the stress-inducing effects of the imperatives of action over the self 
to the deficiency of meaningful reasons underpinning the norms governing individual 
action in conditions of the political-economic theology of neo-liberalism.
Inasmuch as ‘authenticity’ becomes a tool of the capitalist system, it lacks worth 
as a moral ideal and becomes, rather, a part of capitalist ideology. As earlier analyzed,  
when  ‘authentic  self-realization’  becomes  an  ideological  means  of  the  system’s 
legitimation,  and a  practical  tool  for  its  reproduction,  individual  action is  emptied of 
values unless those instrumental in order to keep oneself employable, honoring normative 
expectations of being competitive and profitable. Authenticity here, rather than an ideal in 
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which one may find meaning, can only incarnate on the individual’s constant endeavor to 
“… marketing  her/his  virility in  order  not  to  seem passive,  unmotivated,  indolent  or 
incompetent” (Dejours 1998, cited in Petersen & Willig 2004, p. 344). More broadly, 
‘authenticity’ also incarnates on the purported actualization of  choice and uniqueness 
through consumption and identification with artificial personal-styles disseminated by the 
media.
   In sum, if authenticity is to be analyzed as a contemporary ‘social ideal’ it has,  
so far, been so enmeshed with capitalism that, often, all it can get is a very precarious 
expression wherein  things  like choice,  autonomy,  self-realization etc.  are  not  even at 
stake.  Rather,  the  very opposite  of  these  ideals  stands  out:  behind the  cloak of  self-
fulfillment  and  freedom,  action  embodies  extremely  gregarious  behaviors  of  blind 
obedience to the imperatives of the economic system.
  Meaninglessness  becomes  therefore  part  of  the  equation  of  ‘authentic  self-
realization demands’. The actualization of one’s inner potentials, the continuous devotion 
to action is, in this format, basically valueless. Necessity and compulsion underpin action, 
not meaningful values originated in sacred ideals; it’s also a kind of action alien to the 
Nietzschean  affirmation  of  the  overman able  to  forge  life  as  a  creative  venture.  If 
Nietzsche would probably deem this form of life as a new kind of servitude, Durkheim 
would perhaps claim that this is “an ideal without grandeur” (Durkheim 1973, p. 44) 
merely utilitarian in character “… so that consequences result mechanically from the act 
of violation” (1974, p. 43). Finally, borrowing from Simmel’s ideas, we may think that 
whereas  the  enhancement  of  personal  subjectivity  and the  achievement  of  individual 
goals of performance (as promoted by contemporary ‘authentic self-realization’ demands) 
may bring the “… satisfaction of having fulfilled a demand…” (Simmel 2000, p. 60), the 
devaluation of the objective world – the disconnection from and devaluation of all things 
outside the ‘pure individual’ - may in the end drag “… one’s own personality down into a  
feeling of the same worthlessness” (Simmel 2000b, p.179).
In the individuals’ concrete lives, actions may be experienced as meaningless (and 
compulsive) when its motor is “an overbooked project calendar” (Petersen 2011, p. 17) 
performed repetitively and persistently as in ‘the relentless motion of the treadmill’ (Rosa 
2010b) while being unable to provide a deeper sense of reward and purpose. As Petersen 
himself states, referring to the unclear character of both the content and criteria behind 
self-realization  norms:  “They  possess  no  finality,  and  are  surrounded  by  an  air  of 
boundlessness” (2011, p. 11).
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Referring  again  to  Brinkmann’s  rationale,  we  might  argue  that  while  the 
normative  imperatives  of  self-realization  associated  with  the  spirit  of  capitalism may 
address the existence of causal links for behavior, it does not provide reasons for action 
(intentions expressing meaning, rooted in horizons of signification beyond the delusive 
neo-liberal ideology of an omnipotent ‘pure individual’). In other words, to the extent in 
which money has bought its way into and over the ideal of authenticity (transmuting ends 
of authentic self-realization into means of further money expansion) authenticity can be a 
‘cause’ or a fuel, but not a meaningful reason for action.
Concluding remarks
To  acknowledge the worth of  meaningfulness  in  human life  and to bring into 
question the purported freedom that the new ‘theology of the money-God’ disseminates, 
does not necessarily mean to advocate either a return of transcendence, the resumption of 
society as we once knew it, or the reinvention of ‘new totalities’ and absolute meanings.
In this study, in particular, it does not imply a call to new idols or hopes for the 
renaissance  of  old  authorities,  but  the  acknowledgement  that  limits,  social  forms, 
principles, values, heritages from the past are part of life, and that the latter cannot subsist 
in any meaningful way without the earlier.
Dufour’s analysis on the issue goes directly to the point that we want to argue 
here. He remarks that, on the one hand, an emphasis on the ontological dependence on 
social  structures  which  plays  down  issues  of  socio-political  domination  that  these 
structures may sometimes entail is partial, and dangerously conservative. On the other, to 
concentrate solely upon socio-political dominations (in defense of liberty) while being 
oblivious to the specific role of culture to the very realization of individual freedom, is 
equally mistaken (Dufour 2008, p. 156).
In other words, if we neither need, nor desire the imposition of a single, totalizing, 
rigid,  universalizing ‘sacred pole’ from wherein all  meaning originates - embodied in 
institutions which mutilate individual freedom - we still need the sentiment of sacredness 
emerging from cultural forms, values and ideals which can weight against the ‘infinite 
expanse’ of negative freedom, homogeneity (the leveling of all values) and calculability, 
all of which are greatly intensified in a world wherein money is a God. Without social 
forms, no meaningful point of reference (even as something for the individual to contest 
and  strive  against)  or  reasons  for  action  can  take  root  and  hence,  no  orientation  is 
possible.
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Thereby, even conceding the possible moral potential of individual freedom and 
authenticity as meaning-giving ideals, the pervasive contemporary view of individuals as 
grandiose  beings  in  no  need  of  guidance,  independent  of  the  world  and  its  objects, 
cultural heritages, sacred principles and ideals is found wanting. First, it is oblivious of 
the fact that there is no ‘individual’ outside society and no meaningful life uncontained by 
the mediation of cultural forms. Additionally, it risks being naively unmindful of the new 
forms of domination (often disguised as the very incarnation of freedom) which continue 
to guide and indoctrinate us while lacking the wisdom of sacred principles outside the 
nexus of cash value.
Tying together the thesis’ specific understanding of what constitutes a meaningful 
life  with  its  analysis  of  the  current  societal  conditions,  we  can  conclude  with  the 
following words.
Inasmuch as, unlike animals, human beings do not simply persist through time; 
since they are not complete and self-sufficient, which means that their specific human 
task to lead life is not resolved upon nature, humans have to transcend the ‘pure flow of 
life’ through cultural forms.
For  this  reason,  the  new transcendence  of  the  money-God –  by opposing  all 
culturally  established  values,  ideals,  institutions  and  principles  that  may  block  the 
dissemination of commodities - has been challenging the task of signifying life, leaving 
individuals emptied in forms of pseudo-autonomy disguised in the cloaks of delusive 
‘authentic self-realization’, hedonism, purported freedom and enjoyment.
Thus, a world that cripples meaningfulness – by disseminating realist, pragmatic, 
egoistic,  self-centered,  nihilistic  dogmas  that  subjugate  the  intrinsic  human  need  of 
cultural forms - is one in which  individuals risk not being able to find what matters, 
which is not only an ontological need of human beings but, also, a constitutive aspect of 
each  one’s  identity.  As  a  result,  sentiments  of  personal  worthlessness  and 
meaninglessness will tend to flourish, fueling the diffusion of depression.
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